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1.  Introduction
The 27th SUERF Colloquium in Munich in June 2008: New Trends in Asset 
Management: Exploring the Implications was already topical in the Summer 
of 2008. The subsequent dramatic events in the Autumn of 2008 made the 
presentations in Munich even more relevant to investors and bankers that want 
to understand what happens in their investment universe. In the present SUERF 
Study, we have collected a sample of outstanding colloquium contributions 
under the fitting headline: Asset Management in Volatile Markets.
In the first paper, Robert C. Merton, Professor at the Harvard Business School 
and recipient of the 1997 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, points 
out some important recent challenges to the asset management industry. 
Financial innovation has facilitated decomposition of the asset management 
business into its component parts. Modern financial technology permits 
the separation of risk exposure selection and management from physical 
investment choices, capital expenditure plans, ownership and governance of 
assets. Thus, risk can be viewed as a separate dimension of asset management 
decisions. To illustrate this point, the author applies it to the risk management 
for a whole country. Modern financial technology allows a reconciliation of 
endeavours to exploit comparative advantage and efficient diversification.
The author distinguishes between “Alpha” and “Beta” investment strategies. 
An asset manager produces Alpha when he is able to add performance per unit 
of risk over and above the performance that the client could add without help. 
Beta strategies rely on well-diversified, efficient exposures. They are much 
cheaper to implement. The problem with so-called “Alternative investments” 
such as private equity and direct real estate is that these assets have stale 
prices and do not trade very often. This biases correlation calculations and 
causes mis-measurement of systematic risk. 
Asset managers including hedge funds should be able to explain how they 
are making money. When returns reflect a risk premium, investors should 
know what kind of risk they are taking. Hedge funds are lightly regulated. 
This allows them to act as counterparties to heavily regulated financial 
institutions. 
The trend away from defined-benefit pension plans towards defined-contribution 
plans means that savers are forced to manage their pension assets without 8 Introduction
having the necessary qualifications for doing it. The author argues that financial 
institutions must intermediate and create user-friendly, easy-to-understand 
pension products.
The speaker then turned to sovereign wealth funds. An economic-risk 
balance sheet for a country makes it possible to examine how risks 
associated with all types of assets and liabilities interplay with each other. 
The uncertainty regarding the country’s productive activities should be 
taken into consideration. You cannot come up with an optimal strategy 
for asset allocation for a sovereign wealth fund outside the context of the 
country’s other assets and liabilities. 
Professor Merton recommended that sovereign wealth funds with a mandate 
to invest outside the home country should hold a whole world market 
portfolio. One advantage of this strategy is that a broad index portfolio 
minimizes political concerns. 
The benefits of aligning comparative advantage and portfolio risk 
diversification are illustrated by using the computer chip producer Taiwan as 
an example. In a swap contract, Taiwan can oblige itself to pay the return on 
the world chip market while the counterparty accepts the obligation to pay the 
return on a world portfolio. The swap contract just provides risk transfer. 
In his concluding remarks, Professor Merton finds that the financial instruments 
described open wonderful opportunities. Financial innovation changes transfer 
mechanisms, control mechanisms and risk patterns. This must be understood 
by academics, practitioners and overseers. Supervisory authorities are no 
longer able to say: “We know where all the risks are, they are here and we 
control them, and the risks can not go anywhere else.” Successful innovations 
run ahead of the infrastructure including regulation and oversight. The essential 
trade-off is between managing the mismatch structurally of innovation to 
infrastructure security, and trying to do it in an efficient way. 
In the Second paper, Otto Loistl and Stephan Zellner, Vienna University of 
Economics and Business Administration, and Martin Gartner and Christiane 
Zinner, Siemens AG, Austria look at the asset management value generating 
chain. Inspired by Treynor, they characterize the investment process as 
a three-legged stool supported equally by securities research, portfolio 
management and securities trading. According to the authors, the paradigm 
of the efficient market has been abandoned and the superiority of active 
sophisticated portfolio management is beyond any doubt. Integrated active 9 Introduction
asset management relies on three steps: Research, portfolio construction and 
strategy implementation. In the paper, they discuss the tasks that have to be 
performed at each step.
The relative value strategy is a quantitative trading strategy that aims to take 
advantage of short-term market inefficiencies. When pairs of assets tend 
to show a stationary pattern over a period of time but deviations occur, the 
asset manager should take a long position in the relatively undervalued asset 
and a short position in the relatively overvalued one. A sample of the largest 
stocks included in the DJ Stoxx 600 is pre-selected and suitable similar pairs 
of assets are determined. When a price ratio is starting to deviate from its 
“normal” behaviour, a trade should take place. The idea is that the price ratio 
follows a mean-reversion process. When the time of a portfolio adjustment 
has been identified, the next step is to determine how much to buy or sell. 
A comparison of the relative value portfolio and the DJ Stoxx 600 index 
shows superior performance of the former for the data period 2001 to 2005.
Implementation of a strategy implies transaction costs. Under a relative 
value strategy, the portfolio has to be rebalanced very often. Transaction 
costs are therefore a critical component. The authors go on to analyze 
the implementation shortfall which occurs between the time of a decision 
to revise the portfolio and the time when the revision is realized and the 
portfolio weights are adjusted. A study based on futures data documents that 
transmission via the FIX-protocol reduces the implementation shortfall. 
By integrating the individual tasks in the asset management’s chain of value 
generation there are many opportunities to generate value and increase 
a portfolio’s return. In real markets, there are a lot of arbitrage opportunities 
and integrated active asset management generates returns by exploiting these 
arbitrage opportunities. 
In the Third paper, Krzysztof Rybinski, Deputy Governor of the National Bank 
of Poland and Urszula Sowa, Economist, National Bank of Poland, analyse 
the management by central banks and sovereign wealth funds of global 
reserves. Foreign exchange reserves can be built up in order to hedge the 
country against sudden stops of trade and capital flows and against financial 
market volatility. Reserve accumulation may also reflect central bank 
interventions to prevent the currency from strengthening with implications 
for the international competitiveness of domestic firms. Since the Asian crisis 
of 1997, the precautionary motive of reserves accumulation seems to have 
dominated over other motives.10 Introduction
The authors define opportunity costs of holding ample reserves as a forgone 
growth of GDP amid too conservative central bank reserve management. 
They calculate hypothetical opportunity costs for different alternative 
investment strategies for a sample of 33 countries. The resulting opportunity 
costs are very high. Many central banks are consequently changing their 
reserve management strategies in order to enhance yield and improve risk 
management. There has been a slow but sure move towards more diversified 
portfolios (across currencies and instruments), while at the same time 
monetary policy goals and financial stability needs have remained binding 
constraints.
In the fourth paper, Peter R. Haiss and Bernhard Sammer, Vienna University 
of Economics and Business Administration, focus on the role of derivative 
markets in the financial landscape. The new financial instruments have 
opened new possibilities of risk sharing and risk diversification and 
uncovered interdependencies between the various sectors of the financial 
market in an unsuspected transparent way. Inspired by Merton and Bodie, the 
authors point out the three channels, through which derivatives may influence 
the integration of financial markets and the economic development: the 
volume channel, the efficiency channel and the risk channel. Using BIS data 
they document the impressive growth of exchange traded and OTC-traded 
derivatives. A look at the development of derivatives markets expressed in 
percentage of the GDP confirms that this financial sector has developed very 
rapidly. The rising importance of derivatives can foster a decoupling between 
monetary and financial liquidity via leveraging. Thus, there is little doubt 
that monetary policy has lost some influence on national liquidity conditions. 
Derivatives are used extensively to manage risks by companies as well as 
by asset managers. The LTCM case and the recent “Subprime-Securitization 
Crisis” have shown the sensitivity of the markets towards risk. The lesson for 
asset managers is that they have to draw more attention to risk controlling and 
transparency to better assess risks associated with derivatives. Derivatives 
have in fact a highly concentrated market structure which means that stress 
testing and analysis of counterparty risk are crucial for asset managers.
New financial instruments have undoubtedly increased the complexities of 
the international financial system. It is not evident to what extent financial 
innovation has contributed to the recent crisis. However, each of the papers in 
the present SUERF Study contributes to our understanding of what happens 
in the volatile global financial markets.
Morten Balling, Ernest Gnan and Catherine Lubochinsky13
2.  Future Trends in Asset Management: Challenges
and Observations
Presidential Introduction of Professor Robert C. Merton
by Catherine Lubochinsky
The time has come for the 2008 Marjolin Lecture and I have the privilege 
this year to introduce Robert Cox Merton, professor at Harvard Business 
School (since 1988), and not to be confused with Robert King Merton, the 
famous sociologist professor at Columbia University, his father. Not only 
was he thus introduced to the academic world in his early age but it was also 
his father who introduced him to poker and stock markets - a premonitory 
combination.
However, Robert C. Merton, more fond of cars than cards, decided to go 
to college at Columbia’s engineering school. And even more surprising, he 
published his first paper on Gulliver’s Travels in the Journal of History of 
Ideas. Fortunately for us, Robert Merton diverged into economics when he 
joined the MIT in 1967 to complete a PhD under the supervision of Paul 
Samuelson, and later became his assistant. At that time, Paul Samuelson was 
already investigating warrant pricing. One could say that’s how it all began 
for Robert - the (market) timing was right!
He held his first position at MIT in the Sloan School of Management, where 
he became a Professor and stayed for 18 years, enjoying colleagues such as 
Modigliani, Cox, Black and Scholes. His first fields of research were dynamic 
models of optimal lifetime consumption, portfolio selection, equity asset 
pricing and contingent claim pricing. During that period, he published what 
are certainly the most-read papers in finance around the world:
Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model •   (Econometrica 1973)
Theory of Rational Option Pricing •   (Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management 1973)
On the Pricing of Corporate Debt •   (Journal of Finance 1974), which 
paper definitely contributed to the Nobel Prize he was co-awarded (with 
Scholes) in 1997.14 Future Trends in Asset Management
Black and Scholes had published their paper on the Pricing of Corporate Liabilities 
in 1973 (Journal of Political Economy). Quasi-simultaneously, Robert Merton 
showed in this 1974 paper that the dynamic trading strategy prescribed by Black 
and Scholes to offset the risk exposure of an option would provide a perfect 
hedge in the limit of continuous trading. That is, if one could trade continuously 
without (transaction) cost, one could exactly replicate the option payoffs. This 
was thus an alternative proof of the pricing technology. This proof in finance is 
as important as the discovery of the structure of DNA in biochemistry.
But Robert Merton is a man of two lives: besides being an academic, he has 
always been a practitioner. Over the last 30 years he has been into finance 
practice. By the end of the 1970’s, his research was about applications of 
his models to social security, pension funds, deposit insurance, corporate 
investment decisions etc. and he became, not surprisingly, consultant with 
the Chicago Board Option Exchange. In 1976, with Scholes, he set up the 
first mutual fund with downside protection (well before the put insurance 
products developed in the 1980’s or floor products in the 1990’s). He then 
spent some time as a top advisor to Salomon Brothers, where Scholes joined 
him, and where they met the co-founder of what was to be the famous hedge 
fund LTCM (1994). Robert C. Merton is currently Resident Scientist at 
Dimensional Fund Advisors.
One could go on for another couple of hours trying to summarize all of 
Robert’s achievements, but I think the SUERF participants are more eager 
to listen to him. So, Robert, the “floor” is yours to tell us about the “Future 
Trends in Asset Management”.
1. Introduction
Thank you very much for those remarks. If I was a truly Rational Man I would 
say ‘Thank you!’ and sit down because it can only go one way following that 
introduction. I would first of all like to thank SUERF for inviting me to deliver 
this year’s Marjolin Lecture. I do not intend to discuss the current crisis and 
its immediate interplays with asset management, not because such a topic is 
not interesting, but because it would be too interesting, and we would not 
be able to cover any other topic. Fortunately this topic has been excellently 15 Introduction
summarized this morning, having been thoroughly researched and discussed 
during this Colloquium. Instead, I will address the subject of “Future Trends 
in Asset Management: Challenges and Observations”.
Over the last three decades the financial system has changed enormously, thanks 
in no small part to advances in computer technology, telecommunications and, 
indeed, finance science. In turn, the extraordinary financial innovation that 
practitioners have brought to bear over this period of time has been shaped 
greatly by academic financial research, with a considerable impact on all of 
us, as producers, users and overseers of the system. Nowhere has this been 
more apparent than in the development of derivative securities technologies, 
including futures contracts, options and more complex option contracts. 
I plan to divide my remarks today into three parts.
First, I wish to address the recent trends in the asset management industry 
for the manufacturing or production of asset management services. I will 
discuss the bifurcation that has taken place with the decomposition of 
the asset management business into component parts as well as touching 
upon the implications of this bifurcation for recombining this business for 
institutional and retail clients. Second, I will discuss sovereign-wealth funds 
with a brief case study of this large and rapidly growing sector, in particular 
the execution of sovereign wealth funds, reserves and debt management, 
which can all be decentralized. I will raise the issue of whether considering 
an objective function (from which the optimum policies for each are derived) 
reflects an integrated, generalized asset/liability-management perspective 
for overall country risk exposures forms an appropriate way to address this 
particular asset management activity. Third, I will examine risk transfers vs. 
capital needs and capital flows. Of course, risk allocation forms the essence 
of asset management. Modern financial technology permits the separation of 
risk exposure selection and management from physical investment choices, 
capital expenditure plans, ownership and governance of assets. It is possible 
to radically change risk exposures without affecting capital, trade or income 
flows or even the traditional balance sheet. Thus, risk can be viewed as 
a separate dimension of management decisions. 
As we will see, the tools that are most efficient for risk transfers are not 
necessarily those that are used for managing capital flows, and to illustrate 
this point I will apply this to the risk management for a whole country with 
the explicit idea in mind of exploring the trade-off between pursuing the two 
well-known economic dictums: on the one hand we are instructed to pursue 
our comparative advantage - whether as an individual, a firm, an institution 16 Introduction
or a whole country – whilst on the other hand we are told to diversify 
efficiently. These two dictums conflict with one another, since the pursuance 
of comparative advantage clearly means focusing on a few, typically 
highly-related, activities, whilst diversification advocates investing in many 
different asset classes, preferably ones that are unrelated to one another. 
I will illustrate how modern financial technology allows the reconciliation 
of those two dictums. From the perspective of potential gains as a result of 
efficient asset management for economic growth, in particular in developing 
economies, as well as the challenges we have to deal with, we are faced with 
complexities and increasing demands with regard to required knowledge. 
Overseers and senior managers of producers in particular find themselves 
having to address an ever more complex set of situations. In my title, I have 
deliberately chosen to use the word “observations”, since any single topic of 
the three I will address could easily fill an entire lecture. As such it will only 
be possible to allude to certain aspects of points of each topic, so each section 
should be considered to be a taster menu, rather than forming any definitive 
discussion on such topics.
2.  Recent trends in the asset management industry for 
the manufacturing or production of asset management 
services
Last night, we heard from the Senior Partner of Pioneer Investments about many 
of the issues of trends in asset management from a practitioner’s perspective. 
If we examine how asset management has been changing, the principal change 
has been towards a “barbell” type of investment strategy. Two extremes have 
been responsible for the largest absolute growth within asset management. 
The first extreme is one of very efficient risk exposures - so-called “Beta” 
exposures. Such Beta exposures are good for efficient diversification, as is the 
case in such asset management vehicles as index funds, ETFs, and derivatives 
among others. It has proven to be a huge area of growth in producing Beta 
in a scalable and efficient low-cost form. This pure exposure is balanced out 
by another extreme at the other end of the barbell, which focuses on pure 
performance, – so-called “Alpha”, where superior performance, beyond that 17 Manufacturing or production of asset management services
which can be obtained from core but passive strategies is sought. Typically 
vehicles for the production of Alpha are so-called alternative assets, such as 
private equity, hedge funds, direct real estate investments and almost any 
other kind of niche area, where it is possible to generate excess returns. Both 
of these extremes have proven to be substantial growth areas, at nil expense 
in relative terms. 
Traditional long-only managers have combined Alpha and Beta together 
offering exposures to important assets classes, and promising superior 
performance in these classes. However, many of the star managers, who had 
hitherto been traditionally found in long-only shops, have now left that sector 
to become part of these alternatives. Pressure has therefore been place on this 
middle group, and in some ways this process is catching up with academic 
theory. It has always been postulated that one could logically and perhaps 
efficiently separate those functions and unbundle them and provide open 
architectures for implementing them, and this appears to the way that things 
are heading.
The question arises, therefore, as to the implications of such barbell investment 
strategies? Primarily, it has become apparent that institutions are moving 
more towards alternative investments that they were in the past. I would 
like to point out to you, however, that even if institutions were adopting the 
same portfolio as they had done in past, in order to achieve what they had 
achieved in the past, such a step would nevertheless be necessary. Why? 
Because, as I have already alluded to, since many of the successful managers 
that they were using before in the long-only shops have left to set up hedge 
funds and other alternatives. Effectively, to remain with these managers, they 
have therefore had to pursue alternative asset classes. Therefore, making that 
forecast does not necessarily suggest that changing towards the alternatives 
will imply really different patterns of returns for institutions, although 
I believe that this will be the case in practice.
Secondly, this bifurcation also creates much greater transparencies of 
strategies and sources of value added. Producers of pure Alpha, and by this 
I mean the abstract extreme, have no place to hide and are therefore only able 
to reply, “Here is my extra return and all the systematic risks expected have 
been taken out”. On the other hand, producers of pure Alpha can not proffer 
statements like, “We did well but the market was down, so what can I say?” 
With regard to the aspect of fees, as you are all aware, long-only management 
fees are very different in terms of the percentage of assets than management 18 Manufacturing or production of asset management services
fees for alternative asset classes. For hedge funds, there is an apparent 
standard for fees of “2 and 20” - a management fee of 2% of net added value 
(NAV) per annum and a performance fee of 20% of the fund’s up side or 
profit. However in an actively managed portfolio, the management fee is 
quoted in basis points, whether it is 75 or 100 or even more basis points; 
however the management fees are nothing like the percentages that apply for 
hedge funds. 
However, the question then arises of which type of fund management 
produces the more costly Alpha? It is apparent that this can be measured 
very simply. For example, for a fund with a “2 and 20” fee structure, it is 
possible to express the value of the fees as a traditional annual percentage of 
assets beforehand. This is possible because the performance part of the fee 
is nothing more complex than a call option, and call options can be valued, 
so this when added to the 2% management fee gives us a composite simple 
percentage of assets as an annual management fee. If this is applied for 
a typical fund, e.g. one that has a similar variance or volatility to the market 
as a whole, the figure that emerged with “2 and 20” management fees, for 
pure alpha, i.e. for a provider who is giving 100% of every Dollar or Euro 
invested in the fund to alpha, then it corresponds to about 2.8% per year of 
annual management fee. If, however, the manager is producing alpha on only 
half your invested capital, with the other half producing beta, which costs 
almost nothing to produce - e.g. an amount of practically zero – say as low 
as 2–4 b.p. the difference is very apparent. In some instances people actually 
have a negative management fee, i.e. the fund manager actually pays the 
investor 2 b.p. to let them index for you, although this again is an extreme. 
In the event that the split between alpha and beta is 50:50, then the 2.8% you 
are paying for the alpha becomes 5.6%. It can be compared easily to buying 
liquid detergent for your washing machine from the supermarket and having 
two choices – either the large bottle, which is mostly water, or the small one, 
which is concentrated. If you buy the large bottle, which appears to be the 
better bargain, you are mostly paying for water, which most of the time costs 
practically nothing. This is also the case in investment management. The only 
way that you can compare is to decompose, even with a traditional manager. 
In a more extreme case, if 20% of the portfolio is dedicated to producing pure 
alpha and 80% of the portfolio is dedicated to producing beta or “passives”, 
the effective rate that you are paying for alpha is a management fee of 
almost 15%. Therefore, the fee structure can be comparatively quite different 
depending on the actual mix of alpha and beta. The barbell structure makes 
this transparent – and much more transparent than in the past, and this has 
clear implications for the industry.19 Manufacturing or production of asset management services
The second result of separating alpha from beta that occurs is that there is 
an acceleration of the ongoing process of alpha being “turned into” beta. 
What does that mean? Before answering this question, I wish to define what 
exactly I mean by alpha in my remarks. By alpha, I mean that any time you 
can add performance over and above the performance that the client could 
add without you, you are adding alpha. This may be a little different from 
some definitions but I think it is the practical definition of alpha. Put in other 
terms, if I can show you that I can do something better for you than you can 
do at the moment then there is an added value of performance. But, if the way 
that I do that is something that could be done systematically and at low cost, 
then as soon as this is recognized, even though the entity that is getting the 
alpha is getting the benefit, the fund manager will no longer be able to earn 
fees of a similar magnitude of “2 and 20”, but will earn fees that are much 
closer to fees for providing beta. To give you a couple of concrete examples 
of what I mean by this, there is some evidence that small cap stocks have 
an incremental risk premium over large cap stocks and that so-called value 
stocks have an incremental risk premium over growth stocks. If that is true 
and one tilts the portfolio relative to a base portfolio in the passive market 
towards holding more small cap stocks and more value stocks, then if this 
is the case, you should be able to realize a higher performance per unit risk 
than you would with the passive strategy – and that would be alpha. Some 
well-known hedge funds follow precisely that strategy. However, once this 
approach becomes understood in the market place, then the other part of the 
business - the Beta business - will be able to create small cap vs. large cap, 
value vs. growth, and they would be able to do this at a very low cost. At that 
point, the cost structure will then change away from the high management 
fees for delivering alpha, and that is the sense in which it migrates to beta. The 
speed at which this is happening is accelerating. Like many other businesses 
it has become much more competitive, and is much more difficult now to 
sustain a margin in that environment.
Third, you will witness expansion on the beta side in the following sense: 
new asset classes, among these asset classes are climate, longevity risk being 
traded, liquidity, pre-programmed liquidity, and owner-occupied real estate. 
The concept of owner-occupied real estate as an investor asset class sounds 
strange – after all, how can you get investment exposure, if there are other 
people who live in and own such real estate? It is possible though. As these 
classes expand, we see the Beta side does too. So what is the implication of 
this bifurcation in terms of what the institutions now have a greater need for 
– namely the assembler function.20 Manufacturing or production of asset management services
Chart 1: Stages of Investment Production Process for Given Objective Function
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Figure 1 shows a schematic of money or asset management. It can be 
broken into three pieces. On the far left hand side is the starting point – the 
well-diversified, efficient, so-called Beta exposures, passive assets. There may 
also be macro-market timing across those classes. This forms the first part of 
the activity. Additionally, as shown in the bottom box on the left hand side, 
there is the so-called Alpha, from all the specialized areas from which you can 
pick stocks or other misvalued assets. These three components then have to be 
optimally mixed together to come up with the optimal combination of risky 
assets, which is then mixed with the risk-free asset in order to modulate risk. 
Finally, you come up with your optimal portfolio, and then if you choose to, 
you can actually bend and twist and shake that portfolio into different types of 
payoffs. One of the fastest growing areas is floor products, where a minimum 
return is placed on the optimal portfolio, but where upside is retained. Finally 
you end up with the efficient form of the product. In the traditional version 
of this process, everything that is listed in the three boxes on the left hand 
side of the figure is done by one entity (or by a small group of entities), and 
the client does not really have to do very much, other than to indicate the 
exposures it wants. However, it has now become a specialized process with 21 Manufacturing or production of asset management services
many different portfolio-component providers and someone has to assemble 
all these parts for this institution. One of the implications for this, in terms of 
efficiency, is ensuring that you have integrated and consistent risk measures 
between alternatives and traditional asset classes. Over the last 25 or 30 years 
there has been a lot learned and developed in performance measurement for 
equities, debt, small caps, and large caps – the traditional asset classes. While 
risk measures for these asset classes are hardly perfect, a lot of experience has 
been gained about that kind of performance measurement. 
The problem with alternatives emerges if you take those same performance 
tools and attempt to simply apply them to alternatives – you are going to get 
a mess as they can not be applied well. For example, in any private equity 
or direct real estate, a feature of those assets, even though they quote their 
assets once a month or once a quarter, is that they have stale prices, and do not 
trade very often. Companies in a private equity portfolio sometimes do not 
get re-priced for years. Now the effect of that is that if you put the historical 
returns into a standard optimizer, then they look less far less correlated with 
traditional assets than they actually are. That biases the results to make it look 
like that segment is outperforming and is a much better diversifier than in 
reality. It is possible to correct this bias, but to do so of course requires you 
to actually make the correction. If you just use the traditional measurement 
tools, you will get a very large, order-one effects that could be as much as 
a 1000 b.p. of apparent alpha originating solely from the mismeasurement 
of the systematic risk from stale pricing. In hedge funds, even ones with 
liquid assets which do not have this problem, the hedge funds have dynamic 
strategies which systematically change their risks through time, unlike the 
traditional classes which have reasonably stable risk characteristics. So for 
example, relative-value funds tend to have the feature of increasing their 
risk when they go down, thus acting like contrarians. So, if this non-linearity 
arising from these changes is not accounted for, once again there is a biased 
measure of the risk and there is then an overstatement of the performance 
followed of course by a correction. 
Another issue that was raised in a different context earlier this morning, was 
that one ought to know where the extra returns are coming from. If a risk 
manager is making lots of money, it is also a good thing for the risk manager 
to be able to say how they are making money. 
So part of this assembler process that has been forced onto the institutions 
as a result of the bifurcation is to understand where their returns are coming 
from. For example, in hedge funds, there are three systematic sources from 22 Manufacturing or production of asset management services
where I think returns could be coming from - whether they actually do or 
not is of course an empirical issue. One source is that they are just taking 
systematic market risk, and that they aren’t pure performance players, and 
they are exposed to the same risks that equities are, regardless of whether 
they are trying to be exposed to them or not. This may seem rather prosaic 
but it is true.
Second, as a well-done study by a colleague of mine showed, in which there 
was an analysis of returns for every hedge fund asset class from convertible 
bonds, long and short equity, through to wealth, there is the systematic factor 
for at least since 1994 to 2004–5 that seems to explain a large part of the 
excess returns as usually measured, known as liquidity-event risk. A single 
variable needs to be placed in the returns which identifies when a liquidity 
event, such as the one we experienced in Summer 2007, occurs. I do not 
refer to what has happened subsequently during the credit crisis, as that is 
a different matter, but when you have a seizing-up in the markets regardless of 
size, then that risk seems to be one that all classes of hedge funds are exposed 
to, and all these classes take that risk. Now to a certain extent there is a risk 
premium paid for taking that risk, but you do not realize it, and that could be 
a systematic source of return.
The last one, which might be very important for overseers to recognize, is that 
I believe hedge funds, even if managers do not think of it this way, perform 
a very important role in dealing with the global institutional rigidities that we 
see. We have a global financial system and yet as we all know we have individual 
nation-state systems that do not match up in regulatory terms, which on the 
whole act a bit like a speed limit sign, in that they are designed to approximate 
the best conditions, but clearly at times they create an unintended negative kind 
of restriction for various types of institutions. This is more likely to occur, the 
more global and more complex the system becomes. The role here of hedge 
funds is that they can intermediate for the intermediaries. However, they do 
not intermediate the way a banker intermediates - i.e. on a one-on-one basis, 
facing the clients. They intermediate through markets. The common factor for 
all hedge funds, as far as I know, since they do everything in investing, is that 
they are lightly regulated. That is the only common factor I can really come up 
with. If you have someone who is regulated in the same way as the institutions 
who are up against institutional rigidities, they cannot be an intermediary, as 
they face exactly the same rigidity. So it becomes necessary for there to be an 
alternative way, so that that there are some institutions that are not regulated in 
the same way, thereby allowing them to be on the other side of the transaction, 
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role of service shock absorbers for the complex realities of all the systems that 
are interacting and are writing a fixed set of rules. This is not meant to be seen 
as a criticism of the system, it is just a structural description that when fixed 
rules are written, they do not work well all the time, and sometimes there can 
be unintended consequences. If you able to have an unregulated entity that 
can form the other side of the transaction, then it is possible and they can 
help you. One of the key reasons why hedge funds are making money is not 
because they are smarter, faster, or have better models, but is in fact because 
they are providing a service, an intermediation service, a risk transfer service, 
particularly in the environment I have mentioned, which would be one way of 
trying to understand where these extra returns, if any, are coming from.
I have hitherto described the implications of the bifurcation for institutions, 
but there are also implications on households, as has been alluded to by the 
practitioner’s view of asset management. One of the big visible trends around 
focuses on the retirement part of the life cycle and the oft-quoted metaphor is 
of a three-legged stool approach for retirement, with the respective legs of the 
stool being personal savings, the government/social security type schemes, 
and an employer or equivalent institutional accounts. For the most part, the 
corporate or institutional provisions of the three-legged stool have taken the 
form of defined-benefit plans, or at least this has historically been the case. 
As you are all aware that has changed radically. In the US and the UK and 
many other parts of the world, such defined-benefit plans are disappearing, 
although they still contain approximately USD 3 trillion as well as asset tools, 
so managers of such funds are unlikely to go out of business for a while. For 
people worried about their retirement provision, however, such defined-benefit 
plans are no longer a viable prospect. What has happened is that by substitution 
the defined-contribution plans have come in, which I happen to think they are 
not the answer, but I would have to save any further elaboration for another 
day’s discussion. A next generation does exist, but I do not wish to comment 
upon this. But what is the consequence of this trend? Suddenly professors, 
brain surgeons or auto assembly line workers are now confronted with the 
task of having to figure out how to allocate their assets in order to be able to 
enjoy an adequate standard of living in retirement, which is often decades into 
the future, and which often lasts for decades after retirement, and which is 
a very daunting complex problem - even for professors - to try to address. The 
idea that brain surgeons and professors or auto assembly line workers can do 
that in an effective way, even with the benefit of all their education, is about 
as likely as me being able to make my own decisions on surgery. Imagine how 
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to go under from the anesthetic and my surgeon asks me whether I would like 
12 or 17 sutures. I would not know.
However, this dilemma is one with which we are confronted with the 
defined-contribution plan. In this instance, the bifurcation confronts households 
with decisions they have never had to make in the past, ones which they are 
unable to make in the present, and ones which, even with education, I do not 
think they will be able to make in the future. The answer to that is going to 
be a recombination coming back, we are going to have to use intermediation 
again and create user-friendly, easy-to-understand products. To have millions 
of people go through their retirement being poor can not be viewed as an 
acceptable long-term equilibrium. It is one matter if you lose money and are 
unable to afford to have a second home or second car or whatever, but for the 
general population's retirement that does not make sense. This is currently 
a very big trend which I foresee happening in asset management and we have 
that reversal going through that.
3. Sovereign  Wealth  Funds
The second main topic that I wish to address is that of sovereign wealth funds. 
With regard to sovereign wealth funds, I really wish to make three points. 
I think we are all aware that sovereign wealth funds are an expanding area. 
Currently sovereign wealth funds are worth about USD 3 trillion and are 
growing fast.
Firstly I would like to address the objective function of sovereign wealth 
funds. In this morning’s plenary session it was mentioned that depending 
on which country you are in, there exist sovereign wealth funds, pension 
funds, stabilization funds, savings funds or sector funds. Rather than focusing 
upon all these definitions, I would prefer to look at the balance sheet for the 
government, representing a particular country.25 Sovereign Wealth Funds
Table 1: Government Economic Risk Balance Sheet (For China in this instance) 
Assets
RMB bn

















 Sovereign  Wealth  Fund TBD
  Industry and Transportation Fund TBD
  Culture and Education Fund TBD
  Social Security Fund TBD
 Agriculture Fund TBD
 Housing  Accumulation  Fund TBD
INFRASTRUCTURE TBD
CASH 1.7




NON-BANK STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES TBD
DEPOSITS 1021.1
OTHER ASSETS TBD
TOTAL 13657.9+TBD26 Sovereign Wealth Funds
Liabilities
RMB bn
Present Value of Non Discretionary Expenses on:
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 901.9




 Industry  and  Transportation TBD
  Culture and Education TBD
 Social  Security TBD
 Agriculture TBD
 Housing  Accumulation TBD
 Commerce  and  Trade TBD




 Local  Currency 285.6
 Foreign  Currency TBD
CENTRAL BANK BILLS TBD
BANK RESERVES 651.7
Contingent Claims (Implicit Guarantees)
GUARANTEES TO BANKS AND NON-BANKS TBD
GUARANTEES ON RETIREMENT INCOME TBD
GUARANTEES ON SOCIAL WELFARE TBD
General Balance
(Economic Assets in excess of Economic Liabilities)
9586.7 +TBD
TOTAL 13657.9+TBD
Sources:   State Administration of Taxation, Tax Income Statistics; The People’s Bank of China, Balance 
Sheet of Monetary Authority; Ministry of Finance, 2006 State Fiscal Income/Expense Final 
Account
What we are trying to achieve, and this could be applied to any country, is 
to draw up a balance sheet where all the assets of the government are listed. 27 Sovereign Wealth Funds
This is also done for other reasons, e.g. for fiscal policy we try to assess the 
valuation for the various taxes and present value of those tax assets, as well as 
values for cash and currency reserves, monetary gold, state-owned banks, etc. 
Additionally we also include investments, like sovereign wealth funds, the 
industry and transportation fund, culture and education fund, social security 
fund, - i.e. all the funds that a country might have. The right hand column of 
the table shows the present value of non-discretionary expenditures, the ones 
that you will not skip even if you cannot pay your debts. Then you have the 
various monetary bases. Here I have lumped the Central Bank balance sheet 
together with the government balance sheet including Bank Reserves, as well 
as aggregating accounts and the various contingent claims, (i.e., guarantees 
to banks and non-banks, retirement and social welfare). At the bottom of the 
table there is then a general balance that is available, which is like the equity 
of that sector of the economy. If you are trying to manage the risk in any 
meaningful way, and that is certainly a key role of sovereign wealth funds, 
which whilst being a source of savings it should be remembered that asset 
management, when applied, largely revolves about how you allocate the 
resources you save across different risks. It therefore, does not make sense to 
treat the sovereign wealth fund as if it is a stand-alone entity, when you are 
trying to decide what the optimal objective function is. The only thing that 
makes sense, in that instance, is to do a sort of asset/liability management for 
that whole balance sheet, and to then examine how do these risks interplay 
with all the other risks and the liabilities, and then decided upon what is 
optimal for the sovereign wealth fund in terms of its objective function, given 
all these characteristics. This can be done, or is certainly as doable as the 
naïve approach of treating the sovereign wealth fund as a stand-alone, and it 
really defines risk in an appropriate manner. It also allows currency reserves 
to be run by the monetary authority separately, which also happens to be very 
practical, and debt management can also be handled separately, although it is 
essential that there is a rationalization of the risks somewhere along the line, 
not to act as a constraint on the behavior of the individual players, but rather 
to ensure ultimately, that there is the right risk return characterization for what 
matters to the government.
I would submit to you, that one of the advantages to this approach is that it 
does not matter what the sovereign wealth fund is defined to do. It falls into 
its characteristics when put together with all the other assets - a point I will 
return to - when talking about it in a different context. Certainly one of the 
roles that the fund can serve, besides simply saving intergenerationally, which 
in a certain world it will, e.g., by putting money in bonds, where it does not 
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country. In China, for example, China Investment Corporation (CIC) was 
specifically set up for that purpose, and the reason for doing so can be seen 
on the risk list – as the tax revenues listed are risky. And what is the risk 
related to? One thing that is however certain, is what the country’s productive 
activities are. So clearly if you know from diversification that if you have 
a very heavy domestic investment, and let us understand that computer chips 
in Taiwan form a large part of your industry, then you do not want to be 
investing in computer chips in your sovereign wealth fund, since you already 
have exposure to this, whereas if you are, for example’s sake, Chile and 
have thriving copper and forestry industries, but no computer chips, you will 
want to. That is just a simple  illustration that you cannot come up with an 
optimal strategy for asset allocation within a sovereign wealth fund without 
the context of other government assets and liabilities. In China’s case it is 
trying to address the asset bubble, which has been addressed at least in part in 
the last six months with the halving of the stock market, but these things still 
come and go, and there are ways to deal with them. Now, as a case in point of 
policy, not wishing to be critical, as an outsider I would have to say that I am 
very confused by the policy pursued by CIC. I understand its mandate is to 
invest outside the country and what it is doing is supposed to be representative 
of the proof-of-concept to the ruling powers. Why then, when starting out, 
did CIC begin by investing in individual deals. I quote the example of its 
investment in Blackstone Group, which, whilst it happens to have gone down 
by 30%. Had it gone up by 30% it was still not the correct thing to do. My 
recommendation, for all sovereign wealth funds, but particularly for the ones 
that are getting started, would be, if their mandate is to invest outside the 
country, their core position, right to begin with, should be to hold a whole 
world market portfolio ex their own country's securities, which consists 
of a highly diversified passive set of assets. I say this not because I do not 
believe in active management, but because one starts with the core.
Returning to figure 1, every optimal actively managed portfolio strategy 
always involves significant allocations to passive assets. It is never based 
purely on alpha assets. So you are going to need to have passive assets. 
Second, it is possible to put trillions of dollars to work very quickly with 
almost no market impact, let alone needing to enter into individual deals. 
You are then not under the pressure that China has found itself under, of 
having to go out and try to find outside partners in a rush and to then put 
this money to work without a coherent strategy – the results of which, I am 
sure you can imagine will be to overpay – not that I mean this disrespectfully 
to those people involved in the industry – I, too, am a part of it. However, 
when someone with a huge amount of resources is in a hurry to invest a lot 29 Sovereign Wealth Funds
of money, and they admit that they do not know what they are doing outside 
the country, then they are unlikely to end up in deals that really are the best 
deal for them. There are other benefits for investing in a whole world market 
portfolio. Such an investment is scalable and, reversible, to a far greater extent 
than pursuing any of the active strategies, and from a political point of view 
it is a non-entity in terms of attracting political attention. I realize that I have 
barely touched upon the negative political aspects that have been going on in 
relation to sovereign wealth funds and their exercising too much power. Such 
aspects disappear with a broad index strategy. Once they have also established 
that they can take resources out at their pleasure to do the active parts. For 
this reason, I am, therefore, very confounded why this advice has neither been 
given and nor been followed, but there remains plenty to be done of order-one 
importance to help to ensure that development and to move forward.30
4.  The Difference between Risk Transfer and Capital Flow
Continuing on from my previous example, I would once again like to use 
Taiwan as an example. Suppose that you represent Taiwan and suppose that, to 
make it simple, its sole industry were computer chips, which is a comparative 
advantage for Taiwan. One of the consequences of this being the case, is that 
if you have normal investments in Taiwan and you do nothing about it, you 
are exposed to a very, very concentrated risk, namely an exposure to the world 
chip market, which Taiwan does not control, and which anyone is able to 
invest in, and yet as a result of this it has a very undiversified risk exposure 
as a country. Now it is clear, that while computer chips form a comparative 
advantage for Taiwan, bearing the world’s chip risk does not form part of the 
positive value creation from Taiwan’s exposure, because it is possible for 
anyone to do that. It is what we call a zero net present value type risk, with 
a fair return which anybody can get. It is certainly not necessary or desirable 
for Taiwan to take the whole world chip risk.
The question, therefore, arises as to what Taiwan can do to diversify, while 
still maintaining its comparative advantage? In the old days, the country 
would have had an industrial policy that would start to develop another 
industry - such as a forestry industry or an oil-based industry or an industry 
which reflected just what is needed in the world. But what could a country 
like Taiwan do instead today? 
I would suggest that Taiwan does the following thing, as shown in figure 2 
above. Taiwan enters into a swap contract in the form of a total-return swap 
contract. The swap contract has two parties and basically based on a certain 
notional amount of the size of the actual investment, they swap returns with 
each other on two different asset classes. This can be done with any two 
assets and since the returns of any two assets are being swapped, and you 
are just exchanging returns applied to the same investment base, there is no 
investment cost involved for the swap in question – even for the transaction, 
as it is a pure exchange of returns and such contracts have initial zero value. 
No cash flow or investment are required, it is just an exchange. Every futures 
contract is effectively also the same, as there is no investment in a futures 
contract either.31 The Difference between Risk Transfer and Capital Flow
Figure 2: Separating Risk Exposures from Cash Investments, Governance
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In this instance, suppose that Taiwan put a notional USD 10 billion into 
a contract which states that it will pay the return on the world chip market, 32 The Difference between Risk Transfer and Capital Flow
which will be measured by putting a portfolio together of stocks in Intel, 
AMD and all the other companies in the chip industry, something which is 
done all the time, and that portfolio is monitored and its total return-including 
dividends and capital gains or losses – is examined. Whatever that total 
return is, is multiplied by USD 10 billion each year. This would be what 
Taiwan must pay to the other party. What does Taiwan get in return for that? 
Suppose Taiwan gets back the return on a world portfolio, i.e. one based on 
all industries, which in theory is the best diversified portfolio, at least until 
we are able to go to Venus, or Mars. So, Taiwan in this instance would get 
back the return on the world portfolio, multiplied by USD 10 billion. In other 
words, we see a swap on return, the world chip returns in exchange for world 
diversified portfolio returns.
The economics of this swap contract for Taiwan would be as follows. 
Previously, Taiwan’s returns from the chip returns were made up of two parts. 
Part of Taiwan’s chip returns, which includes the world market, meaning that 
when chips are doing well for the world, then it is also good for Taiwan’s chip 
industry. In contrast, when chips are not doing well in the world, it is also 
bad for Taiwan. In addition, because Taiwan has its own industry, it has an 
additional return, which is Taiwan-specific, which is its alpha. We hope that 
this additional expected return is positive so that Taiwan has a comparative 
advantage, as well as there being another error term, which relates to 
events like there being a strike in Taiwan, which affects Taiwanese chip 
manufacturing, but not chip manufacturing in the rest of the world. So Taiwan 
is getting world chip returns plus alpha for comparative advantage, plus the 
residual for the local risk. World chip represents a big part of the total risk. 
This swap has kept the alpha, and the local risk with Taiwan, but has removed 
world chip risk by instead putting the risk in world diversified risk.
With a single contract, we have transformed the core risk of Taiwan, or in this case, 
at least USD 10 billion of risk, with this risk changing from being concentrated 
in one industry to diversifying it into the best diversified performance in the 
world, while retaining the comparative advantage and the local issues that the 
country controls, 100% for Taiwanese. This has been achieved with a single 
contract, which it is possible to execute in large size at a low cost and which can 
be also reversed if you don’t like it. The swap contract is very non-invasive and 
offers a whole range of other features too, although the feature I am particularly 
trying to highlight in this instance is that of the risk transfer. No money has 
been taken, there have been no capital flows or trade, just a pure risk exchange. 
Some people might believe that there is an investment flow going in and an 
investment flow going out, but if all you want to do is a simple risk transfer, 33 The Difference between Risk Transfer and Capital Flow
then it would be very inefficient to have Taiwanese sell shares in Taiwanese 
companies to foreigners, and then have foreigners and the Taiwanese go and 
buy foreign shares and to have the investment flow come back. Anyone trying 
to develop smaller countries will know that there is no coordination of those 
two capital flows at a later stage, whereby one country’s activities start to take 
off, while the other country’s do not. At that point you get the kind of disruption 
which leads to people calling for capital controls. By doing it using the swap 
contract instead, you have married the two investments as an exchange, so 
you never have a mismatch of the capital flows involved and that is why there 
are no capital flows. Simple risk transfer does not, therefore, provide any core 
investment for Taiwan, but instead just provides risk transfer or risk reallocation. 
In this way, derivatives are very much more efficient than the cash market in 
terms of risk reallocation - both from an overseer’s point of view, as well as in 
terms of efficiency of costs and everything else. There is a built-in coordination 
between the implied flows and the two directions. Of course, if capital needs to 
flow in a country, this won’t directly give you any new capital, so it is necessary 
to use the right tool.
Box 1: Relative Advantages of Country Swaps for Diversifying Risk
•    Minimizes Moral Hazard of Expropriation or Repudiation
•    Locals perform industrial governance, trading in shares in local market, receive 
benefits/losses of local-country-specific component of industry returns, thus avoids 
political risk of “selling off the crown jewels of the country”
•    Credit Risk: no principal amounts at risk; set frequency of payments (0.25, 0.5, 
1 years); “right-way” contract [pay when the country is better able]; potential for 
credit guarantee and/or two-way-market-to-market collateral
•    Policy is non-invasive: doesn’t require change in employment patterns and behavior, 
changes in industrial structure or changes in financial system design
•    Policy is reversible by simply entering into an off-setting swap
•    Robust with respect to local financial system design: works well with capital controls, 
pay-as-you-go pension system, or no local stock market at all
•    How to measure country risk: Patterned after BIS model for banks
•    Potential Gains: From 1972–2001, a gain of 600+ b.p. in average return for same 
risk level by efficient diversification
•    Global political question: In the future if all countries had economic risks that were 
nearly perfectly correlated with the World Market Portfolio, then how might that affect 
global political behavior?
The above box shows the advantages of this method, although it is not 
the only way of going about matters. Let us, however, consider what this 
simple contract has achieved. It has moved Taiwan in principal from having 
a concentrated risk in one industry to a world-diversified risk while retaining 
its comparative advantage, and its workers still do exactly the same thing, 34 The Difference between Risk Transfer and Capital Flow
it is non-disruptive and that’s considering all kinds of activity related to it. 
Furthermore, this size of feature also allows you to separate governance, 
liquidity and things like zero net value present risk. Some people may wonder 
why I mention governance. Rightly, or wrongly, many countries are worried 
about having foreign ownership of their shares and their industries. Some 
countries even place in some restrictions in what their pension and other 
funds invest in. This is done, not because they want to force concentrated 
investment, but because they want to ensure that governance also remains 
within the country. They also may want the cash that is raised by local 
industries for the pension fund to go into local industries as investment for 
the workers – which are both reasonable policies, and this also happens to be 
the case of Taiwan in this instance. All Taiwan shares can be 100% owned by 
Taiwanese, and they could also be in pension funds in Taiwan - as the pension 
funds bought the shares, and thus the local risk is being borne locally. What 
has also been done is to strip out the part of the risk which Taiwan has no 
control over and to substitute a much better risk for term pattern. The potential 
benefits for countries are clear, particularly for smaller countries, which by 
their nature have to be more concentrated with their pursued comparative 
advantages, as well as for developing countries. This technical risk-transfer 
tool could really contribute substantially to economic development.
Performance of world equity and bond markets, 1972 – 2001,


































Source: André F. Perold, Joshua N. Musher (2002), “The World Market Portfolio”
The above graph, by a colleague of mine, covers the last 30 years of the 
20
th century, plotting the average returns in percent on one axis, against the 35 The Difference between Risk Transfer and Capital Flow
volatility measured on those returns on the other axis, covering a period of 30 
years from 1972–2001 for a number of large equity and bond asset classes, 
putting weight on their average returns and standard deviation. In addition the 
CAPM line passes through a point, which is the World Market Portfolio. All 
these asset classes have been taken and put together, weighted by the size of 
their market value. 
In theory, the World Market Portfolio should be the most efficient investment 
as a risk return trade-off, and this graph proofs this to be the case, even though 
realizations can sometimes be different to expectations. Moreover, the CAPM 
line, which goes through the risk-free asset and through the WMP’s point, 
gives you a higher slope, or a higher return to the unit risk than were it to go 
through any of the individual boxes. And that’s solely a consequence exposed 
due to diversification. If we then turn to look at emerging market equities - not 
for one emerging market country, but the whole portfolio of emerging markets, 
which has diversification relative to a single country. It has an average return 
of about 9%, with 22% standard deviation. Some degree of diversification is 
already apparently due to having banded and put together all the emerging 
markets. Now, if we were to suppose that those emerging market countries 
had been able to follow the strategy we just laid out, whether they proceed 
using a single industry or whatever their best option is, and were able to enter 
into contracts for all the risk exposure, not for a total of USD 10 billion but 
for their entire risk exposure, and to do so fully, even though in practice this 
is not possible – however the point here is to illustrate the size of the numbers 
involved. For taking the same risk as they actually took, of 22%, and heading 
straight up until the CAPM line is hit, it would be at this point that you would 
be on for the same risk if you invested in the market portfolio and the risk 
reacted to the same level of risk as if just concentrating on emerging markets. 
That difference to this point is approximately 600 basis points.
Put simply, and after all this is hypothetical although it does demonstrate the 
magnitude involved, if you apply the rule of 72 to calculate how many years 
it takes to double your money at a specific interest rate of 6% it would take 
12 years (i.e. 72/6) to double your money. Therefore, in 30 years, which is two 
and a half times 12 years, had they followed this risk rule completely, they 
would have had 5 or 6 times more accumulated wealth in their country at the 
end of 30 years – which is a big, big number. However, in reality it would not 
be possible for this doubling to be done perfectly, and after all, it is also not 
certain that the future will be the same as the past has proven to be. All I am 
trying to convey to you is that while fancy stuff using derivatives may sound 
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In this case we can see how large the magnitude of efficient risk transfer can 
be, particularly for developing and small countries. So the effects on welfare 
in terms of economic growth and wealth creation are substantial, even if 
they are not as big as in this hypothetical situation. Furthermore, this is not 
achieved by unearthing the next Warren Buffett and getting that person to run 
the country’s assets, but is a result of pure diversification and is the result of 
improving the efficiency of risk transfer.
5. Conclusion
To sum up, I would like to say that I think that there are wonderful 
opportunities coming out of all of this – some of which I have tried to 
allude to, with the last one being in the benefits potentially of risk transfer 
at a very large level. But there are also big challenges. These kinds of things 
are easy to describe and could even be implemented tomorrow, since they 
are not like having GDP bonds or some other assets that no one knows how 
to trade. We can do this, in this size, tomorrow morning - in fact we could 
even start today, since everything I have described to you is doable with 
market proven technologies today. This is not a purely experimental thing, 
but something that could be done instead, even though it is more complex 
than my illustrations. And the challenge, particularly for overseers and for 
management, is knowing what the investments are in. Taiwan, for example, 
would be doing business in this way with all these different countries. And 
in fact it has transferred a huge amount of risk the other way, and is actually 
not exposed largely to the world chip market but is instead exposed to 
something very different. And that’s what’s engaged here in this process and 
that’s the challenge. There are challenges for all the three groups that SUERF 
represents, with a need for a better understanding of modeling and factors that 
change institutions. We need to understand how to design better institutions, 
to understand how risk characteristics are changed, and how flows work. 
For the academic economists, particularly the monetary and macro people, 
there is a need to return to the risk balance sheet in order to understand these 
markets, and to understand that when you create these markets you change the 
transfer mechanism, you change the control mechanism, you change the risk 
patterns, and you can’t get away from it. They are first-order. You can’t use 
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understanding of their limitations and capabilities. For the practitioners, 
the excitement and challenges are clearly going to be: how is it going to be 
possible to produce all these products and how can we keep control over these 
standard risks which are changing across geopolitical borders? We are also 
going to need ex ante and ex post a better understanding of risk characteristics. 
Finally for the overseers, life is going to be much more complex, as there will 
no longer be a single challenge that can be watched. The overseers will no 
longer be able to say: “We know where all the risks are, there are right here 
and we control them, and the risks can not go anywhere else!” This will not 
be the case, and certainly isn’t currently the case, nor will it be in the future, 
which will make overseers jobs more complex. Central Banks will have to 
approach all these markets and risks in a far more sophisticated manner – and 
they already approach them in a more sophisticated manner than they did, say, 
a decade ago. It will be necessary to know more about that the markets, be 
more engaged towards them and aware of what is going on in them.
Finally, with regard to the role of innovation, we have to recognize the 
risk-benefit trade-off in innovation: it is structural that successful innovations 
will run ahead of the infrastructure, I use the term infrastructure to cover 
regulation and oversight. And the reason for that is very simply that most 
innovations are not successful. It makes no sense, nor is it practical, if you 
have 100 ideas for innovations for you first to build 100 infrastructures to 
support all of them and then see what’s going to work – if you were to try 
that, you never get anything done. What happens is inevitably that most 
of them fail with some amount of support put in, but the successful ones, 
whether it is sub prime mortgages, which I think has some positive aspects 
to it although it may have been poorly done in its current form. We will have 
to wait to see that - at least in the US. But these innovations are going to run 
ahead. If you focus solely on the innovations in ensuring that you do not have 
a crisis, and avoid having one, then there will be no innovation. It is a little 
bit like a high-speed train. If a high speed train can go 250 km/h, but the 
track (i.e. the infrastructure) is only capable of handling 100 km/h, if you say, 
“Fine, we will never let you go over 100”, you won’t have a problem with 
the track but you won’t have the benefit of the 250 km/h innovation. At the 
other extreme if you just let it go at the 250 km/h with an infrastructure that 
can only handle speeds of 100 km/h, then I need not have to tell you what is 
going to be the outcome. So the essential trade off is between managing the 
mismatch structurally of innovation to infrastructure security, and trying to 
do it in an efficient way. I wish that there was a golden rule for this, but there 
isn’t one, in my judgment, except for judgment and understanding of what it 
is that you’re analyzing.41
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Abstract
In our work we mainly focus on two recent developments concerning 
asset management. First, asset management has become more actively and 
second, high sophisticated investment strategies have been developed. By 
analysing the involvement of a sophisticated investment strategy in an active 
asset management we distinguish three different tasks into which asset 
management might be separated: Research, Portfolio Selection/Revision and 
Trading. We propose the integration of these separate tasks into the active 
management process as a new trend in active asset management. Therefore, 
the value added chain of each part of the asset management is under revision. 
Discovering the value generating opportunities of the entire process we 
analyse each single step of the integrated active asset management and look 
for possibilities of exploitation. One part of our analysis will focus on the 
issue of trading or, in terms of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
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represent the views and opinions of FSC Financial Soft Computing GmbH, or any of its employees. 
The authors make no representations or warranty, either expressed or implied, as to the accuracy 
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(MiFID), on “Best Execution”. Considering the question, if the price received 
or charged is fair regarding the actual market situation, MiFID only refers to 
traditional securities like stocks. At the moment the Committee of European 
Securities Regulators (CESR) lists 6,983 shares (as of 26 May 2008) being 
admitted to trading on EU regulated markets.
Concerning alternative investments the European Undertakings for Collective 
Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS) already provide the legal 
framework for mutual funds and (alternative) investment companies. The 
aim of the UCITS is to achieve an effective single market for instruments 
that are consistent to the UCITS directive. Measures planned to achieve 
this goal are the standardization of UCITS notification procedures and the 
clarification which assets are consistent with the UCITS and hence eligible 
for investment. Being compliant with the UCITS directive will be a major 
aspect of quality and might also be a major aspect of marketing. We suppose 
that finding a (fair) market price will also affect the so-called “alternative” 
investments in the future. Indeed, as indicated by the problems of Structured 
Investment Vehicles finding an adequate price (when no market price exists) 
is an important issue. It becomes obvious that in the near future CESR will 
have to tackle the pricing and trading issues for alternative investments and 
to identify those (structured) investment vehicles that are qualified as being 
consistent to the UCITS directive. This might have an important impact on 
the liquidity of alternative investments.
In particular by handling individual shares, individual prices and single 
orders the trend towards an integrated active asset management will become 
observable. Therefore, we will focus on individual events, data and detailed 
procedures applied by practitioners and asset managers. Of course the 
proposed integration might be a difficult task. Nevertheless, we want to point 
out the implications of the new trend in a descriptive way. The integration of 
research and portfolio revision will be illustrated by means of the Relative 
Value Strategy. However, the integration of the portfolio revision and the 
trading process is not yet fully realised for the regarded Relative Value 
Strategy. As we do not want to disregard the integration of the trading, we 
will descriptively illustrate new developments in trading by discussing the 
current increase of trading opportunities, quite commonly designated as 
dark pools. In the course of the analysis we will briefly discuss Electronic 
Communication Networks (ECNs) and Automated Trading Systems (ATSs) 
and the recent increase of software tools, designated as order management or 
execution management systems. The new developments in trading involve 
a mixture of cooperation and competition among exchanges and investment 43 Abstract
banks as each player tries to exploit the inefficiencies of the trading process. 
This issue is barely discussed among academic researchers. Nevertheless, 
the appearance of the alternative trading venues provides opportunities to 
exploit market inefficiencies as the implementation shortfall, which might be 
estimated up to 6.00 % p.a. Transaction costs might be mentioned as a further 
example for inefficiencies that might be exploited. Hence it is not surprising 
that the regulatory activities as MiFID in Europe and the National Market 
System Regulation (Reg NMS) in the US try to handle this issue.
Thereby MiFID originates the term “Best Execution”. However, the question 
arises how to measure this term. In the past the available data was limited to 
prices and the measurement of trading efficiency had to rely on proxies like 
“mid prices”, “spreads” or “half spreads”. But for measuring “best execution” 
more than only prices are needed. Due to the developments in information 
technology the whole order book data is available nowadays, i.e. prices, 
numbers, partial fills, etc. These data provide the opportunity to measure the 
trading efficiency by the order “eating up the order book”. With respect to 
Xetra order book data we will show that the trading efficiency is surprisingly 
high. However, the available data provide the opportunity to investigate 
the important step “from orders to prices”, i.e. instead of predicting prices 
the probability distribution of the order placement is estimated. Thereby 
professionals and financial practitioners succeed in exploiting the detailed 
information of the order book and the novel high speed communication 
facilities by implementing procedures that go beyond the methods applied 
by academic researchers: Professionals surpass the researchers in developing 
adequate models and methods.
The methods of the professionals profit from the “organized complexity” that 
was addressed by Weaver (1948) sixty years ago, reaffirmed by Hayek (1974) 
in his Nobel lecture 1974 and has been quite recently addressed again by Klir 
(2006). Real economic problems are controlled by individual actions and 
interactions. While statistical methods help to detect the moving forces in the 
capital markets the modelling of the events generated by individual signals is 
the challenge of recently developed methods as “event stream processing” or 
“complex event processing”. As indicated by recently proposed models these 
methods might provide the tools to integrate portfolio revision and trading. 
As mentioned above, such an exploiting systematic investment approach 
might be structured into the three stages Research or Forecasting, Portfolio 
Construction and Strategy Implementation. In our work we describe the 
difficulties implicated with each stage.44 Abstract
A Relative Value Strategy will be developed and the Forecasting and 
Portfolio Construction will be explained with reference to the Relative Value 
Strategy. But in a systematic investment strategy these three stages have to 
be integrated into the active asset management. This becomes obvious by an 
empirical study showing the embarrassments implicated with the third stage, 
namely the Strategy Implementation. Deriving from the idea of exploiting the 
inefficiencies resulting from a non  integrated active asset management some 
possibilities for exploitation will be figured out as conclusion. Regarding 
trading inefficiencies we differentiate between implementation shortfall and 
slippage. The first analyses the price change between the point in time when 
the asset manager decides to initiate an order and the point in time of the 
execution of the order. The second refers to the transaction prices when the 
execution walks up the order book. Slippage will be discussed by analysing 
tick-by-tick order book data of the German stock index DAX.
1.   Introduction
Jack Treynor, one of the great masters, once stated that Portfolio Management 
equals a three legged stool resting on Securities Research, Portfolio 
Management and Securities Trading (Treynor and Wagner (1990)). The 
importance of these three parts has been remaining during the last decades. 
But the connection among these three parts has become much closer: The 
Improvement in IT, the communication tools, the deregulation of the capital 
markets and last but not least, the introduction of a huge number of so-called 
derivative products lead to a fundamental change in asset management. New 
investment instruments have been developed and investors are not restricted 
to concentrate on long-only equity and fixed income investments or to trade 
on the local market only. The recent regulation initiatives to further investor 
protection both in US and EU will increase importance of trading issues, 
e.g. best execution and multilateral trading facilities. The philosophy of 
buying a market portfolio at only one exchange available and holding it till 
maturity is no longer the guideline, neither from the regulatory nor from 
the portfolio management point of view. The development of the active 
portfolio management strategy (Grinold and Kahn (2000)) break fresh ground 
to portfolio management techniques and terms: Long/short equity, market 
neutral, managed futures and much more sophisticated strategies have been 45 Introduction
made available to a great variety of investors. The impressive developments 
of information and communication technology enable investors to trade 
globally nearly all these instruments. They obtain information about all these 
investments nearly without any time delay.
The paradigm of the efficient market has been abandoned, at least in modern 
portfolio management. Active portfolio management has shown the superiority 
of portfolio selection and revision. The rise of hedge funds regarding both the 
number of funds and money invested is a convincing proof that inefficiencies 
which can be exploited by sophisticated strategies exist on the market. Even 
if the recent crises in hedge fund business underlines that there is of course 
risk in the hedge fund business, the overall superiority of active sophisticated 
portfolio management is beyond any doubt. However, exploiting these 
opportunities requires very sophisticated tools in all three stages of portfolio 
management, either research, either portfolio construction or trading. At the 
moment the major challenge seems to be that these three sectors have to be 
treated together to exploit the opportunities. We will designate this combined 
approach Integrated Active Asset Management (IAAM). The real challenge 
we have to cope with is to take advantage of the opportunities offered by 
the recently available techniques. The advantage of a systematic investment 
strategy is the possibility of using complex quantitative approaches on every 
stage of the Integrated Active Asset Management Process. We will explain the 
individual steps firstly and discuss the issue of integration afterwards.
1.1 Research
The quantitative research strategy assumes that the future returns of an 
investment instrument can be modelled by a certain return generation 
process, e.g. if the future asset returns are significantly influenced by the 
lagged relationship between various factors, the patterns of these indicators 
could be used to accurately predict the future returns (Mitev (2003)). Hence 
a combination of a systematic investment strategy and an accurate prediction 
of short-term future returns of financial assets embedded in an integrated 
active asset management is a convincing approach to exploit market 
opportunities.
To develop a reliable financial forecasting system the target process has 
to be defined and indicators influencing the target process have to be 
found. Dependencies between indicators and the target process have to be 
modelled mathematically and short-term forecasts predicting the future price 46 Introduction
movements have to be generated. The target process in the Relative Value 
Trading Strategy, presented in this paper, consists of the identification of the 
assets, pairs of which tend to show a stationary pattern over a certain period of 
time, but which are experiencing deviations from their equilibrium in a short 
run. Based upon the assumption, that the past behaviour will repeat in the 
future, a short term forecast for each combination of the assets is created.
1.2 Portfolio  Construction
In the second step a portfolio based on the predicted future price movements 
has to be constructed. The optimal asset allocation is a subject to linear 
constraints such as lower and upper limits for single assets or asset classes 
according to the requirements contracted in the management mandate. 
The objective function is to maximize the expected portfolio return while 
minimizing the expected portfolio risk and the expected transaction costs. 
The resulting portfolio is cash neutral and consists of a basket of long and 
short positions, where the sum of all long positions equals the sum of all short 
positions.
1.3 Trading
At the third stage a consistent trading strategy has to be implemented. The 
amount of shares/securities determined in the portfolio construction stage has 
to be realized by buying/selling the appropriate number of shares. Trading 
implies firstly determining the market place, secondly the timing and thirdly 
slicing of the entire amount into several tranches; i.e. where, when and how 
to trade. The execution has to be monitored regarding both trading procedure 
and transaction costs, thus enabling an integrated performance analysis as 
well as an efficiency analysis at each stage of the entire process. Figure 1 
exhibits the entire process. 47 Introduction



















The paper will discuss the tasks that have to be performed at the individual 
stages of the integrated process and the possibilities resulting from integrating 
the steps. Firstly we will discuss the complexities of forecasting and the 
portfolio construction process. Secondly we will discuss new trends in 
trading by a detailed analysis of the trading landscape and the implementation 
process. Due to the short-term forecasts a portfolio based on a systematic 
investment strategy has to be rebalanced very often. Hence, transaction 
costs are a critical component for active asset management. Various factors 
impact transaction costs, e.g. commissions, brokerage fees, price impact 
costs, slippage, implementation shortfall, etc. While some of the costs can be 
measured quite exactly (explicit costs), others cannot be quantified as easily 
(implicit costs). The big issue is that the implicit costs are becoming more 
and more important. Therefore we focus on analyzing the implicit costs. We 
may differentiate three different forms of implicit transaction costs: Round 
trip costs, slippage and implementation shortfall. We will concentrate on 
discussing implementation shortfall and slippage. While round trip costs are 
a common measure of a trading venue’s overall attractiveness, we believe that 
for measuring the implicit transaction cost of a single transaction, slippage 
and implementation shortfall are far more important. We will not question 
the importance of roundtrip considerations. However we believe that the 
investigation of a single transaction’s implicit costs has been neglected so far 
but deserve adequate investigation.48 Introduction
1.4 Implementation  shortfall
Implementation shortfall is due to the discrepancy between the prices at which 
the portfolio manager decides to change the portfolio composition (decision 
price) and the actual trading price (Perold (1988), Treynor (1994)). According 
to our research results, this implementation shortfall may be considerably 
large for non-integrated strategies. It is therefore important to analyze the 
impact on the performance and to discuss how to handle it.
Perold (1988) defines implementation shortfall as the difference of the 
performance of a “real” portfolio and a paper traded strategy. He firstly 
calculated the “paper” price as the midpoint of the current Bid-and Ask-Quotes 
at the time point the trader decides to trade. As the portfolios investigated in 
our analysis consist of the most liquid FX, Stock Indices, Fixed Income and 
Commodity future contracts, we sharpen the definition and use the price of 
the last transaction executed immediately before the portfolio construction 
decision as “paper” price. The “real” price is the effective price of the 
transaction. The implementation shortfall is the difference in performance of 
the “paper” portfolio and the real portfolio.
Analyzing the implementation shortfall we focus on two major factors 
that significantly influence the price difference between paper price and 
transaction price. First, we examine the impact of the amount invested in 
a portfolio. As the order size of high  volume portfolios can be very high, 
brokers are not capable to fulfill all the orders immediately. They slice big 
orders into individual packages that are traded separately. Consequently 
the difference between decision price and trading price might be higher for 
high-volume portfolios.
Then, in a second step we analyze the possibilities to use computerized 
trading, commonly designated as algorithmic trading (Algo-Trading). In 
Algo-Trading computer programs determine the point in time and the volume 
of the orders submitted to the market, i.e. the electronic order book (Prix et 
al. (2007a)). Algo-Trading requires fast and accurate communication between 
the order book and the trader as order submitter. The speed can be improved 
considerably by XML based protocols. One open standard is the Financial 
Information Exchange (FIX) Protocol. Using a FIX Protocol allows order 
placement nearly without delay, so the time delay between initiation and 
execution of an order can be minimized. We compare the implementation 
shortfall between brokers using a FIX Protocol and brokers who have to 49 Introduction
initiate the orders manually. The big advantage of FIX protocol is the speed 
of the order submission and the general acceptance among many market 
participants.
We will also show that the factors influencing implementation shortfall depend 
on the asset class; while implementation shortfall regarding commodity futures 
is influenced by the notional of the portfolio, the time delay between initiation 
and execution of an order is responsible for implementation shortfall of stock 
indices and FX futures. We consider differences between decision/paper and 
execution prices as inefficiency that might be exploited.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 will give a short overview 
of the key aspects and difficulties regarding the stages “Research” and 
“Portfolio Construction” and the resulting new challenges for a modern 
active asset management as shown in Figure 1. In section 3 we want to focus 
on the “Strategy Implementation”. First, we analyze post-order slippage and 
implementation shortfall with respect to the volume invested in a portfolio 
and the use of Algo-Trading systems. Second we try to figure out possibilities 
for exploiting these inefficiencies.
2.  Integration of Forecasting and Portfolio Revision
In the following we try to give an example of each stage, research, portfolio 
construction and strategy implementation. In this section we will describe one 
possibility that might picture the forecasting (research) process. Therefore, 
we want to introduce a strategy designated as Relative Value Strategy.
Relative Value Strategy is a quantitative trading strategy that aims to take 
advantage of short-term market inefficiencies. Although not necessarily 
cash-neutral, in most of the cases it is designed as a self-financing strategy, 
and in its common form it is very simple. Relative Value Strategy involves the 
identification of the assets, pairs of which tend to show a stationary pattern 
over a certain period of time, but which are experiencing deviations from 
their equilibrium in a short run. By taking a long position in the relatively 
undervalued asset and the short position in the relatively overvalued one at 
the moment of their divergence, the profit will be made if the history repeats 50 Integration of Forecasting and Portfolio Revision
itself and the prices converge again. More details about the Relative Value 
trading (or pairs trading) can be found in the following works: Gatev et al. 
(1999), Vidyamurthy (2004) and Elliott et al. (2005).
Here we present the Relative Value Strategy applied on the subset of the 
DJ Stoxx 600 stocks. We want to discuss each single step which has to be 
considered at the research stage. We will try to describe the pre  selection of 
the inputs which are needed to generate the forecasts. We want to figure out 
the target analysis and the final choice of the inputs. And finally, we will give 
a short description how the forecasts can be generated when following the 
Relative Value Strategy within an Integrated Active Asset Management.
2.1  Inputs pre  selection and reduction
The data employed in this paper consist of the daily closing and opening 
prices, market capitalisation, volume and turnover data for DJ Stoxx 
600 shares over the period from January 2000 to December 2005. In order 
to make sure that the proposed transactions can be executed, a pre  selection 
of the assets according to technical and market criteria is a necessary first 
step. The technical criteria include a check for data availability, times-series 
errors and detecting the outliers regarding the open-close spreads. All assets 
that do not satisfy technical criteria are excluded from the analysis. Further 
pre-selection is done based on the following market criteria:
Market capitalisation has to be larger than EUR 3 billion. • 
Volume has to be larger than 10,000. • 
Lend costs have to be less than 0.4% p.a. of the deployed capital. • 
In this pre  selection phase, the number of assets can be reduced to 260 
by filtering out those that do not meet the above criteria. The assets are 
distributed among ten industries, where each of the industries consists of 6 to 
41 assets, which consequently results in a relatively high number of potential 
pairs within one industry. Therefore, the selection of the most suitable pairs 
of assets represents the key step in the relative value trading process. First, it 
reduces the number of pairs we can trade, and second, it takes into account 
only the pairs that make good candidates for the relative value trading.51 Integration of Forecasting and Portfolio Revision
2.2 Target  Analysis
After the initial data screening, where the number of assets has been reduced 
by more than a half, the most important step in the relative value trading 
process - the selection of the most suitable pairs of assets - can begin. The 
idea is to form the pairs of similar assets, i.e. assets from the same industry 
with a stable historical relationship.
Figure 2 shows such a pair of assets. The rescaled price time series of Daimler 
and Fiat show a long  term stable relationship, i.e. they are moving together in 
the long run. Also, the figure below shows the spread between those prices. 
Generally, we look at the historical spread (ratio) between the prices of the 
two assets to see if there is a consistent long term relationship between them. 
Also, the assets that make good candidates for the relative value trade should 
have a measurable relationship.
In order to find an adequate measure or selection criterion, we examine 
different statistical tests. The first measure that we examine is the correlation 
coefficient that we calculate for the pairs’ prices as well as for the daily returns 
of the prices. Beside the correlation coefficient, three unit-root (or stationarity) 
tests are examined as potential measures of the assets similarity. The unit-root 
tests are examined in two different ways. First, as applied on the price ratios 
and second, as applied on the residuals of the linear regression in which the 
price of one asset is the independent variable and the price of the other is the 
dependent variable.
First, we create all the possible pairs out of our 260 assets. Then we create 
two-asset portfolios, with both assets equally weighted and calculate the 
performance of all such two-asset portfolios. Further, we calculate the Sharpe 
ratio
2 for each of the two-asset portfolios. On the other side, we apply each of 
the potential similarity measures (mentioned in the previous paragraphs) on 
the pairs of assets, and as a result we get the test-statistics for each pair and for 
each similarity measure or a potential selection criterion. Finally, we regress 
the previously calculated two-asset portfolios’ Sharpe ratios on the test 
statistics of the corresponding pairs of assets. Figure 3 depicts a relationship 
between the Sharpe ratios of all two-asset portfolios and the test statistics of 
the pairs of assets comprising these portfolios.
2  Sharpe Ratio = (Portfolio return – Risk free rate) / Volatility; Risk free rate = 2.5 % p.a.52 Integration of Forecasting and Portfolio Revision





































































































































































































































































Table 1 shows the coefficients of correlation (the R-square) between each 
selection criterion and the Sharpe ratio.
According to the results in table 1, the Phillips-Perron (PP) unit-root test (see 
Phillips (1987) and Phillips and Perron (1988)) has been chosen as selection 
criterion, and, it is the only criterion that is significantly related to the Sharpe 
ratio of the relative value portfolio. The assets considered as good candidates 
for relative value trading are those for which the sum of all the PP-values for 
all the pairs that asset appears in, optimises our selection criterion. In our work, 
the selection of pairs, using the Phillips-Perron unit-root test, is done at the 
beginning of each year based on the price movements in the previous year. We 
create a similarity matrix for each industry, containing the PP-statistics for all 
asset pairs in that industry. However, the selection of pairs might be done more 
frequently than once a year, but for reasons of simplicity we choose this period. 
Nevertheless, a more frequent selection process might improve the results.53 Integration of Forecasting and Portfolio Revision
Figure 3: Relation between the Selection Criterion and the Sharpe Ratio
of the Two-Asset Portfolios
Table 1: Overview of different criteria
Criterion (test statistics) – R
2 00–05 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
ADF (Residuals) 0.0000 0.0019 0.0012 0.0003 0.0036 0.0195 0.0536
ADF (Ratio) 0.0599 0.0336 0.0117 0.0220 0.0158 0.0692 0.0551
PP (Residuals) 0.0172 0.0860 0.0721 0.0485 0.0694 0.0800 0.1284
PP (Ratio) 0.1493 0.1991 0.1194 0.1875 0.2153 0.1421 0.1618
KPSS (Residuals) 0.0046 0.0004 0.0005 0.0000 0.0548 0.0009 0.0164
KPSS (Ratio) 0.0374 0.0646 0.0140 0.0236 0.0161 0.0072 0.0002
Correlation of the prices 0.0288 0.1779 0.0830 0.0029 0.0161 0.0433 0.0393
Correlation
of the daily price returns
0.0651 0.0104 0.0742 0.0018 0.1102 0.0003 0.009754 Integration of Forecasting and Portfolio Revision
2.3 Forecasting  Process
After the selection of suitable pairs has been done, we are going a step 
further and trying to predict the future price ratios movements, as well as the 
forecasts for each of the assets. Here, we are examining a price ratio of a pair 
of assets.
The point at which our price ratio is starting to deviate from its “normal” 
behaviour is the point at which the trade should occur. We consider 
a deviation from a normal behaviour to be a significant change in the range of 
the oscillation around the mean. Based on the fact that each price ratio follows 
a zig-zag pattern, we search for the alternate local minima and maxima of the 
ratio. If the price ratio has changed by a certain amount (distance d) compared 
to the last local extreme value, then we can expect the mean-reversion to 
occur and accordingly, we can determine in which direction the price ratio 
will move at the next time point, i.e. we can determine one step ahead 
direction forecast for that ratio.
Assuming that the current point of the price ratio is Xt and that the last 
identified extreme value was a minimum (at the point t0), in the interval 
between the last extreme value and the current point (maximum length of 
the interval equals m = [max(t – m, t0 + 1), t – 1]) we will search for a local 
minimum.
X •  j is a local maximum if the following conditions are fulfilled:
Xj =  •  max(Xi |i in [max(t – m, t0 + 1])
X •  t(1– d) ≥ Xj, 0 < d < 1 and
X •  j is the last point in the observed interval that fulfils the first two 
conditions. 
For a minimum, the following should hold:
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That means that a point is an extreme point if it is a minimum or a maximum 
of the observed interval and if the price ratio has changed by d.
Again, following the idea of the mean-reversion, the direction forecast for the 
time point t + 1 would be:
1, if at the point  •  t in the interval [max(t – m, t0 + 1), t – 1], a maximum was 
identified, meaning that the price ratio has fallen by d,
–1, if at the point  •  t in the interval [max(t – m, t0 + 1), t – 1], a minimum was 
identified, meaning that the price ratio has increased by d,
the same as the previous forecast, otherwise.  • 
The point at which the forecast definition occurs is called the identification 
point and the trade should occur one day after the identification.
Example:
Figure 4 shows a graph of a price ratio for two similar assets, as well as the 
local extreme points and the points at which the extreme points have been 
identified. In this example, the above mentioned parameter d equals 5%. At 
the moment of the identification of an extreme point, a new direction pair-
forecast is defined. The blue line represents the pair positions. A pair position 
is later translated to a single asset position. For example, if a pair position 
is long then it means that the position of the asset in the numerator should 
be long and for the one in the denominator it should be short. However, it is 
important to note that relative forecasts shown here are only relative single 
asset forecasts based on the forecast of one pair. As one asset can appear in 
more than one pair, the final forecast for a single asset is equal to the sum of 
all the relative forecasts for that asset.56 Integration of Forecasting and Portfolio Revision
Figure 4: The forecasting process regarding the Relative Value Strategy 




























































































































































































































































Daimler vs Fiat Local Extreme Point




of the previous 
local minimum
Pair position (here short) 
<=> short Daimler, long Fiat
Pair position (here long) 
<=> long Daimler, short Fiat
Daimler / Fiat
>=d
As can be seen from figure 4, at the moment of identification (solid points) of 
an extreme value (outlined points) the pair forecast is changed and it is kept 
constant until the next identification point.
Distance parameter d plays evidently an important role in this process. On one 
hand, it determines which and how many points will be identified as extreme 
points (the smaller the d, the more extreme points will be identified and 
therefore more often the forecast will change). On the other hand, parameter 
d determines after what time an extreme point will be detected and indirectly, 
in case of a strictly mean-reverting process, by what extent the price ratio will 
change before the next extreme value has been reached. 
Therefore, finding a suitable d is of great importance for the successful relative 
value trading. Parameter d is in general not a constant. It is constructed so that 
it reflects the recent price ratio movements. Basically, it is a function of the 
ratio’s volatility, and although it can remain constant for a certain period in 
time, it is periodically checked and automatically adjusted in order to catch 
potential volatility shifts or a beginning of a trend.57 Integration of Forecasting and Portfolio Revision
2.4 Optimal  Asset  allocation
Once the assets to be traded have been selected, and all possible pairs have 
been created as well as the forecasts for each of the pairs, we can go to 
the next stage, to wit, the portfolio construction. We calculate the portfolio 
weights for separate assets and answer the question “How much are we going 
to buy or sell and when?”. In order to calculate the portfolio weights, it is 
necessary to determine the single asset forecasts. 
Let us say that at the identification point, our pair forecast for the next day 
equals 1. In that case the relative single asset forecast equals:
1, for the asset in the numerator, and • 
–1, for the asset in the denominator. • 
The opposite holds if the pair forecast equals –1. The forecast for a single 
asset is then the sum of all the relative forecasts calculated based on the pair 
forecasts for all pairs that particular asset appears in. 
Here we should bear in mind that the same asset can appear in more than one 
pair and therefore it is possible that it is undervalued in one pair while it is 
overvalued in the other. In case of the contradictory relative forecasts (that 
sum up to 0), the final single asset forecast for that particular asset will be 
defined as neutral and the proposed weight for that asset will be zero. 
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Ik designates the industry to which the asset belongs, pj, t represents the sum of 
the relative forecasts for the period t for the asset xj.
Since we are constructing a cash neutral (as well as market neutral) portfolio,
we have 
, 0 jt k jIp       , then it also holds  , 0 jj t W     . Based on the previous 
two equations, it can be easily shown that  , 1 jj t W     . 58 Integration of Forecasting and Portfolio Revision
Finally, under the assumption that the whole disposable capital is invested in 
stocks, according to the previously calculated portfolio weights, and based on 
the assumption that the orders have been executed at the opening prices, the 
portfolio value at the time t equals
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(return of the j
th stock), and c represents transaction costs.
In practice, the calculation of the proposed weights is done every working day 
after the closing of the markets and the proposals are sent to the traders the 
following working day before the opening of the markets. The transactions are 
supposed to be executed at the opening prices on that day, but the execution 
strategy and the choice of the submission of the orders (whether market or 
limit orders) are left to be decided by the trader. In the proposal sent to the 
trader, there is no information on the time-distribution of the trading orders 
or the time distribution of the quantities to be sold or bought, but only the 
information on the portfolio weights for the assets to be traded.
Figure 5 shows the total relative value portfolio development (black line) 
over the period from January 2001 through December 2005, as well as the 
development of the industry portfolios (grey lines) in the same period. The 
portfolio rebalancing is done on a daily basis, while the selection of the pairs 
of assets is done once a year.
The performance of the total relative value portfolio, as well as the 
performances of the separate relative value industry portfolios shown in 
figure 5, is calculated using the opening prices with the transaction costs 
included in the calculation. In practice, the actual trading prices, which are 
not necessarily equal to the opening prices, should be used for the portfolio 
evaluation. However, this will be discussed in more detail in section 3.
Table 2 shows the relative value portfolio statistics for the years 2001 to 2005. For 
the purposes of this calculation, a risk free rate of 2.5% per annum was used.
Although some industry portfolios show a moderate performance, total 
portfolio performance has been relatively high in the whole period and shows 
an upward trend.59 Integration of Forecasting and Portfolio Revision
Figure 5: Performances of the portfolio and the industry portfolios
Table 2: Portfolio Statistics
Return Vola (%) Sharpe Ratio+
Correlation between Portfolio Value
and DJ Stoxx 600
2001 19.2 5.8 2.9 –0.7
2002 8.0 6.4 0.9 –0.9
2003 9.2 5.4 1.2 0.9
2004 3.9 2.7 0.5 0.4
2005 6.1 2.0 1.8 0.9
+ Risk free rate = 2.5% p.a.
The total relative value portfolio in figure 5 (black line) is depicted again in 
figure 6, but this time together with the DJ Stoxx 600 Index. In comparison 
with the underlying index, total relative value portfolio performance shows 
less volatility than the Index and it is also evident that at the times where the 60 Integration of Forecasting and Portfolio Revision
Index experienced a downward trend, there is a strong negative correlation 
between the two (see table 2).





























































































































































Relative Value Portfolio (left)
DJ Stoxx 600 (right)
The main conclusion of this section is that the Relative Value Strategy 
applied on the subset of the DJ Stoxx 600 shares shows a consistent and 
good performance. Also, the co  movement of the Relative Value portfolio 
performance and the DJ Stoxx 600 Index is weakening in the “bad times” 
(i.e. in the year 2001 and 2002, where the Index experienced a downward 
trend) and where the correlation coefficient of the two series proves that 
there is a highly negative correlation. On the other hand, the correlation of 
the two is highly positive in the periods in which the underlying index shows 
a consistent upward trend (year 2003 and 2005).61
3.  Inefficiencies in Non-Integrated Trading Decisions
In chapter 2 we discussed the first two stages of an integrated active asset 
management, to wit, the generation of forecasts and the construction of 
a portfolio in reference to the Relative Value Strategy. Now we want to focus 
on the third stage, namely the strategy implementation. Firstly, we provide 
an empirical study concerning the difficulties when implementing a strategy 
based on futures contracts. Secondly, we analyse the microstructure of trading 
facilities with the aim to discover inefficiencies that might be exploited.
3.1  Implementation Shortfall and Slippage in Futures Trading
So far, when measuring the performance of the Relative Value portfolio, we 
assumed that the calculation of the weightings to be held in each position 
was based on the closing prices. Furthermore we made the assumption that 
the rebalancing of the portfolio’s position was executed at the opening price 
of the corresponding rebalancing day. Such strategies, where a virtual price 
such as the opening price is considered as execution price, are designated 
as paper-traded strategies. The transactions are assumed to be executed at 
a paper price that might differ from the effectiveexecution price. Beside the 
opening price also the closing price or any intraday price could be considered 
as trading price for a paper-traded strategy.
However, while regarding a paper-traded strategy might be very helpful for 
the portfolio construction process, the strategy has to be implemented on 
the real market afterwards, i.e., the numbers of contracts to be traded have 
to be calculated, the orders have to be generated and executed, the price 
developments have to be monitored and the performance of the portfolio has 
to be analyzed. Trading implies also the determination of the market place, 
the timing and the slicing of the entire amount into several trade packages. 
Furthermore one has to decide how the submission of the orders should take 
place. The whole process of implementing the strategy on the market is the 
third stage of an integrated active asset management.
Of course the implementation of a strategy is not free of charge. When 
executing an order the portfolio manager has to think of the related transaction 
costs. Transaction costs might be split into explicit and implicit costs. While 
explicit transactions costs such as broker fees or exchange commissions 62 Inefficiencies in Non-Integrated Trading Decisions
might be accurately measured, implicit costs such as round trip costs, slippage 
or implementation shortfall cannot be quantified quite exactly.
3.1.1.  Data and Method
When following a systematic investment strategy such as the Relative 
Value Strategy the portfolio has to be rebalanced very often. As the Relative 
Value Strategy is rebalanced on a daily basis, transaction costs are a critical 
component for active asset management. Nevertheless, as they can be 
measured quite exactly, the explicit costs will be disregarded in our study. We 
want to focus on the implicit costs, especially we will provide an empirical 
study analyzing the implementation shortfall and slippage costs of a non-
integrated asset management strategy. The magnitude of the derived measures 
will motivate for integrating also the implementation-stage in an active asset 
management.
Before continuing we want to specify some terms used in this chapter. When 
speaking of the execution price the price of an effective execution of an order 
is in mind of the authors. The decision price is the current real time price in 
the moment at which the portfolio manager decides to place an order, to be 
more specific: As the regarded portfolio consists of the most liquid future 
contracts we consider the last execution price prevailing at the moment the 
asset manager decides to trade as decision price.
Presenting an empirical study of a non  integrated strategy we want to point out 
the inefficiencies that arise of the non  integration. Therefore, we look at four 
(non-integrated) portfolios only invested in the most liquid FX  , Commodity, 
Stock-Indices and Fixed Income future contracts. The four portfolios follow 
the same Global Macro long/short investment strategy. Nevertheless, the 
four analyzed portfolios differ in two important aspects. First, the notional 
of two of the portfolios is higher than EUR 150 million. Therefore they are 
defined as high volume portfolios. The notional of the others is less than 
EUR 50 million and we refer to them as low volume portfolios. Second, two 
brokers receive the market orders via electronic FIX connection.
3 The other 
two brokers have to initiate the trades manually. The advantage of using 
electronic FIX connectivity (Financial Information Exchange Protocol) is the 
very fast order execution. In both cases the objective is to execute the market 
3 See  http://www.fixprotocol.org.63 Inefficiencies in Non-Integrated Trading Decisions
orders immediately after their transmission. So we have the following four 
portfolios for comparison:
Low volume, i.e. less than 50 million invested; no FIX, i.e. submission of  • 
orders via email (in the following abbreviated as “Low, no FIX”)
High volume, i.e. more than 150 million invested; no FIX, i.e. submission  • 
of orders via email (in the following abbreviated as “High, no FIX”)
High volume, i.e. more than 150 million invested; FIX, i.e. submission of  • 
orders via FIX protocol (in the following abbreviated as “High, FIX”)
Low volume, i.e. less than 50 million invested; FIX, i.e. submission of  • 
orders via FIX protocol (in the following abbreviated as “Low, FIX”)
The regarded portfolios are rebalanced every Monday at approximately 
15:00 UTC based on the asset allocation proposal calculated by the fin4cast 
Technology. The fin4cast Technology has been developed by FSC Financial 
Soft Computing GmbH since 1995. The fin4cast Technology provides 
forecasts, e.g. weekly Monday-to  -Monday predictions, which we use as input 
for a quadratic optimization of the four portfolios considered in this paper. 
Hence, the strategy considered integrates the first two stages, to wit, the 
generation of forecasts and the portfolio construction.
The result of the second stage of fin4cast Technology is a portfolio construction 
that delivers weekly weightings to be held in each asset over a certain period 
in relation to the notional of the portfolio. The performance of the strategy is 
calculated at a paper  price. When implementing the strategy in the real market the 
weightings to be held have to be transformed into numbers of contracts the brokers 
have to trade. Therefore fin4cast uses the real time (last execution) prices of the 
particular future contracts that arise directly before the numbers are submitted to 
the broker. These real time prices are considered as decision prices.
For our study fin4cast provides for all four portfolios the execution prices, the 
decision prices, the number of contracts traded and the weights proposed by 
the optimization process.64 Inefficiencies in Non-Integrated Trading Decisions
3.1.2 Post-Order  Slippage
Market participants on financial markets have two main possibilities to 
submit their orders: They can place a market or a limit order. If a market 
order is placed the broker will execute the order at the current market price 
or at best efforts. Otherwise, a limit order is only fulfilled if the broker is in 
the position to execute the order at a preliminarily determined price (decision 
price) or at a better price. Hence submitting a limit order has the advantage 
that the current trading price will be the same as the expected trading price, 
but if the broker cannot execute the order to the decision price the order 
will not be fulfilled. Hence the disadvantage of a limit order is that there is 
no guarantee that the order will be fulfilled. Furthermore the broker usually 
will charge higher fees for limit orders. On the other side market orders will 
almost be fulfilled, but the execution price might substantially differ from the 
price at the time point of the order calculation. We will designate this price 
difference between the decision price and the effective execution price as 
post-order slippage (Gartner et al. (2007)).
There are many reasons for post-order slippage. Brown et al. (2006) mention 
the rapidly fluctuating prices due to heavy trading volume. Bessembinder 
and Seguin (1993) consider the dependence between price volatility, trading 
volume and market depth as a possible reason. Lee (1993) mentions the 
different prices at different exchanges or different prices at intermarket 
exchanges as possible reasons. Brown et al. (2006) also mention the 
multistage order process as a reason for the price differences. However, in this 
empirical study we do not want to search for reasons for the price differences, 
but we want to analyze the magnitude of post-order slippage costs and the 
consequences of other price differences occurring on financial markets. 
Furthermore, we want to analyze the factors influencing the slippage costs 
and to quantify their magnitude.
However, when comparing one strategy that is both traded on the paper 
and in the real market it becomes obviously that the performance of the 
paper portfolio and the one of the effective traded portfolio might differ in 
a considerable dimension. It is not surprising that the deviation between the 
paper price and the effective execution price is the reason for the difference in 
the portfolios performances. Hence we arrive at the third stage of a consistent 
trading strategy, to wit, the implementation of a strategy.
When regarding a paper  traded strategy such as the Relative Value Strategy 
the paper price will equal to the decision price. Hence a paper-traded portfolio 65 Inefficiencies in Non-Integrated Trading Decisions
takes no market impact effects into account, which might result from placing 
an order. Moreover, due to quickly changing prices, heavy trading volume and 
big order sizes that cannot be fulfilled immediately by a broker the effective 
execution price might substantially differ from the paper price.
The result of an optimization process such as the Relative Value Strategy is 
the percentage weight of an asset that should be held over a certain period of 
time after the portfolio rebalancing. But as the broker needs the number of 
contracts that have to be traded, the proposed weights must be converted to 
a whole number of contracts. This step of calculating the numbers to be traded 
is designated as order calculation. To transform the weightings into numbers 
of contracts a price is needed. Therefore the current real time price at the order 
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Nevertheless, due to the market impact, the high liquidity in future markets 
and all the other reasons the decision price used for the order calculation might 
significantly deviate from the effective transaction price. Figure 7 clarifies the 
market impact and price effects that appear when an order is placed. The 
figure shows the partial executions of an order that was submitted on the 29
th 
January 2007. The order was a buy order of 209 contracts of the Gold future 
contract (expiring in April 2007). As the broker could not fill all the orders 
at once because no counterpart was available due to the order size, the trades 
had to be split up into trade packages. E.g. the first trade package consisted 66 Inefficiencies in Non-Integrated Trading Decisions
of one single contract, the second package consisted of three contracts, etc. In 
the picture the size of the packages is relative to the size of the black points.
The red line shows the decision price and the green line shows the price of 
the single trade packages that are represented by the black points. When 
looking at the picture one might think of a self fulfilling prophecy, because 
the placement of the buy order drifts the price up. However, the effective 
execution price (regardless of all costs) is the volume  weighted average 
price represented by the blue line and it obviously differs from the decision 
price. As the difference between decision and execution price has a negative 
sign also the post-order slippage is negative. Note that for estimating the 
post-order slippage of the whole order the price deviation has to be multiplied 
by the slot size of each traded contract and by the number of contracts that are 
traded. Considering a slot size of 100 for 209 contracts and a price deviation 
of –2.2 USD per slot it becomes obvious that the post-order slippage might 
be of significant magnitude.
For estimating the magnitude of the post-order slippage for the whole 
portfolio over the observation period 1,...,  t we calculate the cumulated 











         
pi, t, dec  is the decision price in t for the asset i and pi, t, exe is the effective 
execution price of the asset i. ni is the slot size of one contract of asset i and 
qi, t is the number of contracts to be traded for asset i in t.
Figure 8 shows the cumulated slippage of the four portfolios. As the fourth 
portfolio (high, no FIX) was cleared in February 2007, the line ends there. 
As already mentioned above, the portfolios can be distinguished by two main 
aspects, namely the amount invested and the way of submitting the orders 
to the broker and to the exchange. The first message of the graph is that the 
cumulated post-order slippage is considerably large.
Nevertheless, figure 8 allows the following conclusions: The post  order 
slippage depends on the amount invested in the portfolio and on the way of 
submitting the orders. While the low volumed portfolio without using FIX 
connectivity shows a cumulated post-order slippage of nearly 7% over the 
observation period the value can be decreased by using a FIX protocol for 
orders’ submission to approximately 4%. The same effect of using a FIX 
connectivity can be observed for the high volumed portfolios. If comparing 67 Inefficiencies in Non-Integrated Trading Decisions
the two portfolios using (or not using) a FIX connectivity for orders’ 
submission it becomes obvious that also the size of the trades negatively 
influences post-order slippage. The bigger the orders that are submitted, 
the more trade packages have to be built by the broker. This results in high 
deviations between the decision and the effective execution price.





























































However, the first upcoming question is “What is the reason for the large 
post-order slippage?”. First, one might think of the roll  over costs, i.e. the 
costs emerging due to the roll  over from an expiring future contract into 
a more liquid contract, as a possible reason. Therefore, firstly we plot in figure 
9 the cumulated post-order slippage of all orders excluding all the post-order 
slippage resulting from the contract roll  overs (left picture) and compare it in 
a second step with the cumulated post-order slippage resulting only from the 
contract roll  overs (right picture). However, figure 9 clarifies that the roll  over 
costs are not responsible for the magnitude of the post-order slippage.
Now let us split up the cumulated post-order slippage into the four sectors, 
to wit, the Foreign Exchange futures, the Fixed Income futures, the Stock 
Indices futures and the Commodity futures. In figure 10 the cumulated post-
order slippage separated for the four sectors can be seen.68 Inefficiencies in Non-Integrated Trading Decisions
Figure 9: Cumulated post-order slippage of the contract roll  overs
Now it becomes obvious that the biggest part of the post-order slippage is 
due to the trades regarding the Commodity future contracts. As the post-order 
slippage is lower for low volume portfolios the amount invested in the 
portfolio seems to be an influencing factor for the magnitude of the post-order 
slippage for the commodity futures. While the post  order slippage regarding 
the bond and FX futures is negligible, the stock indices futures show an 
influence, but not as much as the commodity futures.
The high post-order slippage in the commodity sector has several reasons: First 
the liquidity for commodity futures might not be given all the time, so submitting 
big-sized orders might result in high price deviations, because the broker has to 
split the order into trade packages. Furthermore filling all these packages might 
take some time. Second, the commodity futures regarded in this portfolio are not 
traded fully electronically. This means that the time span between submission 
and execution of the order might be considerably high. All the future contracts 
of the other sectors are traded fully electronically. That might be the reason why 
using a FIX connection might reduce the post-order slippage.
Nevertheless, post-order slippage must not be summed up with performance 
of a portfolio. Hence a concept for measuring the impact on the performance 
is needed. One possibility therefore is to measure the implementation 
shortfall that will be introduced in the following section. However, due to the 
equivalence of the results regarding the volume and the way of submitting 69 Inefficiencies in Non-Integrated Trading Decisions
the orders we will just consider one of the four portfolios regarded in this 
section. To be more explicit, in the following section we will concentrate on 
the portfolio designated as "High, FIX" in this section.
Figure 10: Cumulated post  order slippage split up into the 4 sectors.
3.1.3. Implementation  Shortfall
Perold (1988) compares both the performance of a paper-traded and an 
effective traded portfolio each following the same strategy. Consequently he 
defines implementation short   fall as the difference between the performances 
of the two portfolios. All other costs are disregarded and the performance rt 










        
where pout, t + 1 represents the price at the end of the holding period, pin,t the 
price at the beginning of the holding period and wi, t the weighting to be held 
over the holding period.70 Inefficiencies in Non-Integrated Trading Decisions
Figure 11: Influence of the Implementation Shortfall
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Before we compare the performances of the paper and the real portfolio, 
we just want to explore the influence of the implementation shortfall. 
Generally one would assume, that the post-order slippage and consequently 
the implementation shortfall would clear in the long run, i.e., the expected 
value of the price deviation between decision and execution price should be 
approximately equal to zero. But the results presented above repudiate this 
assumption. However, also figure 11 gives reason to question this fiction.
In figure 11 we only count the cases in which the paper performance is higher/
lower than the real performance relative to the number of observations. If the 
paper performance is higher than the performance of the traded portfolio then 
the influence of implementation shortfall is considered as negative (bad) and 
vice versa. In some cases the performances can also be equal.
The chart shows the frightening result that the influence of implementation 
shortfall is systematically negative, especially for the commodity futures. This 
means, for the commodity futures the price deviation has a negative impact 
on the performance of the portfolio in approximately 80% of all observations. 71 Inefficiencies in Non-Integrated Trading Decisions
For a portfolio manager this result is very frightening, because implementing 
a strategy on the real market negatively influences the performance of the 
portfolio. Being aware of this a portfolio manager might want to have an 
estimation of the magnitude of this implementation shortfall. Hence figure 
12 shows the performances for both the paper and the real portfolio. Over the 
observation period the implementation shortfall sums up to approximately   
8%. Again one might ask for the reasons. Splitting up the results into the four 
sectors it becomes obvious that the biggest part is again due to the trades in 
the commodity futures.72 Inefficiencies in Non-Integrated Trading Decisions
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If we would compare the four portfolios regarded in the previous section 
we would receive similar results as for the post-order slippage, to wit, the 73 Inefficiencies in Non-Integrated Trading Decisions
implementation shortfall depends on the volume invested in the portfolio and 
on the way of orders’ submission. While the use of a FIX connectivity might 
reduce the implementation shortfall for the Stocks, FX and Bond futures, the 
volume is responsible for the magnitude of the implementation shortfall for 
the commodity futures.
However, this means disregarding the trading effect implies an implementation 
shortfall of approximately 8% over approximately one year. However, 
a portfolio manager has to realize the performance not only on the paper but 
also in the market. This magnitude of the implementation shortfall points 
out once again the need for an integrated asset management where each 
part, to wit, research, portfolio construction and strategy implementation, is 
regarded.
Of course it is a very hard task for a portfolio manager to integrate also 
the trading part into his active asset management because trading is the 
broker’s part. Nevertheless, we want to figure out some possibilities for 
exploiting such inefficiencies as implementation shortfall in the next 
section.
3.2  Price Slippage when Orders are executed
As shown in the previous section implementation shortfall might be 
considerably high. The magnitudes of the presented figures initiate the idea 
of exploiting these inefficiencies in trading. Therefore we want to discover 
possibilities of exploitation at the market’s microstructure level. But before 
we can provide an analysis of the market’s microstructure, we want to give 
a short overview of the European trading landscape.
3.2.1  The European Trading Landscape
The landscape of the European financial industry’s market is shown in figure 
13, provided by the Federation of European Stock Exchanges (FESE). Figure 
13 shows the three market segments, to wit, Clearing & Settlement, Cash 
Markets and Derivatives Markets. As the lines indicate, the market fragments 
are interconnected. Without going into much detail the picture clarifies that 
the European Trading landscape provides a lot of facilities to trade European 
securities.74 Inefficiencies in Non-Integrated Trading Decisions
Figure 13: Landscape of the financial industry’s market in Europe (FESE 2008)
A comparison of the current market with the situation a decade ago points out 
that the landscape has changed very strongly. The driving force for the change 
might be the process of consolidation that affects the entire asset management 
industry. The causing factors for the consolidation are the globalisation and 
the vanishing of national trading monopolies, technological capabilities 
regarding communication and computation and finally regulatory activities. 
It becomes obvious that there has been a need for the regulation of the trading 
and settlement as it is in the interest of the investors. Therefore a market 
regulation, such as MiFID was a logical solution. Compared to the US, it only 
seems to be a first step in the market regulation process, although a major 
step. There is still a long way to go to achieve a unique information system 
like the National Best Bid Offer (NBBO) system that is based on the National 
Market System Regulation (Reg NMS) in the US. As mentioned in table 3 one 
should bear in mind that the major players in the market are the international 
banking institutions. This fact complicates the regulation process.75 Inefficiencies in Non-Integrated Trading Decisions
3.2.2  The global Non-Exchange Trading Landscape
As can be seen in table 3 many other trading venues beside the traditional 
exchanges have emerged since the last 10 years. The first column of the table 
lists the names of the leading international banks, while the other columns 
represent a snapshot of some alternative trading platforms exempt from 
stock exchanges. These trading platforms are mostly joint ventures of big 
investment banks.
These alternative trading platforms are commonly designated as “Dark 
Pools”. Describing potential liquidity that is not disclosed to the market the 
term has become quite popular during the last years. Although the players 
have the possibility to indicate their interest of trading which might be 
executed if opposite trading interests arise, the liquidity of the dark pool 
is not represented in an order book in advance. This dark liquidity is the 
most important aspect concerning dark pools. Due to this fact other market 
participants cannot be informed about the trading interests in advance, hence 
there is no possibility of exploiting the trading interests by taking the opposite 
positions. Furthermore trading at dark pools should avoid market impact 
effects arising from the transaction, because the trades are not disclosed to the 
market, at least till the point in time the transaction occurs.
Table 3: Investments with more than two interests in new platforms





Lehman Brothers • • • •
U B S •••••
Deutsche Bank • • • • •
Goldman Sachs •••••
JP Morgan • • •
BNP Paribas • •
Société Général • •
Some years ago such facilities providing “dark liquidity” were commonly 
designated as Automated Trading Systems (ATSs) or Electronic Communication 
Networks (ECNs). For a while both terms have been used synonymously, but 76 Inefficiencies in Non-Integrated Trading Decisions
quite recently the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has begun 
to differentiate between them: “An ECN is also an ATS, but is distinguished 
from a dark ATS by its display of quotes.” (Sirri (2008), p. 2)
Even if the process is still going on, a first summary concerning the 
changes within the trading landscape might be drawn: The structure of the 
trading landscape is becoming more and more complex, which is due to the 
fragmentation of both the traditional and especially the innovative trading 
facilities. Beside dark pools additional facilities have been designed to 
manage specific trading and transaction tasks. Illustrating the new trends in 
asset management we just want to mention some these additional facilities:
Order Management Systems • 
Execution Management Systems • 
Dark Algorithms • 
Crossing Networks • 
Transaction Cost Analysis • 
Table 4: Dark Pools
Independent Dark Pools Consortium-owned Dark Pools Broker-Dealer owned Dark Pools
Instinet Crossing BIDS Trading
ITG and Merrill Lynch’s joint 
venue powered by POSIT: 
Blockalert
ITG Posit eBX LLC LeveL ATS Citi: Markets and Banking Liquifi
Liquidnet ISE Stock Exchange: MidPoint 
Match Credit Suisse: Cross Finder
Liquidnet H20 The NASDAQ: Crossing 
Network Fidelity: CrossStream
NYFIX Millenium NYSE Euronext: NYSE 
MatchPoint
GoldmanSachs’ 
Execution and Clearing: SIGMA X
Pipeline Trading System Knight Capital Group:
Knight Match
Lehman Brothers: LCX
Merrill Lynch: Internal Crossing 
Network, MLXN
Morgan Stanley: MS POOL
UBS Investment Bank: UBS PIN77 Inefficiencies in Non-Integrated Trading Decisions
Table 4 gives an overview of some Dark Pools. The owners of these 
proprietary systems are once again major investment banks, brokers and 
stock exchanges. As we just want to give a short overview we do not want 
to explain the characteristics of each facility. Nevertheless, it should be 
mentioned that some stock exchanges such as the National Association of 
Securities Dealers Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ) and the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and their European allies are already offering 
and using such alternative facilities. Similarly, the German stock exchange 
makes an effort to use them. However, the differentiation of the mentioned 
computerized systems indicates that trading is becoming a very important 
issue in the asset management industry. Although additional trading facilities 
are arising on the market an analysis of the SEC surprisingly points out 
that the ratio of the volume traded at exchanges to the volume traded at 
non-exchanges approximately levelled off over the years: 
“In December 2004, the total exchange and ECN share of trading 
was approximately 85 % in NYSE stocks and 71 % in NASDAQ 
stocks. By December 2007, total exchange and ECN share trading was 
approximately 83 % in NYSE stocks and 77 % in NASDAQ stocks. 
In other words, NYSE volume percentage in quoting venues is roughly 
flat around 84 %. Moreover, quoting venues increased their percentage 
share substantially in NASDAQ stocks. If these NYSE and NASDAQ 
percentages are rounded together loosely for simplification, the bottom 
line is that the volume percentage of dark pools of liquidity operated by 
dark ATS’s and broker  dealer internalizes has remained approximately 
20 % over the last three years.” (Sirri (2008), p. 29)
It seems that the SEC is not worried about the emergence of the various alternative 
facilities. Nevertheless, SEC is quite carefully monitoring the development. The 
issue of trading shares/securities beyond the official market and the pros and 
cons of disclosing or hiding trading activities have been discussed since many 
years: We briefly want to discuss two aspects, firstly the fragmentation and 
secondly the representativeness of the transaction prices charged.
The rules that determine the price of a transaction are quite different among 
the various trading facilities. While some of them assume the transaction to 
be settled at the closing price or the volume weighted average price (VWAP) 
others assume a price limit. Furthermore, as a major part of the stock’s demand 
and supply is not involved in the price fixing process, the disadvantage is 
given by the fact that the price charged is biased, i.e. it does not represent 
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markets generate prices by chance and the prices do not reflect the true value. 
However, thin markets provide possibilities to manipulate the price that is 
also relevant for big off-exchange transactions.
Market fragmentation is an important problem for traders endowed with 
inadequate technical equipment. Exploiting the currently available data 
communication facilities by using sophisticated technology might decrease 
the negative effect of market fragmentation. Thus, beyond doubt big trading 
institutions claim that they can access every dark pool. Hence market 
fragmentation seems to be a decreasing problem.
However, with regard to finding a fair price for the transaction a price 
fixing mechanism that also considers the market’s entire volume might 
be appropriate. But if the intention of trading is disclosed to the market in 
advance, very attractive trading opportunities arise to people who are aware 
of these trading interests. As the regulators seem not to be interested in the 
discussion, it will still take some time till a way of handling both the price 
fixing process and the disclosure issue is found.
3.2.3  Xetra’s detailed Microstructure
Beside the emerging of dark pools a further trend is becoming quite obvious: 
The asset management industry is even more reacting to individual events, 
i.e. the market is controlled, each single event on the market is observed 
and the asset management immediately reacts or consciously does not react 
regarding each event. However, not only the events on the market, but also 
events at the microstructure level of an exchange are under control. Hence, 
we want to analyse the microstructure of an exchange in this section on the 
basis of order book data of the Frankfurt stock exchange. The Frankfurt 
stock exchange provides data of its electronic trading system, designated as 
“Exchange Electronic Trading” (Xetra). The accuracy of the provided data is 
up to a hundredth of a second. Hence, a detailed analysis is possible.
Presenting the infrastructure of the Xetra order book data we analyse all the 
orders for the 30 DAX stocks submitted from Wednesday, 5th January 2005 
to Wednesday, 12th January 2005 by taking into account the weekend  break. 
Table 5
4 gives information about the frequency of different events in the 
database found in the time period from 5 to 12 January 2005. Each event type 
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is represented by a number designated as event code which will be further 
discussed in table 6. A total of 5,014,200 database entries were examined. 
Absolute count data are given in the middle column, while the two columns 
on the right hand side list the percentage of orders started/ended via each 
respective event code.
Table 6: Example of a 1-5-5-3 order
Modification Timestamp Event Code Buy Sell Limit Price Size
2005–01–05 09:51:27.87 1 S 35.00 0.00 20,000
2005–01–05 13:11:55.05 5 S 35.00 35.00 2,485
2005–01–05 16:27:13.58 5 S 35.00 35.00 377
2005–01–05 16:27:16.11 3 S 35.00 0.00 17,138
Note: The order is inserted with a volume of 20,000 at time 09:51:27.87. Partial execution with a size of 
2,485 reduces the available volume to 17,515 (20,000 – 2,485) at the time 13:11:55.05 and then 
another partial execution of 377 units leads to 17,138 (20,000 – 2,485 – 377) remaining units from 
16:27:13.58 on. At 16:27:16.11 the remainng volume of 17,138 units is cancelled altogether. Further 
data fields omitted in this table entail the order expiry date, auction trade flag, order type, order 
restriction, trade restriction, order entry timestamp, order number and ISIN code.
Table 5: Frequency of different events in the database
Xetra’s Order Structure







a 1 2,284,628 99.98
Order modification 2 36,165
Order Cancellation 3 1,626,896 70.15
Order filled completely 4 675,232 29.12
Order partially filled 5 373,760
Order deleted automatically 6 16,597 0.72
Technical Entry 101 461 0.02
Technical Cancellation 103 461 0.02
Note: a.   Due to the restriction to a certain observation period, some orders' entries were not observable in 
the dataset. Similarly, there were orders without a suitable end/event of code 3,4,103 or 6. This 
is the reason why the sum of order entries (code 1 and code 101 adds up to 2,284,628 + 461 = 
2,285,089) does not match the sum of order terminations (codes 3,4,6 and 103 add up to 1626,896 
+675,332 + 16,597 + 461 = 2,319,186).
b.   Percentage of orders, that are entered via a 1 resp. 101 code. Hundred percent comprises all order 
entry events in the database.
c.   Percentage of orders terminated via a 3,4,6 resp. 103 event. Hundred percent comprises all order 
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Table 6
5 gives an example of the handling of a sell order: The order of 20,000 
shares with a price limit of 35.00 Euros is submitted at 9:51:27.87. The 
order entry is represented by the event code 1. At the timestamp 13:11:55.05 
the first partial execution takes place, i.e. 2,485 shares are sold for 35.00 
Euros per share. In Xetra partial executions are coded with the number 5. At 
16:27:13.58 an additional amount of 377 shares is sold at the price of 35.00 
Euros. At 16:27:16.11 the remaining number of 17,138 shares is cancelled. 
Order cancellations are coded with the number 3. In Xetra the demonstrated 
example would be represented by the code-sequence 1-5-5-3. According to 
the second column in table 6 this code represents the following sequence 
of events: Order entry – order partially filled – order partially filled – order 
cancellation.
Table 7: Structure of Orders












6 gives an overview about Xetra’s handling of the orders submitted during 
the observation period. While the first column shows the code sequence (also 
designated as order type) as exemplified above, the second column shows the 
absolute number of the corresponding order sequences. The last column gives 
information about the relative fraction of each order type. The lion’s share 
of orders, namely 67% is cancelled after submission. Such order entries and 
cancellations without partial executions are represented by the code sequence 1–3. 
More than 23% of all submitted orders have the code sequence 1–4, i.e. after the 
order’s entry into the order book the orders are filled completely. An amount of 
3.8% of the orders has the code sequence 1–5–4, i.e. the amount remaining after 
the first partial execution is filled completely. By adding the order types ending 
5  See Prix et al. (2007a), p.722
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with code 4, i.e. all orders which were finally filled, we end up with 28.9%. The 
analysis of orders submitted in two other 6-day periods gives similar results.
Table 8: Different order types concerning number of orders and money volume 
traded in the time from 5 to 12 January 2005
Numbers of orders submitted
b
Restriction
a Limit Market MtL Iceberg
None 93.96% 2.40% 0.16% 0.93%
F 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
I 2.34% 0.03% 0.00% 0.00%
S 0.03% 0.16% 0.00% 0.00%
Total % 96.34% 2.59% 0.16% 0.93%




a Limit Market MtL Iceberg
None 80.08% 6.32% 0.13% 8.24%
F 0.14% 0.20% 0.00% 0.00%
I 0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
S 4.83% 0.03% 0.00% 0.00%
Total % 85.07% 6.55% 0.13% 8.24%
In abs. figures 34,841,574,719 2,683,281,921 53,501,579 3,375,360,805
Note:   Observation period covers the period from January 5th to January 12th of 2005. A total of 2,284,628 
orders were examined. Percentage of the money volume and number of orders belonging to each 
category are shown in the table above.
a.   Order restriction ’F’ means Fill-Or-Kill, Order restriction ’I’ means Immediate-or-Cancel and ’S’ 
means Triggered-Stop-Order.
b.   The left part of the table shows the relative frequency of each order type entered into the Xetra 
system in conjunction with each order restriction. 100 percent corresponds to all orders submitted. 
Thus, in the above part of the table all orders are counted, regardless of whether they are executed 
or cancelled. The total percentage figures do not sum up to 100% due to rounding effects.
c.   The lower part of the table shows the relative amount of money volume traded using each order 
type in conjunction with each order restriction. Money volume was computed using the size of 
the execution in shares times the price of the transaction per share. Thus, if the price is better 
than a possible limit supplied, the transaction price was used for the computation. The cancelled 
part of any order is disregarded in this part of the table. 100 percent in the lower part of the 
table corresponds to the total money volume traded on Xetra in the observation period. The total 
percentage figures do not sum up to 100 % due to rounding effects.
The above part of table 8
7 provides information about the number of different 
order types and order restrictions. We observed the following order types: 
Limit orders, Market orders, Iceberg orders and Market to Limit orders. As 
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table 8 shows, by taking into account all the different sequences, the limit 
orders have the highest share of 96.34 % in the total number of orders. 
Market orders, on the other hand, amount to 2.59 %, while the interesting 
type of Iceberg orders only adds up to 0.93 %. The other types of orders do 
not have a significant share in the total number of orders. The right part of 
table 8 gives a more promising explanation concerning the importance of 
Iceberg orders. If we calculate the percentage by volume, the share of both 
Iceberg and Market orders increases to 8.24 % and 6.55 %, respectively. 
The further differentiation according to the order restrictions “fill or kill” 
(F), “immediate or cancel” (I), “Triggered stop order” (T) does not provide 
additional information besides the fact that 4.83 % of total limit are the 
triggered stop orders.
3.2.4  Slippage by walking up the order book 
Table 9
8 provides detailed information about an order “walking” up the order 
book when different trading volumes are considered. For ease of presentation, 
the detailed statistics are only given for SAP AG stocks. The table shows the 
volumes traded at the market price. The figures show that the trading venue 
at Xetra is quite liquid.
Since we have the detailed information of the entire order volume available, 
we can perform a more comprehensive calculation of slippage in the context 
of walking up the order book. Basically, slippage should measure the amount 
of a price increase in case of a buy order or the amount of a price decrease in 
the case of a sell order. Hence we do not use the “mid limit” (calculated as 
the average of best bid and ask) as a reference quantity, but the corresponding 
best offer. The slippage is calculated as the difference between the best bid 
or ask and the maximum or minimum price that has to be accepted when the 
entire order is executed. Table 9 entails the slippage figures calculated for 
SAP based on our data sample. For each slippage amount ranging from 0 to 
35 cent, the money volume traded on both sides of the markets is given.
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Table 9: Slippage in Cent caused by increasing trading volume
Slippage Matched Bid Matched Ask
cents Abs. (Eur 000s) Rel. (%) Abs. (Eur 000s) Rel. (%)
0 733,719 86.53 720,040 84.03
1 50,113 5.91 57,738 6.74
2 20,994 2.48 26,084 3.04
3 11,78 1.39 12,88 1.50
4 8,217 0.97 10,548 1.23
5 7,621 0.90 10,266 1.20
6 3,179 0.37 3,333 0.39
7 2,895 0.34 3,311 0.39
8 1,95 0.23 1,506 0.18
9 1,856 0.22 2,252 0.26
10 1,454 0.17 2,173 0.25
11 1,325 0.16 1,386 0.16
12 590 0.07 300 0.04
13 166 0.02 635 0.07
14 129 0.02 230 0.03
15 803 0.09 854 0.10
16 21 0.00 297 0.03
17 267 0.03 121 0.01
18 153 0.02 139 0.02
19 106 0.01 151 0.02
20 351 0.04 98 0.01
21 133 0.02 – –
22 20 0.00 196 0.02
23 17 0.00 506 0.06
24 2 0.00 10 0.00
25 13 0.00 493 0.06
26 – – 46 0.01
27 – – 137 0.02
28 – – 917 0.11
29 – – 62 0.01
30 – – 105 0.01
32 88 0.01 – –
34 – – 41 0.00
35 21 0.00 77 0.0184 Inefficiencies in Non-Integrated Trading Decisions
Table 10: Order executed by zero Slippage
 DAX 30
Matched Bid Matched Ask
(Eur 000s) (%) (Eur 000s) (%)
Dt.Telekom 1,113,578 98.99 1,203,600 97.68
SAP 733,719 86.53 720,040 84.03
Deutsche Bank 698,109 89.01 758,876 90.79
Siemens 629,025 91.36 652,542 89.93
Allianz 454,538 88.96 525,366 85.28
RWE 493,865 90.25 406,656 91.57
E.ON 418,362 87.99 426,587 89.44
Daimler-Chrysler 414,266 93.24 409,357 92.48
Münch. Rückvers. 352,506 89.97 362,653 88.53
BASF 317,073 91.90 344,747 90.28
Bayer 319,895 95.03 340,663 93.78
Bay.Hypo-Vereinsbk. 340,336 93.31 326,027 95.47
Volkswagen 322,593 92.87 317,895 93.22
Schering 272,369 93.70 231,830 88.16
Infineon Tech. 236,572 98.83 247,441 97.38
Bay.Motoren Werke 227,900 93.11 217,481 92.28
Metro 224,767 94.49 202,919 89.58
Commerzbank 239,726 95.71 204,733 95.78
Thyssenkrupp 133,645 96.65 133,160 91.40
MAN 120,533 93.10 114,082 91.24
Continental 119,351 92.97 99,330 91.68
Deutsche Post 104,995 96.51 115,214 96.07
Adidas- Salomon 88,472 90.44 96,132 86.18
Deutsche Börse 86,344 94.11 107,106 95.49
Lufthansa 97,030 96.55 84,391 96.28
Altana 58,730 92.49 81,893 90.72
TUI 72,358 94.15 75,616 91.34
Henkel 68,351 87.37 61,378 92.70
Linde 67,573 89.85 64,400 91.87
Fresen.Med.Care 34,285 90.69 38,664 91.18
The row with slippage equal to 0 cents reads as follows: A money volume 
of 733,719,000 (720,040,000) Euros was traded on the bid (ask) side with 
a slippage of 0 cent, meaning that the shares have been traded at the best bid 
respectively the best offer. This calculation clarifies the problem of the mid 
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might have been half the spread instead of zero cents! The relative volume 
figures amount to 86.53 % (84.03 %) of the entire matched, i.e. traded, bid 
(ask) money volumes for SAP during the period covered by the data. The row 
with slippage equal to 25 cents reads as follows:13,000 + 88,000 + 21,000 
= 122,000 (1,878,000) Euro were traded with a slippage equal to or larger 
than 25 cents.
Table 10
9 gives an overview of all DAX 30 companies. The figures give 
information about the amount of market orders (in absolute and in percentage 
terms) that have been executed during the 6 trading days without walking 
up the order book. We call this a zero slippage situation. The table contains 
the money volume of zero slippage orders for each DAX 30 stock. For 
example, in case of Deutsche Telecom, the figures of 98.99% for matched 
bid and of 97.68% for matched ask indicate that 98.99% of bid orders have 
been executed with a slippage of zero cents and similarly 97.68% of ask 
orders have been executed at the prevailing market price, i.e. walking up 
the order not a single cent. While Kempf and Mayston (2005) showed that, 
based on earlier Xetra data, 20% of all orders walk up the order book, the 
detailed analysis of SAP  trades (table 9) shows that the adverse price change 
of market orders is comparably low. These figures indicate a new trend. Our 
data clearly show a comparable increase in liquidity and improvement of the 
execution process on the Xetra trading platform. It is probably due to both 
an improvement in Xetra’s trading procedure and the improved of technical 
trading features. Also, the additional liquidity could have been generated by 
the so called central counter party. A further research is required in order to 
confirm the preliminary explanations. However, our preliminary results show 
that it is very promising to analyse the hitherto neglected microstructure by 
looking at the tick-by-tick data.
9  Prix et al. (2007b), p.3786
4. Conclusion
We tried to give an overview of all the individual parts of asset management, 
to wit, Research, Portfolio Construction and Trading. We analyse each part 
separately and try to discover the opportunities which the integration of the 
three provides to the market participants. By following a systematic investment 
strategy the inefficiencies arising from each part might be exploited.
First we introduce such a systematic investment strategy, namely the Relative 
Value strategy. This strategy is based on the identification of the assets, pairs 
of which tend to show a stationary pattern over a certain period of time, but 
which are experiencing deviations from their equilibrium in a short run. 
Relative Value strategy aims to benefit from these short-term inefficiencies. 
However, the integrated active asset management requires the integration of 
the further steps. In the portfolio revision process two aspects should be taken 
into account, first, the implementation shortfall, and second, the slippage 
occurring by “walking up the order book” when executing the orders.
The implementation shortfall occurs between the point in time the decision to 
rebalance the portfolio is made and the point in time the trades are executed. 
We present an empirical study of the implementation shortfall performed on 
futures data. The main factor influencing the implementation shortfall is the 
speed of transmitting the trading proposals to the trader. The study shows 
that the transmission via the FIX-protocol reduces the transmission time and 
consequently the implementation shortfall.
The “walking up the order book” slippage is determined by the transaction 
costs caused by the lack of liquidity in the markets. Measuring the transaction 
costs by doubling the so called mid price, as proposed by Lee and Ready (1991) 
nearly 20 years ago seems not to be an appropriate solution, as it is based on 
the bid  ask spread. Slippage in the sense of “walking up the order book” is not 
influenced by the spread but in order to measure it, the order book data should 
be available. Nowadays, the availability of the tick-by-tick order book data, 
classifies the “walking up the order book” slippage as an appropriate measure. 
Based on order book data of the Frankfurt stock exchange we provide the idea 
of measuring slippage as the difference between the best bid or offer and the 
maximum or minimum price that has to be accepted when the entire order is 
executed.87 Conclusion
By entering the age of modern asset management, the trading strategies 
that neglect the markets’ microstructure disregard the fact that arbitrage 
opportunities might exist. As our preliminary results have shown the 
Integrated Active Asset Management could generate returns by discovering 
and exploiting these arbitrage opportunities. We do not provide a final solution 
for exploiting these arbitrage opportunities, but we want to proclaim such 
analysis of the markets’ microstructure as an innovative trend in the active 
asset management. We presume that an integrated systematic investment 
strategy combined with a detailed analysis of the market’s microstructure 
might generate returns by exploiting arbitrage opportunities resulting from 
the exploitation of price inefficiencies emerging through the big variety of 
trading platforms.88
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GLOBAL RESERVES MANAGEMENT











Foreign exchange reserves held by central banks rose to 6.4 trillion dollars in 
2007 from 1.5 trillion a decade ago and are expected to rise further in the coming 
years. Sovereign wealth funds manage assets in excess of 2.5 trillion dollars, 
and total reserves managed jointly by central banks and SWFs are forecasted 
to top 10 trillion dollars very soon. This paper presents motives behind this 
reserves growth and proposes a concept of OCHAR – Opportunity Cost of 
Holding Ample Reserves – which is defined as a forgone GDP growth resulting 
from too conservative reserve management by central banks. We estimate 
OCHAR for a sample of 33 countries which accounted for 80% of total central 
bank reserves in 2007. We also argue, that unlike in the 20
th century, where 
central banks used to be very secretive institutions, 21
st century central banking 
is characterized by widespread knowledge sharing and transparency. Therefore 
best practices, such as inflation targeting or efficient reserve management 
spread out quickly and are adopted by increasing number of central banks. 
Thus central banks collectively embarked on a reserves diversification journey, 
it does appear to be the central banks collective mindset and we can speak of 
the global reserves management in the 21
st century. At the end of the paper 
1 Authors are respectively: (1) partner at Ernst & Young and former deputy governor of the 
National Bank of Poland and former member of the Polish Financial Services Authority; (2) 
economist at Millennium Bank in Warsaw and former economist at the National Bank of Poland. 
The views presented in this paper are those of the authors and do not represent the official position 
of institutions that authors are or were affiliated with. This paper was inspired by World Bank 
Treasury Jennifer Johnson-Calari and Roberts Grava presentations, who drew authors’ attention 
to the problem of rising opportunity cost of holding ample reserves. We thank Roberts Grava and 
Ewa Szafarczyk for helpful comments on the earlier draft, all remaining errors are ours.94 Abstract
we put forward several hypotheses of what could be the consequences of this 
diversification journey. It seems that relative prices of various assets will find 
new steady states, which may have little in common with relative valuations 
seen in the 20
th century. We also expect that slowly, over time, US “exorbitant 
privilege” will be eliminated. Finally we consider global stability risks in the 
context of the new reserves management style adopted by central banks. We 
postulate that due to the increasingly global nature of shocks as long as central 
banks and governments in countries-stakeholders of global imbalances focus 
their actions on maintaining global price and financial stability, central banks in 
smaller emerging markets can afford to improve reserve management without 
incurring additional stability risk.
In 2007 foreign exchange reserves held by central banks and sovereign wealth 
funds likely topped 9 trillion dollars. According to IMF COFER database 
central bank reserves stood at 6.4 trillion dollars at the end of 2007 and assets 
under management by SWFs were estimated at around 2.5–3 trillion dollars
2. 
With oil spot-trading above 120 dollars per barrel and oil futures remaining 
above 100 dollars for 2016 contracts and with gradual approach to enhancing 
exchange rate flexibility in China further sharp growth of central bank and 
sovereign wealth funds assets should be expected in the coming years.
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2 MGI (2007) estimates that Sovereign Wealth Funds account only for 60 percent of 
petrodollar assets, with the rest managed by wealthy private individuals95
1.  The origins of the sharp rise in foreign exchange 
reserves.
Large and unprecedented rise of foreign exchange reserves led to many 
attempts to explain the reasons behind this trend. 
In January 1999 Martin Feldstein, the President of the National Bureau 
of Economic Research, the famous US think-tank, wrote an article in the 
aftermath of the Asian crisis arguing for the need to keep large foreign 
exchange reserves, that would serve as source of protection, flexibility and 
trust
3. In March 1999 Alan Greenspan, Federal Reserve chairman spoke on 
this issue during the World Bank conference
4. Those days economists focused 
their attention on the need to build large reserves to hedge emerging markets 
against capital flight and sudden stops. Economists discussed whether the rule 
of thumb such as reserves coverage ratio of six months of imports is good 
enough, or whether one should also take into account short-term debt, which 
shortly after Greenspan speech was labeled as Greenspan-Guidotti rule. This 
rule states that a country should keep its reserves large enough to survive one 
year without new loans.
From today’s perspective it may seem improbable, but it was only eight 
years ago when economists recommended building up of sizeable foreign 
exchange reserves in emerging markets. Today, as shown in this paper, many 
countries amassed reserves well in excess of what can be considered a safe 
and desirable level. Problem of too few has been replaced in many countries 
by a problem of too plenty.
Several papers identified Asian crisis in 1997 as the time series structural 
break which explains why in late 1990s US current account deficit and Asian 
foreign exchange reserves started to grow simultaneously and what led Dooley 
et al. (2003, 2004, 2005) to formulate the new Bretton Woods hypothesis
5. 
For example Gruber and Kamin (2005) estimated a model explaining current 
account to GDP ratio for a panel of 61 countries in 1982–2003 period. 
The pretty much standard model, using budget deficit, net international 
3 Feldstein  (1999)
4 Greenspan  (1999)
5 Rybinski (2007) discusses all existing theories of global imbalances, shows their strengths 
and weaknesses (book, in Polish).96 The origins of the sharp rise in foreign exchange reserves.
investment position, income per capita, GDP growth, demographic variables, 
terms-of-trade volatility and openness fails to explain why US recorded huge 
current account deficits and why Asian countries posted sizeable current 
account surpluses accompanied by rapidly rising foreign exchange reserves. 
However adding dummies for crisis years in Asia explains the lion’s share 
of current account surpluses in Asian countries. Authors conclude that 
Asian countries in post-crisis period adopted macroeconomic policy based 
on domestic spending restraints, investment spending in particular, and 
undervalued exchange rates, which required heavy interventions and led to 
massive reserves accumulation after few years of such macromanagement. 
Malecki et al. (2001) use financial markets microstructure analysis to show 
that it is justified to link the Asian crisis to post-crisis reserves accumulation. 
They show that the direct cause of speculative attacks on Asian currencies 
was low level of foreign exchange reserves on net basis. Attack on Thai baht 
took place when markets learned that net foreign reserves in the coffers of 
Bank of Thailand were much smaller than those reported in bank assets amid 
large foreign currency sales in forward transaction conducted by the central 
bank. In other countries in the region speculative attacks were triggered by 
market assessments that foreign exchange reserves were too small relative to 
foreign currency denominated loans taken out at commercial banks. Investors 
knew that these banks will not be able to renew such loans and that they will 
have to purchase foreign exchange from the central bank to make payments 
on existing loans. Anticipation of such massive purchases led to speculation 
against local Asian currencies. 
 There is little doubt that the roots of the rapid reserves accumulation are in 
the hangover period after the Asian crisis. Even larger literature deals with 
explanation of the magnitude of reserve holding increases in the past decade, 
testing different motives and target size of reserves with mixed success. 
Examples are Mendoza (2004), Garcia, Soto (2004), Caballero, Panageas 
(2004a, 2004b), Aizenman, Lee (2005), Gosselin, Parent (2005), ECB (2006), 
Aizenman (2006), Jeanne, Ranciere (2006), Ricerche (2007), Cifarelli, 
Paladino (2007), Green, Torgerson (2007). 
There could be many different motives of building large reserves pool: 
economics, politics, or reputation. Two economic motives are analyzed in 
Aizenman, Lee (2005) paper, i.e. precautionary motive and mercantilist motive. 
In the first case, in line with Martin Feldstein recommendations reserves are 
built to hedge the country against sudden stops and against financial markets 
volatility. In the second case reserve accumulation is a natural consequence of 
industrial policy based on maintaining undervalued exchange rate to stimulate 97 The origins of the sharp rise in foreign exchange reserves.
exports, which involves central bank interventions to prevent currency from 
strengthening. Aizenman and Lee analyze 53 countries in the period 1980–2000. 
Their results indicate that variables related to trade openness, capital flows 
openness and experienced financial crises explain level of foreign exchange 
reserves quite well, are statistically significant and economically important. 
On the contrary, variables related to mercantilist motive, such as export growth 
or exchange rate, do not influence reserves accumulation in a sizeable manner, 
although some are statistically significant. 
Gosselin, Patent (2005) analyse the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves 
in eight Asian countries, and they analyze time series which include also 
years 2003–2004, when reserves grew rapidly. Authors show that time series 
exhibit a structural break in 1997–1998, and that after the Asian crisis demand 
for foreign exchange reserves at central banks did increase significantly. 
However, the actual level of reserves observed in 2003–2004 was much 
higher than the model predictions, which led to the following conclusion. If 
historical relationships between analyzed economic variables
6 still prevail 
one should expect slower growth of foreign exchange reserves in the years to 
come, which could create risk of US dollar depreciation amid less abundant 
current account deficit funding available in the future. Well, the frantic 
pace of reserves growth in 2006 suggests that either relationships between 
economic variables did change, or that there is another factor, missing in the 
analysis, that has led to acceleration of reserves accumulation.
Also Jeanne, Ranciere (2006) find that recent accumulation of reserves by 
Asian central banks cannot be explained by an insurance motive against 
sudden stops. Authors present a model of optimal level of foreign exchange 
reserves and find that Greenspan-Guidotti rule is a very good approximation of 
their model results, with an exception, when the short-term debt to GDP ratio 
is less than 2.5%, then the optimal size of foreign exchange reserves is zero. 
6  The most parsimonious cointegrating relationship contains the following variables: ratio of 
reserves to nominal GDP, imports to GDP, broad money to GDP, volatility of export revenues and 
structural changes in coefficients related to imports to GDP and money to GDP after the Asian 
crisis.98 The origins of the sharp rise in foreign exchange reserves.
The buffer stock model was used by Cifarelli, Paladino (2007) in order to 
understand the motives of reserves accumulation
7. The basic model assumes 
that there are two types of costs related to holding reserves: the opportunity 
cost of holding reserves and the adjustment cost of reserves restocking, amid 
need to generate balance of payments surplus to build up reserves which 
reduces output. With growing level of reserves opportunity cost rises and 
the adjustment cost falls. Authors use cointegration analysis to capture the 
long term relationships and error correction method to model the short-term 
dynamics. Their results suggest that in the long run precautionary motive 
is a valid explanation of rapid reserve accumulation in many emerging 
economies. However authors also find, that in some countries short-term 
dynamics of reserves accumulation does depend on mercantilist motives, as 
reserves accumulation speed increases with appreciation of the real effective 
exchange rate.
One general conclusion can be formed basing on to-date empirical research. 
It appears that precautionary motive of reserves accumulation has dominated 
over other motives in the period following the Asian crisis. Central banks used 
large foreign reserves as an insurance or hedge against the risk of liquidating 
long-term investment projects in situation when country experiences sudden 
stop. Existing evidence shows that the cost of such hedge has been growing 
over time. Mark-to-market losses on reserves related to local currency 
appreciation may lead to massive losses in central banks balance sheets, 
in extreme cases topping 10 percent of GDP
8. Many countries face rising 
costs of sterilization, which are particularly high in situations when local 
interest rates are above the level of interest rates in the United States or in the 
Eurozone.
7 Cifarelli, Paladino (2007) present a discussion of previous empirical research utilizing 
buffer stock model. In particular they show that two strands of papers emerged. First one attempts 
to adopt the buffer stock model to emerging markets characteristics by adding proper institutional 
variables. Second one focuses on quantitative aspects of the cost- benefit structure, e.g. estimating 
relationship between reserves and the probability of costly default. For example Rodrik and 
Velasco (2000) estimated that the probability of the sudden stop would fall by 10 percent if 
a country fulfilled Greenspan-Guidotti rule.
8 Green,  Torgerson  (2007).99
2.  Is excessively prudent foreign exchange reserve 
management costly?
As discussed above the precautionary motive led to a purchase of a possibly 
very expensive insurance against the sudden stop risk. However sterilization 
costs and local currency appreciation implications may be relatively minor 
costs in relation to the opportunity cost of holding reserves accumulated 
over the years. Opportunity cost of holding reserves has been discussed in 
economic literature since 1960s
9. There were many attempts to measure the 
opportunity cost. For example Ben-Bassat, Gottlieb (1992) use a difference 
between return on capital in domestic projects
10 and interest income earned 
on reserve investment in foreign deposits and fixed income securities. Rodrik 
(2006) assumes reasonable spreads between the yield on reserve assets and the 
cost of foreign borrowing, and computes that the income loss to developing 
countries amounts to close to 1% of GDP. Paper argues that conditional on 
existing levels of short-term foreign borrowing, this does not seem too steep 
a price as an insurance premium against financial crises. Paper asks a question 
why developing countries have not tried harder to reduce short-term foreign 
liabilities in order to achieve the same level of net liquidity (thereby paying 
a smaller cost in terms of reserve accumulation) and concludes that it remains 
an important puzzle.
As shown above there are several definitions of the opportunity costs of 
holding large reserves, and each of them has short-comings. Therefore we 
propose our own concept of opportunity cost of holding ample reserves. The 
name implies that definition applies only to situations when level of central 
bank reserves is beyond what could be considered as adequate to fulfill 
central bank goals related to financial stability and exchange rate policy 
implementation. 
9 Kenen, Yudin (1965), Courchene, Youssef (1967), Flanders (1971), Frenkel, Jovanovic 
(1981), Edwards (1985), Landell-Mills (1989), Ben-Bassat, Gottlieb (1992).
10 They used a maximum of return on business projects and government projects. The latter 
was approximated by return on investment in infrastructure. The difference between real return 
on domestic projects and on foreign reserve investments was always positive in the analyzed 
case of Israel, and remained in the range 5 to 15 percentage points. This strand of literature used 
opportunity cost of holding reserves to estimate the demand for reserve assets, it did not focus on 
the forgone potential GDP growth.100 Is excessively prudent foreign exchange reserve management costly?
We define opportunity cost of holding ample reserves (OCHAR) as 
a forgone growth of GDP amid too conservative central bank reserve 
management
11.
The opportunity costs of holding ample reserves (OCHAR) depends on three 
factors: 
(1)   the size of reserves (the absolute size and the excess over the amount 
needed to perform central bank stability and exchange rate policy 
functions); 
(2)   the deviation of the strategy optimal in the long run from the actual 
investment strategy pursued by the central bank focused entirely on short-
term financial and economic stability objectives;
(3)   the country specific ability to translate additional income into socially 
useful projects with high social rate of return (road, telecom or knowledge 
infrastructure, education etc.).
Factors (1) and (2) combined correspond to opportunity cost concept 
discussed in economic literature in the past forty years, but we adopt a more 
sophisticated measure of forgone profits amid explicit assumptions related to 
actual and desired asset management styles.
We analyze all three factors below for a selected sample of countries
12, 
which accounts for c.a. 80% of global foreign exchange reserves. There are 
many rules of thumb regarding proper level of reserves: they should cover 
above three or above six months of imports of goods and services (depends 
on the exchange rate regime, the sign and size of trade balance, on country 
rating), they should cover certain percentage of money in circulation (5–20% 
depending on currency regime
13), and they should allow a country to survive 
without new loans for at least a year. The latest rule is called Greenspan-
11 We limit our analysis to central bank portfolios amid very limited information about asset 
size and investment styles of many sovereign wealth funds (truly exceptional in this respect is the 
Government Pension Fund of Norway which is a very transparent institution)
12 These countries are: Germany, France, Switzerland, Sweden, Poland, Hungary, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Japan, China, Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Russia, 
Norway, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Venezuela, Kuwait, Mexico, Algeria, United Arab Emirates, 
Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, South Africa, Sudan, Kenya, Botswana, Ghana. We excluded 
U.S.A. from the analysis as we think that it would be odd to add the biggest world debtor into the 
global assets analysis. The same could apply to Western European countries, as in every case the 
country short-term debt vastly exceeds country foreign exchange reserves.
13  Wijnholds, Beaufort, Kapteyn (2001)101 Is excessively prudent foreign exchange reserve management costly?
Guidotti rule and appears to be cited in the literature more often than other 
rules, so we also take this approach. We adopt the standard definition of the 
short-term debt and country liabilities payable to non-resident holders within 
one year, irrespective of the currency in which they are issued
14.
Figure 2 and table 1 below present foreign exchange reserves and outstanding 
short-term foreign debt for the sample of selected countries. It is evident 
that reserves are growing fast in every location with exception of developed 
countries in Western Europe and that reserves above the short-term debt are 
also rising fast. For the analyzed countries the total excess reserves according 
to Greenspan-Guidotti rule likely topped USD 3.5 trillion in 2007 compared 
with USD 500 billion a decade ago.












Note: short-term data for 2007 not available, we used data for 2007 Q2 
Source: IMF, BIS-OECD-IMF-World Bank
Above we calculated the first OCHAR factor, which was the easiest to 
calculate among the three factors. In order to identify the second OCHAR 
factor we have to make numerous assumptions. Firstly data on actual return 
on foreign reserves is available only for half of the sample of the analyzed 
countries
15. So while we calculate the second OCHAR factor for reporting 
countries, we will also make assumption what that factor estimate would be 
if central bank followed certain stylized investment strategy. We will define 
14  For a recent review of other reserve adequacy rules see Green, Torgerson (2007).
15 See table 6 in the appendix. Only 16 out of analyzed 33 countries reported return on 
reserves in for at least one year in 2004–2006 period. Out of 16 countries four report returns in 
local currency, which further complicates calculations.102 Is excessively prudent foreign exchange reserve management costly?
the typical central bank portfolio as US, eurozone and UK government bonds 
with duration 1–3 years. For comparative purposes we will use a long-term 
focused investment strategy often adopted by pension funds. We will also 
define a combined strategy which assumes that reserves consistent with 
Greenspan-Guidotti rule are invested according to the central bank typical 
style, while reserves above that level are invested according to stylized 
pension fund investment style.
Stylized central bank portfolio return was calculated on the basis of the 
rate of return for the weighted average of bond indices for the main reserve 
currencies (US Treasuries 1–3, EMU Government 1–3, UK Governments 
1–3). Currency composition of foreign reserves was obtained from the IMF 
COFER data. For the observations before 1995 currency composition for 
1995 was assumed. 
Stylized pension portfolio return was calculated on the basis of stylized 
central bank portfolio rate of return (with 40% weight) and weighted average 
of stock indices returns for the main reserve currencies (DowJones, DAX, 
FTSE). We assumed that such weighted average of stocks accounted for 60% 
of the pension portfolio.
Stylized combined portfolio return was calculated after splitting reserves into 
two parts: traditional reserves component and sovereign wealth component
16 
(excess over short term debt according to Greenspan-Guidotti rule). We 
assumed stylized central bank return for traditional part of reserves and more 
aggressive pension strategy for the sovereign wealth part of reserves.
16 Coming from the central banking community we do acknowledge that splitting reserved 
into “traditional reserves” and “sovereign wealth component” is controversial. It raises questions 
whether central banks should act as sovereign wealth managers given institutional constraints they 
face (see Bakker, van Herpt (2007)). Hildebrand (2007) asks a question whether it is appropriate at 
all to treat reserves above any rule the same way we treat assets in sovereign wealth funds. These 
are important considerations but in-depth discussion of these issues extends beyond the limited 
scope of our paper.103 Is excessively prudent foreign exchange reserve management costly?
Table 1: Reserves and short term debt in analyzed countries (USD m)
 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007Q2 2005 2006 2007*
 Reserves Short-term  debt Reserves exceeding
short-term debt
Germany 101675.9 111637.0 136234.4 988470.0 1091577.0 1344252.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
France 74360.0 98239.1 115717.2 748095.0 1038080.0 1249240.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Switzerland 57639.6 64497.5 75372.1 411942.0 419299.0 550819.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sweden 24890.1 28022.8 31037.4 156919.0 179865.0 202853.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Poland 42560.9 48474.2 65734.2 16564.0 17130.0 23339.0 25996.9 31344.2 42395.2
Hungary 18603.1 21590.0 24051.8 15899.0 18215.0 22928.0 2704.1 3375.0 1123.8
Czech
Republic
29363.8 31220.8 34594.3 11975.0 13005.0 13422.0 17388.8 18215.8 21172.3
Slovakia 15479.6 13364.0 18976.1 5929.0 6725.0 7462.0 9550.6 6639.0 11514.1
Japan 835505.7 880977.4 954144.7 426468.0 383513.0 380547.0 409037.7 497464.4 573597.7
China 825588.0 1072564.0 1534354.0 63106.0 79984.0 103817.0 762482.0 992580.0 1430537.0
Korea 210390.6 238956.2 262224.3 62719.0 100055.0 122804.0 147671.6 138901.2 139420.3
Thailand 52064.9 66984.7 87455.2 12774.0 14452.0 10654.0 39290.9 52532.7 76801.2
Taiwan 257952.1 270840.0 275027.0 38091.0 33184.0 50899.0 219861.1 237656.0 224128.0
Singapore 116172.0 136259.0 162957.0 82888.0 102490.0 123764.0 33284.0 33769.0 39193.0
Hong Kong 124278.3 133210.5 152701.9 79279.0 93368.0 97244.0 44999.3 39842.5 55457.9
Russia 182240.0 303732.4 476390.9 48444.0 57528.0 73553.0 133796.0 246204.4 402837.9
Norway 46985.9 56841.6 60839.6 74349.0 138649.0 181426.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Saudi Arabia 26759.9 27764.9 34014.4 13644.0 11886.0 19418.0 13115.9 15878.9 14596.4
Nigeria 28279.7 42298.8 51334.4 1930.0 4042.0 3802.0 26349.7 38256.8 47532.4
Venezuela 29636.8 36672.3 33477.1 6728.0 4629.0 5746.0 22908.8 32043.3 27731.1
Kuwait 8971.5 12675.8 16776.3 7320.0 8262.0 10770.0 1651.5 4413.8 6006.3
Mexico 74054.1 76270.5 87109.2 29002.0 31189.0 27554.0 45052.1 45081.5 59555.2
Algeria 56582.4 78207.7 110626.8 1076.9 989.0 910.0 55505.5 77218.7 109716.8
UAE 21010.3 27617.4 n.a 19608.0 27849.0 29728.0 1402.3 0.0 n.a
Brazil 53799.3 85838.9 180333.7 45583.0 45848.0 52370.0 8216.2 39990.9 127963.7
Argentina 28086.7 32026.0 46116.5 13793.9 13296.0 14883.0 14292.8 18730.0 31233.5
Chile 16932.5 19396.3 16842.2 12426.0 14470.0 16144.0 4506.5 4926.3 698.2
Colombia 14954.6 15437.2 20952.1 5733.0 5710.0 10388.0 9221.6 9727.2 10564.1
South Africa 20629.7 25586.9 32942.9 8615.0 15635.0 16480.0 12014.7 9951.9 16462.9
Sudan 1868.6 1659.9 1377.9 1904.5 1959.2 2105.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
Kenya 1799.1 2416.1 3355.2 529.9 625.8 730.2 1269.1 1790.2 2625.1
Botswana 6309.1 7992.4 n.a 50.0 32.0 46.0 6259.1 7960.4 n.a
Ghana 1897.4 2268.1 n.a 839.1 1194.8 742.8 1058.3 1073.4 n.a
*We used short-term debt for 2007 Q2.
Source: IMF, BIS-OECD-IMF-World Bank104 Is excessively prudent foreign exchange reserve management costly?
We begin by looking at the actual returns as reported by central banks in their 
annual reports. In our sample of 33 central banks only 16 report actual returns, 
and in four cases these returns are measured in local currency (Germany, 
France, Switzerland, Hong Kong), which makes it impossible to compare 
these returns with those achieved in other countries. Table 2 below presents 
the results
17. 
Table 2: Actual rates of return on foreign reserves
    Actual rates of return
 2004 2005 2006 2007
Western Europe Germany*   1.4% 1.7% 1.5%
 France* 2.0% 3.5% 3.8% 3.9%
 Switzerland* 2.3% 10.8% 1.9% 3.0%
 Sweden   2.0% 5.1%
CEE Poland 2.6% 2.6% 3.2%  5.4%
 Hungary   2.6% 3.6%  
 Czech  Republic 2.8% 2.6% 3.0%  
 Slovak  Republic   2.2% 2.4%  
Asia Hong Kong* 5.7% 3.1% 9.5% 11.8%
Oil exporting countries Russia   3.0% 3.8%  
 Norway  ** 7.8% 9.1% 7.30% 3.4%
 Mexico 2.0% 1.7% 4.9%  
 United  Arab  Emirates 1.3% 2.6% 2.7%  
Latin America Argentina*** 3.1% 3.1% 5.7%  
 Chile 1.8% 2.9% 2.5%  
 Colombia   2.7% 3.9%  
* indicates that returns were reported in local currency
**data refers to investment portfolio only
***return in USD terms
Source: Central banks annual reports and authors calculations.
It is evident, that in the era of low global interest rates central banks are 
not able to generate high rates of return on their reserves amid conservative 
investment strategies basing on high grade fixed income instrument in most 
liquid markets. Norges bank and Hong Kong Monetary Authority are notable 
exceptions, and they reported higher than typical central bank returns amid 
more diversified portfolio and more aggressive investment style, which 
17 Actual rates of return were obtained from the central banks’ annual reports. They were 
either reported directly or calculated on the basis of reported interest income on foreign exchange 
assets.105 Is excessively prudent foreign exchange reserve management costly?
includes equities
18. In the case of Norway the turmoil on the credit markets 
triggered by bursting bubble of the US housing market reduced investment 
results in 2007, especially in the second half of the year, so the rate of return 
was lower than in the previous years. Table 7 in the appendix presents the 
opportunity cost (first and second OCHAR factor put together) for countries 
that report actual returns on foreign reserves. For example this cost for CEE 
countries is estimated between 1.2 and 2.3% of GDP in 2006, for commodity 
exporters at 0.7–2.5% of GDP, measured against the stylized pension 
portfolio. In other words if central banks in CEE had pursued investment style 
typical for pension funds their profits would have been larger by 1.2–2.3% of 
GDP, which is a very large sum and often covers large percentage of budget 
deficit in these countries. 
Because we have very limited data on actual returns in what follows we 
assume that central bank allocate their reserves according to central bank 
stylized portfolio, and we measure the opportunity cost in comparison 
with stylized pension and combined portfolio. There are always several 
caveats of such analysis. Firstly, how far back one should go. With massive 
changes in the global economy and global financial markets – such as Great 
Moderation to mention one major structural change – we decided to follow 
Alan Greenspan advice and use the last 20 years of data that does respond 
to the Great Moderation period
19. Of course there is an immediate question 
whether our OCHAR calculations would still hold in the long run in the post 
Great Moderation period, with more volatility in the markets. Our answer is 
affirmative and we discuss it in the last part of this paper.
18  Swiss National Bank also manages a well diversified portfolio has included equities since 
2004, see Hildebrand (2007).
19 In this decision we follow Greenspan (2005) who said: “Over the past two decades, 
inflation has fallen notably, virtually worldwide, as has economic volatility. Although a complete 
understanding of the reasons remains elusive, globalization and innovation would appear to be 
essential elements of any paradigm capable of explaining the events of the past ten years. If this 
is indeed the case, because the extent of globalization and the speed of innovation are limited, 
the current apparent rapid pace of structural shift cannot continue indefinitely. While the outlook 
for the next year or two seems reasonably bright, the outlook for the latter part of this decade 
remains opaque because it is uncertain whether this transitional paradigm, if that is what it is, 
is already far advanced and about to slow, or whether it remains in an early, still-vibrant stage 
of evolution”. 106 Is excessively prudent foreign exchange reserve management costly?
































































































Cumulative Return on a Typical Central Bank 
Portfolio
Cumulative Return on a Typical Pension Portfolio
Source: Authors calculations based on Merill Lynch indices 
Second caveat is that even in a Great Moderation period returns on various 
portfolios vary a great deal, so it makes sense to use multi-year averages. We 
decided to use five-year average as it often corresponds to a central banker term 
in the office. In other words when central banker makes asset diversification 
decisions she would probably be concerned how these decisions affect returns 
on reserve assets during her term, as poor performance may lower chances 
of reelection
20.
Figure 4 below presents rolling cumulative returns for both investment strategies 
over the period of past five years, the data is plotted for each year between 
1990 and 2007. Few observations do stand out. Firstly, in low global interest 
rate environment stylized central bank portfolio returns exhibit downward 
trend. Secondly, in some years stylized pension portfolio returns were two to 
three times higher than stylized central bank portfolio returns. Finally in the 
periods following the burst of the Internet bubble pension portfolio did bring 
returns below the central bank portfolio, but it has never resulted in a capital 
loss over the five year period. So our stylized pension portfolio has yielded 
a successful capital protection strategy even in the aftermath of the bursting 
stock market bubble, assuming five year verification period.
20 We assume that central bankers love their jobs and they do want to be reelected or 
reappointed.107 Is excessively prudent foreign exchange reserve management costly?
Figure 4 shows also that pension portfolio volatility is much higher than 
central bank portfolio volatility.

















































































Cumulative Return on a Typical 
Central Bank Portfolio
Cumulative Return on a Typical 
Pension Portfolio
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Merill Lynch indices
In what follows we take the estimated annual differences in returns between 
central bank portfolio, pension portfolio and combined portfolio, take into 
account size of reserves and measure the opportunity cost as a percentage of 
GDP. Figure 5 below presents these results in the form of a five year arithmetic 
average for the whole sample of 33 countries. There are four periods: low 
reserves period with low opportunity cost; pre-internet- bubble period, when 
this cost stands at 0.4–0.9% of GDP; post-bubble period when opportunity 
cost turns negative; and in 2005–2007 the five year average opportunity cost 
turn positive again and reaches levels even higher than before the Internet 
bubble crisis.108 Is excessively prudent foreign exchange reserve management costly?





















































































Hypothetical opportunity cost,  5-year 
average return, as a percentage of 
GDP, pension portfolio
Hypothetical opportunity cost,  5-year 
average return, as a percentage of 
GDP, combined portfolio
Source: IMF, BIS-OECD-IMF-World Bank, Merill Lynch indices, authors’ calculations.
Figure 6: Hypothetical opportunity cost as a percentage of GDP, pension portfolio, 















Source: IMF, BIS-OECD-IMF-World Bank, MerillLynch indices, authors’ calculations.
21 Short-term debt data for 2007 not available, we used the data for 2007 Q2, for the period 
1990–1996 reserves data for some countries (Taiwan, Russia, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, 
Hong Kong) are missing, for those years we calculated average opportunity cost excluding 
countries with missing data.109 Is excessively prudent foreign exchange reserve management costly?
The average opportunity cost masks wide differences between groups of 
countries. As shown in figure 6 in mid-90s CEE countries faced highest 
opportunity cost of around 1.5% of GDP (measured against pension portfolio), 
while for remaining groups of countries this cost stood between 0.5 and 1% 
of GDP. The reason for that is high reserves/GDP ratio in CEE countries, 
which was equal to 18% in 1999. In the same year reserves amounted to 13% 
of GDP in Asia and not more than 10% in the rest of analyzed countries. In 
2007, however Asia was the biggest reserve holder with reserves equal to 
36% of GDP, while the same ratio for CEE countries amounted to “only”18%. 
In line with sharp rise of reserves, the highest five-year average opportunity 
cost was calculated for Asian countries, closely followed by oil exporters and 
by CEE countries
22.
Table 3: Total, hypothetical opportunity cost for different alternative investment 
strategies (USD million or % GDP, sample of 33 countries, data for each year)
 2004 2005 2006 2007*
Stylized central bank portfolio return 51 357.3 64 657.4 135 366.5 323 001.2
Stylized pension portfolio return 101 433.5 171 848.7 483 453.5 429 447.8
Stylized combined portfolio return 81 878.2 129 742.7 358 123.5 395 442.8
Hypothetical opportunity cost, pension 
portfolio 50 076.2 107 191.2 348 087.0 106 446.7
Hypothetical opportunity cost, 
combined portfolio 30 520.9 65 085.3 222 757.0 72 441.6
Hypothetical opportunity cost as 
a percentage of GDP, pension portfolio 0.29% 0.56% 1.69% 0.46%
Hypothetical opportunity cost as 
a percentage of GDP, combined 
portfolio
0.17% 0.34% 1.08% 0.31%
*We used short-term debt for 2007 Q2.
Source:   Authors’ calculations based on IMF, WEO, BIS-OECD-IMF-World Bank data and Merill Lynch 
indices
22 At the National Bank of Poland we conducted the following exercise. We assumed that we 
are allowed to invest in ten currencies (USD, EUR, GBP, CHF, JPY, DKK, SEK, NOK, AUD, 
CAD) and there are no limits on the share of a particular currency. We conducted the optimization 
procedure, using PLN as base currency and assumed investments in asset classes that we actually 
use (governments and high rated agencies). We then selected the optimal unconstrained portfolio, 
which had the same volatility as the actual portfolio (the same risk related to volatility of returns). 
This theoretical portfolio had a return of 2.7 pp. higher than the actual one, on average each year, 
which could have translated into 0.4–0.5% of GDP of additional revenue to the budget each 
year. The currency structure of the theoretical portfolio would have probably been unacceptable 
amid to high share of CAD and NOK, which are not liquid enough markets given the size of 
Poland’s reserves. But this exercise shows what is the magnitude of the opportunity cost, even 
before one starts to think about opportunity costs related to diversification across asset classes.110 Is excessively prudent foreign exchange reserve management costly?
Tables 3 and 4 show opportunity cost estimates for the last four years, in each of 
these years for both pension and combined portfolio. For 2006 this hypothetical 
cost for analyzed Asian countries was estimated at 2.7% of GDP or 239 billion 
dollars. In 2007 the cost decreased to 0.75% of GDP as a result o significant 
increase of rate of return on typical central bank portfolio and decrease of return 
on typical pension portfolio. Opportunity cost estimates for individual countries 
for the period 2005–2007 are presented in table 8 in the appendix.
Table 4: Hypothetical opportunity cost as a percentage of GDP, by group of countries 
(USD million).
  Hypothetical opportunity cost, 
pension portfolio
Hypothetical opportunity cost, 
combined portfolio
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2004 2005 2006 2007*
Western Europe  4491.7 8134.2 25852.7 7475.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CEE 1573.3 3334.9 9801.7 2990.3 957.0 1750.4 5093.1 1589.6
Asia  35836.4 76192.4 239361.8 71523.8 25358.7 52116.0 170365.2 52964.7
Oil exporting 
countries
6090.4 14928.0 56603.1 18159.5 3736.5 9430.9 39249.5 13933.5
Latin America  1674.6 3579.2 13054.6 5512.0 272.6 1140.0 6273.0 3555.7
Africa  409.8 1022.5 3413.2 785.9 196.1 648.1 1776.2 398.2
 
Hypothetical opportunity cost 
as a percentage of GDP. pension 
portfolio
Hypothetical opportunity cost as 
a percentage of GDP. combined 
portfolio
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2004 2005 2006 2007*
Western Europe  0.08% 0.14% 0.43% 0.11% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
CEE 0.31% 0.57% 1.50% 0.37% 0.19% 0.30% 0.78% 0.20%
Asia  0.45% 0.90% 2.72% 0.75% 0.32% 0.62% 1.93% 0.55%
Oil exporting 
countries
0.27% 0.55% 1.76% 0.48% 0.17% 0.35% 1.22% 0.37%
Latin America  0.17% 0.27% 0.83% 0.29% 0.03% 0.09% 0.40% 0.19%
Africa  0.15% 0.33% 1.00% 0.20% 0.07% 0.21% 0.52% 0.10%
*We used short-term debt for 2007 Q2.
Source:   Authors’ calculations based on IMF, WEO, BIS-OECD-IMF-World Bank data and MerrillLynch 
Indices
We have estimated above two out of three OCHAR factors. Estimating the 
third factor is even more difficult, and there are very few studies and very 
limited data on government ability to generate projects with high social rate 
of return, and there is hardly any data available to measure what percentage 
of the “windfall profit” will be spent on such welfare-enhancing projects, 111 Is excessively prudent foreign exchange reserve management costly?
and what will be spent on current consumption or growth reducing social 
hand-outs, very much in line with windfall proceeds from the first oil shock. 
Alternatively, governments may decide to save part of the proceeds for 
future generations, as was indeed the case in many of commodity exporting 
countries: Norway, Russia, Venezuela, Trynidad and Tobago, Botswana, 
Nigeria, Kazakhstan, Korea, Chile and Kuwait have invested part of its 
foreign exchange reserves through special purpose funds that aim to preserve 
national wealth
23. Many oil exporting countries are heavily investing to 
improve infrastructure and to develop alternative activities, where Dubai 
Outsource Zone
24 serves as the best example. 
In order to estimate OCHAR we will assume that governments invest 100 percent 
of extra profits made by central banks to improve the national infrastructure, 
which is often a growth bottle-neck in many emerging economies. There are 
of course other ways of public spending that stimulate long-term growth and 
potentially have higher growth multiplier than spending on infrastructure, for 
instance education or well-targeted research and development. In this version 
of the paper however we focus on the infrastructure development, but we do 
acknowledge that the OCHAR estimates based on this spending assumption 
may be in the lower end of the actual OCHAR, when all desired public 
investment opportunities are taken into account
25.
An adequate supply of infrastructure services is an essential ingredient 
for productivity and growth
26. Aschauer (1989) in his classic study used 
a Cobb-Douglas production function to analyze 1970’s data from the United 
States. He found that the output elasticity of public investment in core 
infrastructure was about 0.4. Which means that 1% increase in investment in 
public infrastructure would lead to a 0.4% increase in output of the private 
sector. Wylie (1996) obtained similar results for Canada. He concluded that 
the investment in infrastructure, especially public one, has significant and 
positive role to play in national economic growth and productivity
27. However 
23 Pringle, Carver (2007), Johnson-Calari, Rietveld (2007), presentations at the World Bank 
Sovereign Investment Partnerships forum, Washington, 16–18 April 2007.
24 www.doz.ae
25  On the other hand one can assume that going forward significant percentage of central bank 
reserves in countries holding ample reserves will be allocated to SWFs (recently in Korea, plans 
announced in China and Japan). In such case, if profits of SWFs are retained, then our OCHAR 
estimate may be too high as investments in physical or intellectual assets will not be forgone, they 
will be shifted to the future. We reiterate that the 3
rd OCHAR factor is country-specific as there 
are “good governments” as well as “bad governments” when it comes to spending extra revenues. 
Here we use “average government” assumption for all countries.
26  Calderón , Servén (2004).
27 Wylie  (1996).112 Is excessively prudent foreign exchange reserve management costly?
elasticities derived from different studies vary significantly. The frame 
below presents results obtained for United States and Japan. 1% increase 
in investment in public infrastructure would lead to 0.03%–0.39% increase 
in the output of the private sector. One may expect that output elasticity is 
higher in developing countries, as road and telecommunication infrastructure 
is much more underdeveloped there. Indeed Calderón and Servén (2003) find 
that lagging infrastructure accounts for about one-fifth of the GDP growth 
differential between Latin America and East Asia over the last 20 years – 
nearly one percentage point per annum. This suggests that the growth payoff 
from infrastructure catch-up would be quite significant
28.
In what follows we use the highest estimate presented in Munnell (1992) – see 
the frame below – to calculate forgone GDP growth. The result is presented 
in the table 5 below. We calculated average forgone GDP growth for four 
periods 1990–1995, 1996–1999, 2000–2003, 2004–2007. In the first, second 
and fourth period cost was positive. The third period, which corresponds to 
the dot-com bubble burst, was characterized by negative cost. It means that 
stylized central bank portfolio was more profitable than stylized pension 
portfolio, and as a result central banks transferred more profit to the state 
budgets than under more diversified investment strategies. It is however 
worth repeating that the cumulative 5-year return was never negative in the 
analyzed period for any of the analyzed strategies. 
Source: Munnell (1992)
28  Calderón , Servén (2003). 113 Is excessively prudent foreign exchange reserve management costly?
Table 5: OCHAR estimates 1990–2007. 
 1990–1995 1996–1999 2000–2002 2003–2007 1990–2007
  Pension
Western Europe 0.01% 0.23% –0.27% 0.12% 0.04%
CEE 0.11% 0.74% –0.91% 0.46% 0.18%
Asia 0.03% 0.50% –0.82% 0.66% 0.17%
Oil exporting countries 0.04% 0.42% –0.58% 0.42% 0.13%
Latin America 0.05% 0.35% –0.42% 0.25% 0.10%
Africa 0.03% 0.32% –0.46% 0.23% 0.07%
  Combined
Western Europe n.a. 0.10% 0.00% 0.00% 0.03%
CEE n.a. 0.42% –0.50% 0.26% 0.12%
Asia n.a. 0.24% –0.49% 0.46% 0.15%
Oil exporting countries n.a. 0.14% –0.23% 0.25% 0.09%
Latin America n.a. 0.04% –0.07% 0.08% 0.03%
Africa n.a. 0.15% –0.18% 0.11% 0.05%
(unweighted average, for the elasticity equal to 0.39). 
Source: Authors’ calculations
As shown in this section OCHAR can be very high. In 2003–2007 
hypothetical OCHAR amounted to almost 0.7% of forgone GDP growth for 
Asian countries, while oil exporters and CEE economies lost almost 0.5% 
per annum and Latin American countries lost 0.3% of GDP growth in the last 
three years. Of course in a very bad year, such as the stock exchange crash, 
the OCHAR can turn negative, as was the case for all countries in 2000–2002 
period. But as shown in figure 3 and table 5 the cumulative return on stylized 
pension portfolio has been much higher then on stylized central bank portfolio, 
so the cumulative OCHAR over that last twenty years was high and positive. 
Average forgone GDP growth for the whole period 1990–2007 was positive, 
and amounted to 0.18% in CEE, 0.17% in Asia and 0.13% in oil exporting 
countries. These estimates are not high, which is mainly the result of negative 
opportunity cost during the period 2000–2002. Going forward many countries 
face very large opportunity costs of holding ample reserves, given forecasts 
of further reserves growth, forgone GDP growth may top 0.5% per annum in 
the long run.
These are conservative estimates using infrastructure multipliers, while we 
should assume that if extra central bank profit is invested in R&D, or in 
education which could have much higher marginal return in the knowledge 114 Is excessively prudent foreign exchange reserve management costly?
economy, then increase in the potential GDP amid less conservative reserve 
management can be even larger over the long run
29.
29 “Government clearly has a role in financing basic research, but government programs to 
finance commercial R&D have a mixed record. The government often has difficulty in selecting 
appropriate research projects and in motivating researchers to focus on developing viable projects. 
Researchers applying for grants have an incentive to present the prospects of success in the best 
possible light to increase their chances of receiving funding. Research administrators in turn 
have incentives to tell their superiors that prospects for success are bright in order to increase the 
budgets of their divisions”. (Glennerster R., Kremer M. (2000)). Public R&D spending may thus 
turn wasteful or unproductive. One can escape from that limitation using a maximum of return on 
business projects and government projects (see Ben-Bassat, Gottlieb (1992)) while estimating the 
opportunity cost. It is equivalent to the assumption that the government either finances R&D by 
itself, or lowers taxes in order to stimulate private R&D spending.115
3.  How central banks change their thinking about 
reserves management.
Opportunity cost of holding ample reserves (OCHAR) is a new concept, but is 
closely related to opportunity cost idea discussed in economic literature in the 
past forty years. However it was only in the last few years that central banks 
collectively started to think in these terms when taking reserve management 
decisions. There is overwhelming evidence now that central banks will 
manage foreign exchange reserves differently in the 21st century, than they 
managed in the 20th century. Previously often almost 100 percent weight was 
given to the following goals: capital preservation, the role of lender of last 
resort, the intervention needs, preventing financial crises. Nowadays these 
goals remain very important, but the ample level of reserves increased the 
weight attached by central bankers to the return on reserve assets. There are 
also other factors, nicely put together by Rietveld and Pringle (2007):
“What changed? Countries have become better stewards of their 
national wealth, with commodity revenues now being channeled into 
endowment funds for social and economic purposes rather than private 
bank accounts or politically-inspired investments. The production of 
manufactured goods has shifted massively to emerging market countries, 
creating the accumulation of national wealth in the form of foreign 
currency reserves. Finally, governments have benefited from “windfall” 
revenues from the privatization of state-owned companies “.
There are two different types of strategies being pursued. Some countries 
(a clear minority, e.g. Mexico, Slovakia and Switzerland) try to estimate 
what is the “optimal” level of reserves, and achieve this level via various 
transactions on the market or with other local stakeholders. This approach 
could be modeled using approach proposed in Green, Torgerson (2007), 
where the optimal level of reserves R
* can be formally determined such that 
marginal cost of holding reserves equals marginal revenue.116 How central banks change their thinking about reserves management.
Figure 7: Possible reserves marginal revenue and marginal cost, and the equilibrium 
level of reserves.
Source: Green, Torgerson (2007), authors modifications. 
However majority of central banks have adopted a different approach. Instead 
of targeting the optimal level of reserves (which often cannot be precisely 
determined and changes over time, similarly to the natural rate and potential 
output estimates) they choose to increase returns on existing pool of reserves 
in order to reduce OCHAR, which can be sizeable as shown in the previous 
section. This is equivalent to the following strategy depicted in figure 8.
Figure 8: Possible reserves marginal revenue and marginal cost, and yield 
enhancement strategy
Source: Green, Torgerson (2007), authors modifications. 117 How central banks change their thinking about reserves management.
Yield enhancement strategy (for example by adopting a stylized pension 
investment style) may lead to higher marginal revenue curve MR’, and the 
higher level of reserves R’>R*, which can also become the optimal level 
of reserves. For high-rated countries, which face low borrowing costs this 
strategy may be very tempting. In the long run the country can borrow at 
low cost, and amid high rating will face slowly upward sloping marginal cost 
curve. However a properly diversified investment portfolio with a proper long-
term horizon may lead to high marginal revenue curve, and this would result 
in a very large equilibrium level of reserve assets. These properties have been 
used by United States on the macro level, which in the post Bretton Woods 
period enjoyed twice as high return on its total foreign assets (6.82%) that cost 
of its liabilities (3.5%), which was labeled as the “US exorbitant privilege”
30.
One can try to formalize the reserves management change process in the 
following way. A country has a given social preference function related to 
reserves. We may assume that central bank utility function is identical to the 
social preference function. In general terms it can be written as:
) , , (
) ( ) (
 
   
  risk return f L  
where first derivatives of utility with respect to return and risk are positive 
and negative respectively, and α denotes bank’s risk appetite. The central 
banks face problem of maximizing such a utility function subject to various 
constraints, such as:
Appropriate part of reserves should be invested in liquid markets, which  • 
implies that liquidity can be sourced from these markets instantly and the 
loss of reserves value resulting from such transaction cannot be significant 
(related to spread, or to market ability to absorb sizeable asset sales);
Currency structure and also general guidelines for asset structure of  • 
reserves should be relatively stable in short run;
Changes in central bank investment policy should be market neutral; • 
Some countries, depending on the level of reserves, the exchange  • 
rate regime or the exports structure may wish to impose other “expert 
constraints” in the optimization process. For example commodity exporter 
may wish to reduce exposure to currencies that are positively correlated 
with commodity prices; some less developed countries may wish to invest 
in currencies which are used in import invoicing, etc.
30  See Gourinchas, Rey (2005).118 How central banks change their thinking about reserves management.
To illustrate this problem consider maximization of a very simple utility 
function:
max(αE(S) – (1 – α)Var(S)
Where  S denotes investment portfolio, E and Var denote expected return 
and variance of returns respectively. In optimization process the volatility of 
returns related to exchange rates was by an order of magnitude higher that 
the volatility related to interest rate changes. Hence it was natural for central 
banks to determine the optimal currency allocation as a minimum variance 
portfolio on the efficiency frontier. However, it implied that α was set to zero 
in the above utility maximization problem. Now it appears that many central 
banks are gradually raising their risk appetite which corresponds to adopting 
higher (non-zero) α in the optimization process, and central banks are also 
moving across different efficiency frontiers, as shown on figure 9 below.
We are aware that not every central bank used formal optimization techniques 
in order to optimize currency structure of the reserves portfolio. Often such 
decisions are taken on the basis of the expert view, are affected by the country 
exchange rate regime, export or import structure, and the need for investment 
policy changes to be market neutral. However even in such case the above 
modeling framework would apply to the thinking process about reserves 
management in the 21st century.
Central banks are changing their reserve management strategies also by 
improving risk management, by building in house capacity to invest in new 
asset classes or cooperating with external asset managers. There is vast 
literature with examples of such strategies and large investment banks are 
producing numerous reports on this topic. So it is not necessary to repeat 
this evidence here. However it is worth looking at the chart below in order to 
understand the journey the central banks embarked on some time ago. 119 How central banks change their thinking about reserves management.






















Source:   World Bank Treasury presentation, authors’ modifications. This figure is for illustrative purposes 
only.
This stylized journey started some time ago, with central banks pursuing a very 
conservative capital protection strategy, which implied very safe investments, 
such as deposits with highly rated institutions. This is the low-left box-mark 
in figure 9. Then central banks realized, that capital protection strategy may 
be relaxed a bit, to allow for a very low likelihood of limited capital loss 
in the short run. This implied enhancing central bank reserves portfolio 
by adding treasuries of largest developed countries, usually US treasuries, 
German bunds, UK gilts, and similar instruments denominated in Japanese 
yen or in Swiss franc, but to a much lesser degree. However the old, very 
rigid risk limits were still in place, which implied that central banks were not 
able to achieve risk-return profiles implied by treasury efficient frontier. The 
situation improved with better risk management systems put in place. Then 
central banks continued their journey, started diversifying across currencies 
(in some countries in the eurozone the reverse was observed in order to 
reduce balance sheet volatility) and started adding new instruments. There 
are some examples of central banks which invest in emerging markets and 
in hedge funds. On one of the trips to London one of the authors found, that 
a London-based hedge found has received a mandate from an Asian central 
bank to invest in CEE4 currencies. It has been reported, that the Singapore 
GIC achieved the annual average return of 9.5% in the past 25 years, and 
GIC is probably a very good example of the monetary authority that “sits” on 
a very high efficiency frontier. 120 How central banks change their thinking about reserves management.
One should also observe that diversification across instruments and currencies 
makes it possible to move up-left, i.e. it is possible to improve returns and 
reduce volatility of returns at the same time. This is not a free lunch however, 
there are other types of risk that do increase, such as liquidity risk, which 
may become a significant source of capital losses as shown so painfully in the 
current credit markets turmoil. 
4.  What are the implications of the global change in 
reserves management?
 As documented by actions and by public announcements many central banks 
have already embarked or are planning to embark on a journey that leads to 
a more efficient reserves management. Recent creation of the new investment 
company in China – China Investment Corporation – new investment funds 
in Korea and Japan, increasing allocation to equities from 40% to 60% by 
Norway Pension Fund or more aggressive allocation of Russian oil export 
proceeds, serve as best examples.
This will imply slow but sure move towards more diversified portfolios 
(across currencies and instruments), while at the same time monetary policy 
goals and financial stability needs will remain binding constraints.
This trend, which appears to be a commonly shared vision in the vast majority 
of public sector institutions (central banks and sovereign wealth funds) jointly 
managing more than 9 trillion dollars, is likely to result in shift of relative demand 
across asset classes. It will likely be associated with further effects, as public 
institutions actions tend to coordinate private sector actions around trends.
These trends would probably imply gradual reallocation of reserve assets 
away from treasury bonds and away from the dollar-denominated assets. 
While many central banks ruled out net sales of dollars, it is not a universal 
assumption, for example the National Bank of Poland was a net seller of 
dollars and US treasuries in the last two years and the share of US dollar in 
its portfolio fell from 50% to 40%. So far the IMF COFER data does not 121
indicate that central banks started to move away from dollars, and public 
announcement by countries which hold large reserves assets and have 
currencies pegged to the dollar reaffirm this view
31.
This long term shift away from dollars and towards riskier assets, ceteris 
paribus, could provide additional safety cushion to emerging markets in the 
post Great Moderation period. Global Financial Stability Report published 
by the IMF in April 2008 argues that there are several risks to continuation 
of remarkable emerging markets stability in the face of the global credit 
and confidence crisis. Namely, parent banks may pare back funding to their 
emerging markets subsidiaries, balance sheet contraction may reduce funding 
and raise funding costs for investments by hedge funds and other institutions 
investing in emerging markets, emerging markets financial institutions may 
yet prove vulnerable to financial contagion and a spike in exchange rate 
volatility could slow or reverse flows into emerging markets fixed income 
classes. These risks may materialize, especially in countries with high 
external imbalances and with large share of short-term financing. However at 
the same time reserves managers may use the opportunity to accelerate asset 
diversification to benefit from much more attractive valuations than in the 
last few years
32, thus providing a safety cushion for emerging markets with 
sound fundamentals. 
This is also consistent with weakening of the US dollar
33 and steepening of 
the US yield curve at the same time (whether it is rising long term rates and 
falling short term rates depends on the US growth and inflation outlook, 
which is not relevant for our discussion). On balance it should contribute to 
reducing the global imbalances problem in the long run.
In May 2007 version of this paper we wrote that ceteris paribus was not 
a relevant assumption here. We argued that credit derivatives markets 
31 Although one has to acknowledge that the US dollar peg is complicating macroeconomic 
situation in some GCC countries. While these countries should be raising rates amid high inflation, 
the Federal Reserve has been cutting rates to avoid credit-crunch led recession, which limits the 
GCC central banks ability to raise rates.
32 Example of such diversification is a series of investments by emerging markets SWFs 
in large US, Swiss and British financial institutions in the last few quarters. There is however 
a debate whether SWFs moved in too quickly and “burnt their fingers” as the mark-to-market 
valuations few months after the purchases shows significant losses. It is however worth recalling, 
that SWFs have much longer investment horizons than typical private sector investors and may 
pay more attention to fundamental valuations that to quarterly mark-to-market outcomes.
33  US dollar perspectives will also depend on the home bias developments in the US. It the last 
few years US investors have diversified assets internationally and the home bias fell. It remains 
to be seen whether the dollar weakening that took place in 2007 and 2008 to date will reduce or 
reverse this process.122 What are the implications of the global change in reserves management?
could be a source of large shocks and that originate-to-distribute business 
model made it impossible to understand what the risks are and how they are 
distributed across institutions and across borders. Late 2007 and early 2008 
did show that it was the case indeed.
US subprime credit crisis and implosion of credit derivatives markets indicate 
that asset valuations in the last few years did not reflect all risks properly and 
currently markets are in the process of finding the new equilibrium, where 
liquidity risk will be adequately priced. Similarly the changes in global reserve 
management imply continued trend towards new equilibrium, where relative 
prices of various asset classes will find its 21
st century steady state, in which 
some assets prices will likely have very little in common with their historical 20
th 
century averages. This trend will probably be interrupted from time to time by 
bouts of volatility related to sentiment shifts in this or that market (with subprime 
crisis as far sigma example of such event). Recent evidence of sovereign wealth 
funds purchases confirms that such episodes will be used by public sector asset 
managers (including central banks) to accelerate asset diversification. 
In May 2007 version of this paper we also asked a question what if central 
banks moved too far with yield enhancement strategy, and they invested in 
markets that appeared liquid in a world within two-sigma deviations, and then 
four-sigma global event hit the markets. Will these markets remain liquid, 
will central banks be able to take timely actions to preserve liquidity and 
stability? Few moths later such a global shock did happen. Well, with shocks 
becoming increasingly global
34 this global stability responsibility obviously 
lies with the biggest central banks, banks of rich countries which do not have 
large opportunity costs of poor investment strategies and possibly with PBoC, 
which faces huge opportunity costs but also has huge reserves to be utilized 
for monetary policy and stability purposes. Another question is whether large 
central banks should act in such event? This is a Greenspan-put question, 
beyond the scope of discussion in this paper. So it appears that as long as 
smaller central banks in emerging markets have trust in the ability of large 
central banks
35 to deal with global shocks, they may afford to improve the 
returns on their reserves to a certain degree.
34  In the late 20th century Federal Reserve assumed this responsibility in the face of Russian 
and LTCM crisis. In the 21st century it will likely be joined in this role by ECB and PBoC, with 
smaller global roles played by BoJ and SAMA. On global nature of shocks see for example 
Ehrmann, Fratzscher (2006).
35 Multilateral consultations coordinated by IMF with the participation of United States, 
Eurozone, China, Saudi Arabia and Japan are testing the ability of large stakeholders of global 
imbalances to deal with this issue. See IMFC statement http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/
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One more trend, which is slow but deterministic, is the financial deepening 
in Asia. This is a welcome development, because in the long run highest 
returns should be expected in regions with highest potential growth rates. 
This is probably Asia in the first 50 years of the 21
st century, and Africa in the 
following 50 years. This trend will have gradual but far reaching impact of 
global reserve management. It is likely that in 20-30 years Asian currencies 
will have a large share in central bank portfolios around the world, and this 
share could dwarf dollar and euro if the single Asian currency is created.
Let us restate our main claim in this section. We are in an unprecedented process 
of finding a new 21
st century steady state in terms of relative prices of various 
asset classes
36. Actually this equilibrium should have been found already, but 
the fact that big chunk of financial intermediation takes place via central banks, 
which behave in a different manner than private institutions and individuals, 
has delayed the process. But the common, collective mindset, to improve 
reserves management by central banks and sovereign wealth funds will slowly 
remove this distortion. Let’s hope this will be a smooth adjustment.
Global collective move of central banks towards more diversified portfolios 
will also gradually take away US “exorbitant privilege”, by shifting it to 
reserve abundant emerging markets. This will not be a zero-sum game, as 
more diversified and more efficient reserve allocation will result in higher 
global growth, which will be a positive sum outcome, with higher percentage 
slice of the bigger pie going to emerging markets.
This section puts forward a number of hypotheses that will be tested in 
the coming years. The empirical research on the topic of global reserves 
diversification and its impact on asset prices is still rare
37, and this issue will 
certainly attract more attention of researchers in the coming years.
36 For example B-rated and BB-rated emerging market CDS spreads fell below spreads on 
similarly rated US corporate in 2007, see BIS(2007). Another example is given by PIMCO (2007) 
research which notes that local and external market debt have been among the most stable asset 
classes in the episode of market volatility in late February – March 2007. Finally, as documented 
by JPMorgan (2006), the correlation between VXY and EM-VXY, which are volatility indices for 
G-7 and for emerging markets has gone up significantly in recent two-three years, which reflects 
the fact that global investors cross asset classes borders much more often than before. 
37 A very good survey and some early empirical results are reported in the IMF Global 
Financial Stability Report (2007).124
5. Conclusions
Foreign exchange reserves held by central banks rose to 6.4 trillion dollars 
in 2007 from 1.5 trillion a decade ago and are expected to rise further 
in the coming years. Sovereign wealth funds manage assets in excess of 
2.5–3 trillion dollars. This paper presents motives behind rapid reserves 
growth and proposes a concept of OCHAR – Opportunity Cost of Holding 
Ample Reserves – which is defined as a forgone GDP growth amid too 
conservative reserve management by central banks. We estimate OCHAR for 
a sample of 33 countries which account for 80% of total central bank reserves. 
We also argue, that unlike in the 20
th century, where central banks used to be 
very secretive institutions, 21
st century central banking is characterized by 
widespread knowledge sharing and transparency. Therefore best practices, 
such as inflation targeting or efficient reserve management spread out quickly 
and are adopted by increasing number of central banks. Thus central banks 
collectively embarked on a reserves diversification journey, it does appear 
to be the central banks collective mindset and we can speak of the global 
reserves management in 21
st century. At the end of the paper we put forward 
several hypotheses of what could be the consequences of this diversification 
journey. It seems that relative prices of various assets will find new steady 
states, which may have little in common with relative valuations seen in 20
th 
century. We also expect that slowly, over time, US “exorbitant privilege” 
will be eliminated. Finally we consider global stability risks in the context of 
the new reserves management style adopted by central banks. We postulate 
that due to the increasingly global nature of shocks as long as central banks 
and governments in countries-stakeholders of global imbalances focus their 
actions on maintaining global price and financial stability, central banks in 
smaller emerging markets can afford to improve reserve management without 
incurring additional stability risk.
In our analysis we encountered significant problems with access to data on 
central bank reserves, such as investment structure, currency composition 
and returns achieved in the past. This problem is particularly severe in some 
Asian countries. We therefore welcome IMF initiatives such as CPIS and 
JEDH
38 and we are of the opinion that expanding these initiatives to include 
multilaterally agreed format of reporting reserves structure and reserve 
returns would be a further desirable step in the right direction. 
38  See IMF (2007), page 77.125
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During the last decade, derivatives markets became an asset class of their 
own and influenced the financial landscape strongly. While the financial 
sector contributes positively to overall economic growth in many studies up 
to the mid nineties, a positive contribution of the financial sector to economic 
growth in mature market economies is less evident with more recent data. 
What has happened? Is the rapid growth of derivative markets a catalyst 
for changes in the financial sector? Did the impact of asset management on 
the economy change? Drawing on the Merton and Bodie (1995) functional 
perspective, this paper tries to explain this change by discussing the spheres 
of derivative impact. We find that derivatives appear to fill part of the gap that 
traditional products and participants recently face in explaining the fostering 
of economic development.
1 Bernhard Sammer is a graduate student, Peter Haiss is a lecturer at the Institute of 
International Business, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business and is with Bank 
Austria, member of UniCredit Group. The opinions expressed are the authors’ personal view and 
not necessarily those of institutions the authors are affilitated with. The authors are indebted to 
helpful comments by Gerhard Fink, Bernhard Mahlberg and the Finance-Growth-Nexus Team at 
WU-Wien, http://www.wu-wien.ac.at/europainstitut/forschung/nexus.134
1. Introduction
The establishment of the first derivative exchanges in the seventies and 
eighties and the appearance of derivative product innovations gave asset 
managers and market participant’s a large access to a broad range of 
new financial instruments and enabled the development of new trading 
strategies.
2 New possibilities of risk sharing and risk diversification uncovered 
interdependencies between the various sectors of the financial market in 
a transparent way. The development of new asset classes and changing 
institutional structures can a priori be expected to strengthen the financial 
sectors ability to foster economic growth. The question if financial markets 
have a positive influence on economic growth (Schumpeter, 1911/1959, 
Goldsmith, 1969, McKinnon, 1973) and if financial development enhances 
growth or vice-versa (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1988, Pagano, 1993) has 
been discussed for many years. While many studies up to the mid 90s showed 
a positive link between the financial sector and economic growth (King 
and Levine, 1993), recent theoretical and empirical work by Rousseau and 
Wachtel (2006) shows a weakening link. What has caused the finance-growth 
relationship becoming less robust when using more recent data? Are there 
changes in the structure of the financial markets that have influenced this link 
sustainable? Did the advent of derivatives markets encourage speculation 
in the underlying asset markets, diverting private and public resources from 
efficient allocation (Tobin, 1984)? 
To cope with the rapid financial development, various scholars have extended 
previous finance-growth studies by including additional financial sectors 
and segments (e.g. Obstfeld, 1994; Levine and Zervos, 1998; Fink, Haiss, 
Hristoforova, 2006; Haiss and Sümegi, 2008; Haiss and Pantel 2008), industry 
effects (Rajan and Zingales, 1998), the role of law (LaPorta et al, 1998), and 
integration and liberalisation effects (Rusek, 2004; Haiss and Fink, 2006; 
Pichler et al, 2008). Significant differences could be caused by the growth 
of derivatives exchanges, by the process of liberalization and integration 
within the financial markets, the appearance of new institutional investors as 
pension funds, insurance companies and hedge funds, and by new techniques 
of taking and transferring risk. New financial products, improved computer 
and telecommunication techniques and advances in the theory of finance have 
generated rapid changes in the structures of global financial markets. Progress 
2 While not all derivatives are new – some were actually traded e.g. at the Amsterdam 
Securities Exchange in the 1600s – the emphasis here is on their growth and wide-spread usage.135 Introduction
in the finance theory has strongly influenced a wide spectrum of finance 
applications and has enabled advancements in asset allocation models, 
performance measurement and risk management (Merton and Bodie, 2005).
The rise of derivatives markets sticks out in the change to the financial 
architecture. “Finance science has contributed fundamentally to the remarkable 
rate of globalization of the financial systems” (Merton and Bodie, 2005) 
and derivative instruments function as “adapter” for the integration of the 
markets. They allow the flow of funds and risk sharing among national 
systems with different institutional shapes and sizes. In using Merton’s and 
Bodie’s (1995) financial functions approach we will derive three channels 
through which derivatives influence the integration of financial markets 
and the economic development. In the following we investigate whether the 
changing approaches to asset allocation have changed the interaction of the 
financial sector at large with the real economy. We argue that the emergence 
of derivative markets and the associated structural move from regulated to 
more unregulated market activity has influenced the key financial segments 
(banks, insurance, stock and bond markets) ability to foster growth. Asset 
management clearly plays a pivotal role which changed through the advent 
of derivatives. Finally we will discuss if the rapid development of derivatives 
markets has increased the sensitivity of the financial markets with respect 
to risk and financial crisis. The expansion of risk spreading abilities, the 
increase in the risk bearing capacity of economies and the emergence of new 
intermediaries with rising appetite for risk has caused concern that financial 
systems are more vulnerable to shocks and financial crisis. “Under some 
conditions economies may be more exposed to financial-sector-induced 
turmoil than in the past” (Rajan, 2005) though we argue that the “unobserved 
alternatives” (Mason, 1995) need to be taken into consideration. We contribute 
to the existing literature by extending the conventional finance-growth view 
to the derivatives markets, by providing a theoretical framework for analyzing 
the impact of derivatives on the ability of the financial sector to support 
growth and investment, and by providing respective descriptive data on the 
relevance of derivatives markets.
In the first section of our paper we review selected theoretical and empirical 
literature in the finance-growth nexus research to provide a framework to 
introduce derivative markets as additional determinant in this context. In the 
following section we will explore the impact of derivative markets on the 
finance-growth nexus by using Merton’s and Bodie’s (1995) methodology. 
We will theoretically derive three channels through which derivatives 
may influence financial markets and economic development (the volume 136 Introduction
channel, the efficiency channel and the risk channel). In addition the 
structure-conduct-performance paradigm (Waterson, 1984; Hahn 2001) 
shall give a theoretical framework to discuss the ability of the structure of 
derivative markets and the behavior of the market participants to influence the 
Merton & Bodie (1995) channels. Section four is devoted to analyzing three 
channels of derivative influence which act the transmission channels. Section 
five shall conclude and discuss the various findings in this paper.
2.  The Finance-Growth Nexus Revisited
2.1 Introduction
The relationship between financial development and economic growth has 
received great attention throughout the modern economic history. A host of 
studies have been carried out to find evidence that a well-developed financial 
system promotes economic growth. Already Schumpeter emphasized the 
importance of financial services in promoting growth (Schumpeter, 1911, 
1959). Based on the work of Schumpeter, Goldsmith (1969) and McKinnon 
(1973) illustrated the close link between financial development and economic 
growth for a few countries. Lucas (1988), on the other hand, described the 
relationship between financial and economic development as “overstressed”.
In their prominent paper King and Levine (1993) presented evidence 
that supported Schumpeter’s view that services provided by financial 
intermediaries stimulate technological innovation and economic development. 
King and Levine found various measures of financial development that were 
strongly linked to current and later rates of economic growth. Greenwood and 
Jovanovic (1988) address the issue of causality between financial development 
and economic growth. According to Greenwood and Jovanovic “Financial 
intermediation promotes growth since it allows a higher rate of return to 
be earned on capital, and growth in turn provides the means to implement 
costly financial structures”. Pagano (1993) addresses whether financial 
development enhances growth by raising the efficiency of investment or the 
rate of investment. In addition he argues for more disaggregated measures of 
financial intermediation to examine the finance-growth link.137 The Finance-Growth Nexus Revisited
Besides the historical focus on banking, research expanded into other 
financial segments in the finance-growth equation. Obstfeld (1994) includes 
internationally integrated stock markets and demonstrates that “international 
risk-sharing can yield substantial welfare gains through is positive effects on 
expected consumption growth. The mechanism linking global diversification 
to growth is the attendant world portfolio shift from safe, but low-yield, 
capital into riskier, high-yield capital”. Levine and Zervos (1998) analyze if 
well-functioning stock markets and banks promote long-run economic growth 
and find evidence that even after controlling for many factors associated with 
growth both stock market liquidity and banking development are positively 
and robustly correlated with contemporaneous and future rates of economic 
growth, capital accumulation, and productivity growth. 
Levine and Zervos’s results - services provided by financial institutions and 
markets are important for long-run growth – complement microeconomic studies 
as performed by Rajan and Zingales (1998). They examine if financial development 
reduces the cost of external finance to firms. They ask “whether industrial sectors 
that are relatively more in need of external finance develop disproportionately 
faster in countries with more developed financial markets”. Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) conclude that financial development fosters economic growth by reducing 
the cost of external finance to financially dependent firms. In addition they provide 
evidence that financial market imperfections have an impact on investment and 
growth. Finally they assume that “the existence of a well developed market in 
a certain country represents a source of comparative advantage for that country in 
industries that are more dependent on external finance”.
2.2  Challenges to the “Classical” Finance-Growth-Findings
In their paper “Finance and Growth – Schumpeter might be right”, King and 
Levine (1993) examine if higher levels of financial development are positively 
associated with economic development. King and Levine (1998) tested the 
empirical relationship between financial indicators and macroeconomic 
indicators using a cross-country analysis with data on over 80 countries over 
the 1960–1989 periods. They find evidence that each financial indicator 
is positively and significantly correlated with each growth indicator. Their 
“classical” conclusion is that the predetermined component of financial 
development is a good predictor of long-run growth and that financial 
development predicts (1) the rate of physical capital accumulation and (2) the 
rate of improvement in the efficiency with which economies allocate physical 
capital. King and Levine (1998) summarise: “Finance does not only follow 138 The Finance-Growth Nexus Revisited
growth; finance seems importantly to lead economic growth.” They conclude 
that the used financial indicators are strongly and robustly correlated with 
growth, the rate of physical capital accumulation, and the improvements in 
efficiency of capital allocation. 
Despite growing consensus in the empirical literature that financial sector 
development has a significant impact on economic growth
3, Rousseau 
and Wachtel (2006) find evidence that the finance-growth link weakened 
considerably over time. By addressing the question “What is happening to 
the impact of financial deepening on economic growth” they re-examine 
the results found by King and Levine (1993) by adding more recent data. 
Rousseau and Wachtel (2006) use cross sectional and panel data on financial 
and macroeconomic indicators over the period 1960 to 2003. Surprisingly 
they found that the impact of financial deepening on economic growth was 
not as robust with more recent data as it appeared in the original study by 
King and Levine with data from 1960–1989.
4 Rousseau and Wachtel’s main 
hypotheses regarding the decreasing influence of finance on growth were 
(1) the incidence of financial crisis and (2) country efforts at financial 
liberalization. They emphasize the role of financial crises and underlying 
excessive financial deepening in their analysis.
2.3  Broadening the View
With regard to the ability of the financial sector to influence growth, various 
scholars have broadened previous approaches, e.g. by focusing on financial 
integration and growth (Rusek, 2004), by including financial innovations and 
the sensitivity of financial systems towards risk (Rajan, 2006), by emphasizing 
the impact of the stage of economic development (Rioja and Valev, 2004; Fink, 
Haiss and Vuksic, 2009), by including further sectors in the finance-growth 
equation (bond markets: Fink, Haiss and Kirchner, 2005; insurance sector: 
Haiss and Sümegi, 2008), by stressing the complexities of the finance-growth 
linkage (Favara, 2003; Manning, 2003) and by analyzing the disconnection of 
3 For recent positive findings, see Haiss and Sümegi (2008) for the insurance sector and 
Arena (2006) who provides empirical evidence that the bank/stock market-economic growth 
relationship holds for sample periods including the nineties.
4  The general Rousseau and Wachtel (2006) results across the sample were largely consistent 
with King and Levine´s (1993) findings. Dramatic differences appeared when they estimated the 
equation for two time periods (period 1: 1960–1989, period 2: 1990–2003). In the historic period 
1, all financial indicators showed a significant influence on growth, whereas only one indicator 
was significant in period 2. Whereas the other coefficients in the growth equation were relatively 
stable across the time periods, the effects of financial depth on growth were simply smaller and 
not significantly different from zero in the more recent period.139 The Finance-Growth Nexus Revisited
growth theory and growth empirics (Trew, 2006; see table 1). While Rousseau 
and Wachtel (2006) found no clear evidence that innovation and liberalization 
was the reason for the weakening of the finance-growth link, several authors 
(e.g. Favara, 2003; Haiss and Fink, 2006; Moutot et al, 2007) argue that new 
functional and institutional features of the financial architecture need to be 
taken into consideration in such analysis. In drawing on the derivatives sector 
we offer additional thoughts to the finding of Rousseau and Wachtel (2006).
5 
Table 1: selected recent studies on the finance-growth-nexus
Study Focus Countries Time period Method/ 
Variables
Major findings





85 countries 1960-1998 Empirical/control 
variables (e.g. real 
per capita GDP, 
av. years of 
attainment in sec. 
and higher 
education, ratio of 
export plus import 
over GDP), 
amount of liquid 
liabilities of the 
financial system 
(in % of real 
GDP), value of 
loans to the 
private sector (in % 
of real GDP)
The relationship between financial development and 
economic growth is weak and there is evidence that 
the link is not linear, suggesting that finance matters 
for growth only at intermediate levels of financial 
development. For some specifications of the model 
the estimated effect of financial development on 
GDP growth is often negative. "The proxies of 
financial development considered might be 
inadequate to capture the beneficial effects of a 
good system of financial intermediation", and further 
research is needed to investigate several channels 




Effects of financial 
development on 
sources of growth in 
different groups of 
countries






Finance affects growth predominantly through 
capital accumulation in low-income countries. Have 
countries reached a certain income level, financial 





Influence of bond 
markets on finance-
growth nexus
7 countries 1950-2001 Empirical/Real 
GDP, Volume of 
bonds, volume of 
stocks, volume of 
credit
Causality from either bond market growth or stock 
market growth or credit amounts growth to GDP can 
be found in all analyzed countries except Germany. 
Causality from economic development to the 
development of the financial markets was 




complexities of the 
finance-growth 
linkage
Descriptive "It is difficult to disentangle the effect of financial 
development from that of other correlated factors". 
In cross country studies it is difficult to isolate the 
true impact of finance upon growth because of high 
correlations between financial, institutional, legal 
and regional factors. It should be focused on long-
range historical studies covering a small number of 
countries at similar stages in their economic 
development or individual country studies.
Rusek (2004) Financial integration 
and growth in 
Europe, Japan, and 
the United States, 
"the role of financial 
markets in facilitating 
the engine of modern 





3 countries 1993-2003 Descriptive Similar resource endowments, but higher average 
annual economic growth in the US compared to 
Europe and Japan. Different nature of the financial 
systems (bank based financing in Europe and 
Japan, market based financing in the US) as 
possible reason for the different growth rates. The 
combination of new economic activity, financial 
development, financial integration and the creation 
of innovative financial products seemed to be most 
successful in the US and serves as explanation for 
the different growth rates.




to the design of 
financial systems by 
applying a synthesis 
of the neoclassical, 
the new institutional, 
and the behavioral 
perspectives on 
finance
Descriptive Dramatic and rapid changes in the structure of 
financial markets and institutions caused by new 
financial product and market designs, improved 
computer and telecommunication technology, and 
advances in the finance science. Derivative 
instruments as "adapter" for the integration of 
financial systems that are rarely compatible in terms 
of regulations, laws, tax structures and institutional 
forms. Innovations in telecommunications, 
information technology, and financial engineering as 






the bond and 
insurance sector, 
and effects of foreign 
bank entry and 
investment into 
future research on 
Finance-Growth-
Nexus
Descriptive A reason for the less robust relationship between 
the financial sector and economic development 
when using more recent data could be "the 
liberalization and integration of the financial 
markets, and the emergence of new institutional 
types, such as e.g. hedge funds, and more recent 
techniques, such as securitization...". New 
influential players and new financial techniques 
change the channels which lead to the financing of 
the economic development.







Descriptive Current studies do not adequately consider 
experiences of countries going through industrial 
revolution and cross-sectional studies do not 
consider the impact of transition over time of 
countries on the finance-growth-nexus. Focus on 
historical experience of industrialization, asymmetric 
information and intermediation and the construction 
of a growth theory that is founded in 
microeconomics.
Rajan (2006) "Has Finance Made 
the World Riskier?"
Descriptive Expanding credit and risk sharing opportunities 
caused by technological change, market 
liberalization, and institutional change. Emergence 
of a range of intermediaries with an expanding 
appetite for risk. Economies that are "more exposed 
to financial-sector-induced turmoil and the 
possibility of low probability but costly downturns.
Source: compiled by the authors
3. Transmission  Mechanisms
Can derivative markets play an important role in the economic development 
of a country? As we have seen in the first section of this paper there have 
been many scholars exploring the impact of financial development on 
economic growth. While the financial sector contributes positively to overall 
economic growth in many studies up to the mid nineties (King and Levine, 
1993), a positive contribution of the financial sector to economic growth 
in mature market economies is less evident in several studies with more 
recent data (Rousseau and Wachtel, 2006) as shown in the previous section. 
Are derivative markets responsible for the weakening linkage between 
financial development and economic growth? Has the rapid development of 141 Transmission Mechanisms
this innovative financial sector influenced the financial landscape in a way 
that financing through the “traditional” financial sectors (e.g. banks, equity 
markets, and bond markets) has become less important?
We will explore the question how derivative markets have possibly influenced 
the finance-growth linkage by focusing on the functions these perform. In 
emphasizing functions over institutions we follow the Merton and Bodie 
(1995) framework, i.e. we analyze what the functions provided by derivatives 
are in the financial market and for asset management. According to Merton 
and Bodie (1995) “the functional perspective views financial innovation as 
driving the financial system toward the goal of greater economic efficiency”. 
Merton and Bodie (1995) identify six core functions performed by the 
financial system to facilitate the allocation and deployment of economic 
resources:
These functions are:
(1)    To provide ways of clearing and settling payments to facilitate trade
(2)   To provide a mechanism for the pooling of resources and for the 
subdividing of shares in various enterprises
(3)   To provide ways to transfer economic resources across time and 
space
(4)    To provide ways of managing risk
(5)    To provide price information
(6)    To provide ways of dealing with incentive problems
The first function of the financial system is the provision of ways of clearing 
and settling payments to facilitate the exchange of goods, services, and assets. 
This function includes the provision of wire transfers, checking accounts, 
credit and cash cards, and clearing and settlement systems for securities 
transactions. According to Mason (1995), derivative instruments serve as 
an important extension of the payment system because they substitute in 
a variety of ways for trading cash market instruments. 
The second function of the financial system is the pooling of funds and the 
subdividing of shares in enterprises to facilitate diversification. This function 
enables the pooling of funds from individual households into larger amounts 
of capital for the use of business firms. As profitable investment projects 
often require large capital inputs, the financial system provides opportunities 
for households to participate in these projects. By subdividing the individual 
unit size of the traded securities they hold and by packaging non-traded assets 
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mutual funds and the securitized assets are good examples how financial 
systems provide this function.
Financial systems provide ways to transfer economic resources through time, 
across geographic regions, and among industries (third function of financial 
systems). A well-developed financial system facilitates the efficient allocation 
of physical capital to its most productive use, the efficient life-cycle allocation 
of household consumption and the efficient separation of ownership and 
management, which enables the use of comparative advantages and the 
specialization in production.
The fourth function of financial systems is the risk management and risk 
controlling function. Financial systems provide mechanisms for pooling, 
trading and sharing risks for both households and business firms. In addition 
this function allows the separation of real investment and risk capital and 
fosters specialization in production according to the principle of comparative 
advantage. Derivative instruments are important innovations to diversify, and 
to hedge and insure against risk.
Financial systems provide information useful for decision-making (fifth 
function of financial systems). Information provided by financial systems 
are important for households to make their consumption-savings decisions 
and to choose appropriate portfolio allocations, and for managers of firms to 
evaluate interesting investment projects.
According to Merton and Bodie (1995) financial systems provide “ways to 
deal with the incentive problems when one party to a financial transaction has 
information that the other party does not, or when one party is an agent for 
another” (sixth function of financial systems).
Coming back to one of King’s and Levine’s (1993) key core statements that 
the predetermined component of financial development is a good predictor 
of long-run growth and that financial development predicts (1) the rate 
of physical capital accumulation and (2) the rate of improvement in the 
efficiency with which economies allocate physical capital, we will identify 
certain channels through which derivatives are able to influence financial 
markets and the economic development. Merton’s and Bodie’s (1996) core 
functions of a financial system shall give guidance to develop appropriate 
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First we will define a “volume channel” via which derivative markets 
exercise their influence on financial markets and the economic development. 
This channel (termed “the pooling of resources and subdividing shares” by 
Merton and Bodie (1995) facilitates and increases the accumulation of capital 
(Levine 1996). The mobilization of savings from many individuals and the 
investment in a diversified portfolio of risky projects facilitate a reallocation 
of investment towards higher return activities with positive implications on 
economic growth. As we will see in the next chapter derivatives markets have 
been very successful in pooling enormous amounts of capital in the last years 
and the creation of a broad range of derivative instruments which enabled to 
build up any needed risk-return profiles has drawn the attention of various 
types of investors to build up exposure in derivative markets. 
The “efficiency channel” of derivatives summarizes several of Merton’s and 
Bodie’s (1996) functions in efficiently substituting cash market trades, 
transferring resources across time and space, managing risk and pricing 
information, thus improving the efficiency with which economies combine 
capital and labor in production (Levine, 1996). Corporations, financial 
institutions and governments all benefit from derivative markets through 
lower funding costs and more diversified funding sources (see Culp and 
Mackay, 1994). Institutional investors and portfolio managers can for 
example enhance asset yields and build up exposure in attractive asset classes 
and markets with poor liquidity by using derivatives. Companies can borrow 
in the cheapest capital market (domestic or foreign) without regard to the 
currency in which the debt is denominated or the form in which interest is 
paid (fixed or floating) by using currency or interest swaps. Foreign currency 
flows derived from entrepreneurial activity can - for example – be hedged 
into the home currency eliminating foreign currency risk. 
We argue that the net effects of enhanced risk allocation, reduction in transaction 
costs and improved informational efficiencies via derivatives benefits the 
economy, though we recognize that derivatives securities may also impact the 
volatility of other markets and may not be suitable for all types of investors 
at all times (Mason, 1995). Via derivatives markets, exposures can be better 
hedged against price and interest fluctuations. Derivatives are a powerful 
tool for limitating risks that individuals and companies are facing in their 
ordinary course of business. According to Kolb (2003) financial derivatives 
also “play a valuable role in financial markets because they help to move the 
market closer to completeness. If we consider two financial markets that are 
the same, except one includes financial derivatives, the market with financial 
derivatives will allow traders to more exactly shape the risk and return 144 Transmission Mechanisms
characteristics of their portfolio, thereby increasing the welfare of traders and 
the economy in general”. Finally derivatives are a useful instrument to drive 
the markets towards one common price for a specific asset. Does the same 
asset or two assets with identical cash flows not trade at the same price in all 
markets, or does one asset with a known price in the future not trade at its 
future price discounted at the risk-free interest rate today, arbitrage is possible. 
The use of derivatives to profit from arbitrage opportunities therefore helps 
to eliminate market inefficiencies. Since derivatives help to eliminate price 
differentials they fulfill the information function described by the fourth 
function of financial systems (“financial systems provide price information”, 
Merton and Bodie, 1995).
Finally we define the “risk channel” through which derivatives may negatively 
influence financial markets and the economic development. The theoretical 
rationale rests e.g. in claims that derivatives markets encourage speculation in 
the underlying asset, i.e. that they add unnecessary risk to the economy (Tobin 
(1984)). Rousseau and Wachtel (2006) already suggested that financial crises 
could be one reason for the weakening link between financial development 
and economic growth. Their study found evidence of a positive and significant 
impact of finance on growth in non-crisis observations, but a negative 
correlation between financial development and economic growth when 
a country is in crisis. In this context we will examine both the influence of 
derivatives on the credit, market and liquidity risk of market participants and 
possible derivative influences that are capable of destabilizing the banking and 
financial system (systemic risk). A discussion of various examples (LTCM, 
the subprime-securitization) shall help to assess the ability of derivatives to 
negatively impact the financial system and the economy.
4. Derivative  Channels
4.1 Volume  Channel
The volume channel acts as transmission channel through which derivatives 
influence financial markets and thus economic development. According 
to King and Levine (1993) financial development predicts the rate of 
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which economies allocate physical capital. Merton and Bodie (1995) name 
the pooling of resources as one core function of financial systems to facilitate 
the allocation and deployment of economic resources. We will examine 
therefore if derivatives markets are capable of mobilizing resources and 
acting as transmission channel to finance growth.
To analyze derivative markets, we collected data from various sources. 
Statistical data on exchange-traded derivatives are available through the 
World Federation of Exchanges (www.world-exchanges.org) and the Bank 
for International Settlements (www.bis.org). The World Federation of 
Exchanges started to collect statistical derivatives data in the 1990’s and 
provides notional value data of stock options, stock index options, stock index 
futures, government debt options and government debt futures for worldwide 
derivatives exchanges since 1995. In 2002 the World Federation of Exchanges 
began on the one hand to provide data on currency options and currency 
futures, on the other hand government debt instruments have been segmented 
in short term interest rate options and futures and long term interest rate 
options and futures. Unfortunately notional value data have not been collected 
in 2000 and 2001. In 1986 the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) began 
to collect statistical data on exchange-traded derivatives. Since then turnover 
and open interest data in both number of contracts and notional amounts 
are available. The highly aggregated data set includes data on interest rate, 
currency and equity-linked options and futures for North America, Europe, 
Asia and Pacific and Other Markets.
In June 1998 central banks of the G10 countries started reporting to the 
BIS semiannual over the counter (OTC) derivatives statistics on forwards, 
swaps and options of foreign exchange, interest rate, equity and commodity 
derivatives. Data are available by risk category and instrument, by currency, 
and by maturity and counterparty. As of end-December 2004 semi-annual 
data on credit default swaps (CDS) including notional amounts outstanding 
and gross market values for single- and multi-name instruments are released 
by the BIS. Additional information on CDS by counterparty, sector and rating 
are available since December 2005. 
Since 1995 the BIS publishes the “Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange 
and Derivatives Market Activity”. In absence of records of over-the-counter 
traded derivatives, central banks of the G10 countries started in 1995 to collect 
and publish data on OTC-traded derivatives together with the tri-annual survey 
of foreign exchange market activity. This survey gives a detailed picture of 
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Although data on derivatives (both exchange-traded and OTC-traded) are 
available since the mid 1990’s, an interpretation and a coverage of derivatives 
development faces various problems. Firstly, continuous data on exchange-
traded derivatives are not available for 2000 and 2001 since notional values 
have not been collected by the World Federation of Exchanges. Secondly, 
the markets for exchange-traded derivatives have been confronted with 
various exchange mergers and cooperations that influenced data availability 
considerably. Liffe, for example, the international derivatives business of the 
NYSE Euronext Group (the transatlantic exchange has been formed in 2007) 
operates regulated derivatives markets in Amsterdam, Brussels, Lisbon, 
London and Paris. Derivatives data published for each of the markets have 
been aggregated by the World Federation of Exchanges to total Euronext 
numbers since the merger of the derivatives exchanges. This aggregation 
implies a time-series breach for these markets since data available for 
each market have been aggregated to Euronext numbers not allowing the 
development of derivatives activity to be examined in these markets across 
time.
Chart 1: Global consolidation of exchanges as a result of increased competition
and higher expectations 
Source: Pitsilis, 2008, McKinsey & Company, presentation to the World Federation of Exchanges
In addition, derivatives markets faced tremendous liquidity shifts within the 
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activity on a country-basis. A good example for the tremendous changes 
taking place in derivatives markets is the European bond sector and the 
sector for European government debt derivatives (see Kaiser et al, 1999). 
With the introduction of the Euro the second largest market for bonds and 
the largest market for government bonds in the world formed. Prior to the 
introduction of the Euro, bond yields began to converge. Spreads between 
different bond asset classes resulted from foreign exchange rates risks and the 
different credit ratings of the various national issuers. With the introduction 
of the Euro exchange rate risks became obsolete and the different yields of 
government bonds were mainly based on the assessment of the credit ratings 
of the various national issuers. In addition, increased competition among 
national bond issuers emerged (Haiss and Marin, 2005). Prior to European 
Economic and Monetary Union each national issuer issued benchmark-bonds 
for the national markets. Afterwards national issuers competed against each 
other for the provision of European benchmark-bonds. Bonds are qualified as 
benchmark-bonds if they are both issued by prime-issuers and characterised 
by high liquidity. In the first month after the introduction of the Euro French 
and German government bonds obtained benchmark-status for different 
maturities. 
Another condition for the attainment of the benchmark-status is the existence of 
efficient and liquid markets for government debt derivatives. According to the 
statistical data provided by the World Federation of Exchanges (www.world-
exchanges.com) several European derivatives exchanges have been successful 
in accumulating liquidity in government debt instruments. Although various 
European derivatives exchanges introduced government debt instruments up to 
the mid 1990’s, only a few exchanges were able to provide significant liquidity 
in government debt instruments. Liquidity became a „critical success factor“. 
The Bund-future traded at the German/Swiss EUREX exchange became the 
most liquid government debt instrument in Europe. According to Kaiser et al 
(1999) the EUREX Bund-future has been used by many market participants to 
hedge positions in government bonds other than German Bunds. The risk due to 
imperfect hedging has been accepted in favour of liquidity. The concentration 
of European government debt derivatives towards only a few highly liquid 
instruments showed that certain segments of derivatives markets (especially 
government debt instruments) decoupled from national development and turned 
into a regional phenomenon. According to the ECB (2007a) “futures and options 
on Euro-denominated government bonds are almost exclusively traded on one 
trading platform” (EUREX), showing again the internationalization of interest 
rate derivatives. European markets for equity-linked derivatives seem much 
more fragmented since trading in equity-linked instruments still takes place in 148 Derivative Channels
many European markets. According to Kaiser et al (1999) accounting regulations, 
corporate structures and different investment mentalities may have restrained 
a extensive integration of European markets for equity-linked derivatives. 
According to the World Federation of Exchanges (2003) equity market volumes 
and derivatives market notional values are strongly correlated. “The relationship 
is close to one for one – a dollar of equity trading is associated with a dollar of 
equity derivatives trading (except in Korea and Israel, and for Eurex)”.
Exchange traded and over-the-counter (“OTC”) traded derivatives have 
experienced enormous growth rates during the last years.
6 Table 2 shows the 
development of worldwide derivative instruments traded on organized exchanges 
and over-the-counter from 1998 to 2006 (amounts outstanding in billions of US 
dollars). In 1998 $13,931.8 billion were traded on organized exchanges, whereas 
$80,317 billion were traded over-the-counter. With a market share of 85.2% in 
1998 the OTC segment was by far the most used segment for derivatives trading. 
Until 2006 both market segment experienced enormous growth rates; in 2006 
amounts outstanding of $ 70,443.3 billions can be recorded in the exchange 
traded segment, the OTC segment saw amounts outstanding of $ 385,639.0 
billion. With a market share of 84.6% in 2006 the OTC segment remained nearly 
unchanged. Classified according to the popularity of instruments interest rate 
derivatives are ranked first, followed by foreign exchange and equity-linked 
products. A majority of derivative interest rate and foreign exchange trading is 
done in the OTC segment, only equity index derivatives traded on organized 
exchanges can maintain a significant market position within the derivative 
universe. Looking at growth rates, amounts outstanding of the exchange traded 
segment rose 405.6% from 1998 to 2006. Especially interest rate (724.4%) and 
equity index (616.1%) options and currency futures (409.2%) showed strong 
increases within the period. The OTC segment experienced a growth rate of 
380.15% from 1998 to 2006. Especially commodity instruments (1,614.5%) 
enjoyed rising interest from market participants, followed by interest rate 
(482.1%) and equity-linked (403.2%) OTC derivatives.
6 Due to the fact that derivatives data are not consistent over time and because various 
derivative segments have decoupled from national developments, we rather use aggregated data 
(provided by the BIS) to describe the development of worldwide derivatives markets in the 
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Table 2: Derivative financial instruments traded on organized exchanges
and over-the-counter (OTC), amounts outstanding in billions of US dollars, 1998–2006
Product/Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Exchange Traded 13,931.8 13,552.6 14,214.6 23,759.8 23,810.3 36,787.0 46,592.4 57,788.5 70,443.3
9 . 2 8 6 , 5 2 4 . 0 0 6 , 1 2 6 . 3 0 9 , 8 1 9 . 2 5 7 , 3 1 2 . 3 2 3 , 0 1 8 . 4 6 6 , 9 4 . 8 3 3 , 8 0 . 4 9 2 , 8 3 . 2 4 3 , 8 s e r u t u F
2 . 6 7 4 , 4 2 8 . 8 0 7 , 0 2 9 . 4 6 1 , 8 1 7 . 3 2 1 , 3 1 7 . 0 5 9 , 9 3 . 5 6 2 , 9 1 . 2 9 8 , 7 9 . 3 1 9 , 7 9 . 9 1 0 , 8 e t a R   t s e r e t n I
4 . 1 6 1 6 . 7 0 1 5 . 3 0 1 9 . 9 7 0 . 7 4 6 . 5 6 4 . 4 7 7 . 6 3 7 . 1 3 y c n e r r u C
3 . 5 4 0 , 1 0 . 4 8 7 2 . 5 3 6 3 . 9 4 5 5 . 5 2 3 9 . 3 3 3 9 . 1 7 3 4 . 3 4 3 7 . 0 9 2 x e d n I   y t i u q E
4 . 0 6 7 , 4 4 1 . 8 8 1 , 6 3 8 . 8 8 6 , 7 2 1 . 4 3 0 , 3 2 1 . 7 8 4 , 3 1 0 . 5 9 0 , 4 1 2 . 6 7 8 , 5 6 . 8 5 2 , 5 5 . 9 8 5 , 5 s n o i t p O
5 . 6 1 1 , 8 3 3 . 8 8 5 , 1 3 1 . 4 0 6 , 4 2 8 . 3 9 7 , 0 2 5 . 9 5 7 , 1 1 8 . 2 9 4 , 2 1 2 . 4 3 7 , 4 5 . 5 5 7 , 3 5 . 3 2 6 , 4 e t a R   t s e r e t n I
6 . 8 7 1 . 6 6 7 . 0 6 9 . 7 3 4 . 7 2 4 . 7 2 4 . 1 2 4 . 2 2 2 . 9 4 y c n e r r u C
3 . 5 6 5 , 6 7 . 3 3 5 , 4 0 . 4 2 0 , 3 4 . 2 0 2 , 2 2 . 0 0 7 , 1 8 . 4 7 5 , 1 6 . 0 2 1 , 1 7 . 0 8 4 , 1 8 . 6 1 9 x e d n I   y t i u q E
0 . 9 3 6 , 5 8 3 0 . 0 6 7 , 3 8 2 0 . 3 2 8 , 1 5 2 0 . 7 6 1 , 7 9 1 0 . 0 8 6 , 1 4 1 0 . 9 7 1 , 1 1 1 0 . 0 0 2 , 5 9 0 . 0 0 2 , 8 8 0 . 7 1 3 , 0 8 d e d a r T   C T O
Foreign Exchange 18,011.0 14,344.0 15,666.0 16,748.0 18,460.0 24,475.0 29,580.0 31,364.0 40,239.0
0 . 5 1 1 , 1 9 2 0 . 0 7 9 , 1 1 2 0 . 2 0 5 , 0 9 1 0 . 1 9 9 , 1 4 1 0 . 8 5 6 , 1 0 1 0 . 8 6 5 , 7 7 0 . 8 6 6 , 4 6 0 . 1 9 0 , 0 6 0 . 5 1 0 , 0 5 e t a R   t s e r e t n I
0 . 8 8 4 , 7 0 . 3 9 7 , 5 0 . 5 8 3 , 4 0 . 7 8 7 , 3 0 . 9 0 3 , 2 0 . 1 8 8 , 1 0 . 1 9 8 , 1 0 . 9 0 8 , 1 0 . 8 8 4 , 1 d e k n i l - y t i u q E
0 . 5 1 1 , 7 0 . 4 3 4 , 5 0 . 3 4 4 , 1 0 . 6 0 4 , 1 0 . 3 2 9 0 . 8 9 5 0 . 2 6 6 0 . 8 4 5 0 . 5 1 4 y t i d o m m o C
0 . 2 8 6 , 9 3 0 . 9 9 1 , 9 2 0 . 3 1 9 , 5 2 0 . 8 0 5 , 5 2 0 . 0 3 3 , 8 1 0 . 4 8 3 , 4 1 0 . 3 1 3 , 2 1 0 . 8 0 4 , 1 1 0 . 8 8 3 , 0 1 d e t a c o l l a n U
3 . 2 8 0 , 6 5 4 5 . 8 4 5 , 1 4 3 4 . 5 1 4 , 8 9 2 0 . 4 5 9 , 3 3 2 3 . 0 9 4 , 5 6 1 8 . 8 3 9 , 4 3 1 6 . 4 1 4 , 9 0 1 6 . 2 5 7 , 1 0 1 8 . 8 4 2 , 4 9 l a t o T
Derivative financial instruments traded on organised exchanges and over-the-counter (OTC)
Amounts outstanding in billions of US dollars
Source: compiled by the authors
The development of derivatives traded on organised exchanges shows 
strong growth rates in North America (478.1%) and Europe (427.6%). 
Exchange traded derivatives grew only 116.5% in the Asia and Pacific 
region over the period 1998 to 2006, but showed strong growth rates in the 
last couple of years.
Chart 2: Derivative financial instruments traded on organized exchanges,
by location, 1998–2006
Source:   compiled by the authors from BIS Quarterly Review, June 2000, March 2002, March 2004, March 
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Chart 3: Geographical distribution of reported OTC derivatives market activity, 
average daily turnover, in billions of US dollars
Source: BIS, Triennial Central Bank Survey, December 2007
According to the data provided by the Triennial Central Bank Survey (BIS, 
2007) around 85% of worldwide OTC derivatives trading takes places in 
nine financial centers (Australia, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States), with UK and the US accounting 
for around 60% of the worldwide daily OTC turnover in 2007. In addition the 
data confirm London’s role as the largest international centre for OTC trading 
activities.
Table 3 shows amounts outstanding of OTC traded derivatives by the type 
of counterparty. According to the Bank for International Settlement (see 
BIS, Triennial Central Bank Survey, 2007) 3 types of counterparties can be 
distinguished: “reporting dealers”, “other financial institutions” and “non-
financial customers”. Reporting dealers are “financial institutions that actively 
participate in local and global foreign exchange and derivatives markets. These 
are mainly large commercial and investment banks and securities houses…” 
(BIS, 2007). Other financial institutions are financial institutions, such as 
smaller commercial bank, investment banks, securities houses, mutual funds, 
pension funds, hedge funds, currency funds, money market funds, building 
societies, leasing companies, insurance companies, other financial subsidiaries 
of corporate firms and central banks (BIS, 2007). Non-financial customers are 
mainly corporate firms and central banks (BIS, 2007).151 Derivative Channels
A majority of derivative activity is concentrated within the group of reporting 
dealers and other financial institutions (see table 3). These counterparties 
account for 78.34% of total foreign exchange, 86.84% of total interest rate 
and 91.24% of equity-linked amount outstanding in 2007. The market share 
of all three types of counterparties is relatively stable over the period 1998 to 
2006 in the foreign exchange and interest rate segment. Only the equity-linked 
segment faces significant movements of market shares over the period 1998 
to 2006. The strongest increase in market share can be seen within the group 
of other financial institutions (1998: 39.18%, 2006: 57.36%), probably due 
to the fact that equity-linked derivatives experienced rising popularity within 
the asset management industry. The sharpest decrease (in equity-linked 
instruments) in market share faced the non-financial institutions sector (1998: 
33.06%, 2006: 8.76%). It can be supposed that corporations and central 
banks are mainly interested in foreign exchange and interest rate derivatives 
for risk management reasons. According to Sundaram and Willey (2008) 
the top 25 US banks, for example, account for 99% of the total notional 
amounts of derivatives in the US commercial banking system, showing the 
high concentration of derivatives activity in the US. A similar concentration 
can be found in the credit derivatives sector. According to Eichhorn and 
Eichhorn-Schurig (2007), 86% of the volume of credit derivatives in 2006 is 
concentrated within 10 counterparties worldwide, suggesting a rising need to 
consider counterparty risks.
Table 3: Derivative financial instruments traded over-the-counter (OTC), by product 
and counterparty, amounts outstanding over 1998–2006 (in USD bn)
Product and Counterparty/Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Foreign exchange 18,011 14,344 15,666 16,748 18,460 24,475 29,580 31,364 40,239
with reporting dealers 7,284 5,392 5,729 5,912 6,845 8,660 11,674 12,161 15,503
with other financial institutions 7,440 6,102 6,597 6,755 7,602 9,450 11,640 12,721 16,019
with non-financial institutions 3,288 2,850 3,340 4,081 4,012 6,365 6,266 6,482 8,717
5 1 1 , 1 9 2 0 7 9 , 1 1 2 2 0 5 , 0 9 1 1 9 9 , 1 4 1 8 5 6 , 1 0 1 8 6 5 , 7 7 8 6 6 , 4 6 1 9 0 , 0 6 5 1 0 , 0 5 e t a R   t s e r e t n I
with reporting dealers 24,442 30,518 31,494 35,472 46,722 63,579 82,258 91,541 127,140
with other financial institutions 19,790 24,012 27,048 32,510 43,607 57,564 85,728 95,320 125,654
with non-financial institutions 5,783 5,562 6,126 9,586 11,328 20,847 22,515 25,109 38,321
8 8 4 , 7 3 9 7 , 5 5 8 3 , 4 7 8 7 , 3 9 0 3 , 2 1 8 8 , 1 1 9 8 , 1 9 0 8 , 1 8 8 4 , 1 d e k n i l - y t i u q E
with reporting dealers 413 522 609 644 739 1,008 1,334 1,940 2,537
with other financial institutions 583 790 668 847 1,053 2,091 2,485 3,332 4,295
with non-financial institutions 492 497 614 390 516 688 566 520 656
Derivative financial instruments traded over-the-counter (OTC)
By instrument and counterparty, amounts outstanding in billions of US dollars
Source: compiled by the authors
Having analyzed the size and the structure of worldwide derivatives markets 
we examine the size of North American derivatives markets in comparison 
to various financial indicators and to GDP (see charts 4 and 5). We use bank 
assets, stock market capitalization, total debt securities, total of bonds/equities/
bank assets and GDP compared to exchange-traded derivative instruments for 152 Derivative Channels
North America as provided by the International Monetary Fund (2003–2008). 
The comparison shows that derivatives have experienced enormous growth 
rates in North America between 2001 and 2006. Although bank assets, bonds, 
equities and the GDP have experienced a steady growth from 2002 until 2006, 
derivatives instruments have exceeded this development by far. Knowing 
that North American markets are responsible for approximately 20% of 
worldwide daily OTC turnover in 2004 and 2007 (BIS, 2007), and knowing 
that OTC traded derivatives amounted to USD 385,639.0 billion in 2006 (see 
table 2), we can roughly estimate USD 120,000 billion (amounts outstanding) 
that were traded on organized exchanges and OTC in 2006. This estimate 
can give an impression of the huge size of derivatives markets compared to 
various financial indicators and the GDP in North America.
Box 1: Recent development in market for credit derivatives
While we concentrate mainly on conventional derivatives here, we acknowledge 
the rise of credit derivatives as well. The overall market for OTC derivatives 
amounted to $455 trillion at the end of 2007, with credit derivatives showing rapid 
expansion and accounting for $62 trillion (The Economist, 2008). Rising fears that 
the market’s infrastructure will not be able to cope with the rapid expansion of credit 
default swaps (CDS) and the nearly default of Bear Stearns – a top ten actor in the CDS 
market – have sparked discussions to regulate this market. CDSs have been created as 
hedging tool but enjoyed rising popularity to speculate on the likelihood of the default 
of a company. The rapid development of CDSs markets led to processing backlogs 
and errors and forced the industry to accelerate trade automation and to clarify the 
rules of engagement. Problems remained as the peak in trading in the summer 2007 
was accompanied by a rise in late confirmations (see chart). To cope with the rapid 
growth of the CDSs regulators argue for cash settlement, rather than physical delivery 
of bonds.
Dealers announced efforts to reduce unconfirmed backlogs and the collection of 
data about trades. In addition large dealers plan clearing facilities for CDSs through 
a central counterparty to reduce the overall amount at risk by “netting” offsetting 
contracts. Also exchanges are thinking about the provision of clearing facilities and 
turning credit derivatives into exchange-traded products. The question is if credit 
derivatives are amenable to standardization and if dealers are willing to abstain from 
generating fees.153 Derivative Channels
Derivatives – Clearing the Fog, The Economist, April 19 2008, p.78
A look at the development of derivatives markets expressed in percentage of 
the GDP confirms that this financial sector has developed rapidly (see chart 
5). In 2001 derivatives amounted to 150% of North American GDP, ranked 
third after bonds and bank assets. In 2006 derivatives amounted to nearly 
300% of GDP, getting ahead of bonds, equities, and bank assets by far. Taking 
into account the enormous growth and the importance of the derivatives 
sector it seems that derivatives markets have decoupled from various financial 
indicators and the real sector as measured by GDP. 154 Derivative Channels
Chart 4: Selected indicators on the size of the capital markets in North America
(in billions of US dollars)
Source:   compiled by the authors from Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, March 03, September 
04/05/06, April 07/08
Chart 5: Selected indicators on the size of the capital markets in North America
(in % of GDP)
Source:   compiled by the authors from Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, March 03, September 
04/05/06, April 07/08155 Derivative Channels
Chart 6 gives an impression of the importance of market liquidity compared 
to monetary liquidity with derivatives accounting for nearly ten times global 
GDP. Cash and minimum reserves account for only 10% of global GDP; 
adding broad monetary aggregates the share rises to 122% of global GDP. 
According to UniCredit (2007) the rising importance of derivatives can foster 
a decoupling between monetary and financial liquidity via leveraging. As 
derivatives are claims on the underlying asset they represent a form of “quasi 
money”. Due to the fact that leveraged positions only require a small cash 
transaction in the beginning it is not surprising that the following “global 
liquidity pyramid” (Chart 6) has been built up within a few years. Taking into 
account the importance of market liquidity one could ask if central banks have 
lost control over global liquidity (UniCredit, 2007)? According to UniCredit 
(2007) “there is little doubt that monetary policy has lost some influence on 
national liquidity conditions”. Under the assumption that central banks have 
superior information and “a broader and far more meaningful overview than 
individual investors and banks can ever get” (UniCredit, 2007), central banks 
can still exercise strong leadership on financial markets.
Chart 6: Global Liquidity Pyramid 
Source: UniCredit, Economic &  Commodity Research, Economic Special, 2007
4.2 Efficiency  Channel
We have defined the efficiency channel as second transmission mechanism 
through which derivatives influence financial markets and the economic 
development. As we have already discussed in chapter 2 of this paper the 156 Derivative Channels
efficiency channel allows an efficient allocation of capital by facilitating 
trade and risk management, and by driving the markets to one common price 
for a specific asset through the use of arbitrage opportunities. The use of 
derivatives for speculation, hedging and risk sharing purposes, and arbitrage 
strategies has been discussed by many scholars and market participants (e.g. 
Kolb, 2003, Hull, 2007). Derivatives are useful instruments to allocate risk 
to market participant that are able to bear those risks, to build up exposure 
in assets in a cost efficient manner and to use price and market inefficiencies 
by arbitrage strategies. Both the efficiency and the complexity of the risk 
allocation function was considerably increased by innovations in the area 
of derivatives (Mason, 1995). In addition derivatives “can provide investors 
with opportunities that would otherwise be unavailable to them at any price”. 
That is, derivatives can provide payoffs that simply cannot be obtained with 
other, existing assets. In theory, derivative contracts can be written to provide 
any conceivable pattern of payoffs that depend on future conditions, i.e. 
derivatives can make markets “complete” (Sill, 1997; Mason, 1995). As those 
characteristics of derivatives have been widely discussed in the past, we will 
have a closer look at the transmission channel, through which derivatives 
influence the economic development and the asset management industry. We 
will ask the question if and to what extent derivatives – apart from their basic 
benefits – are used by market participants and if derivatives are capable of 
influencing the financial markets and the economic development positively. 
In the following, we will have a closer look at two beneficiaries of financial 
innovations: (1) Corporations using derivatives for corporate risk management 
purposes, and (2) Institutional investors and asset managers using derivatives 
to enhance asset yields, build up exposure in attractive asset classes with poor 
liquidity and hedge certain unmeant risks in their portfolios.
4.2.1  Corporate use of derivative instruments
An important element of a firm’s overall business strategy is corporate risk 
management. Companies may – for example - borrow in the cheapest capital 
market (domestic or foreign) without regard to the currency in which the 
debt is denominated or the form in which interest is paid (fixed or floating) 
by using currency or interest swaps. Foreign currency flows derived from 
entrepreneurial activity can - for example – be hedged into the home currency 
eliminating foreign currency risk. Derivatives enable companies to better 
hedge and manage exposure to risk from price and interest fluctuations.157 Derivative Channels
According to Stulz (1996) “the primary goal of risk management is to eliminate 
the probability of costly lower-tail outcomes – those that would cause financial 
distress or make a company unable to carry out its investment strategy”. “Moreover, 
by eliminating downside risk and reducing the expected cost of financial trouble, 
risk management can also help move companies toward their optimal capital 
and ownership structure” (Stulz, 1996). As Guay and Kothari (2003) notice 
“financial derivatives – currency, interest rate, and commodity derivatives – are 
one means of managing risks facing corporations. If a firm’s derivative position 
generates positive cash flows or value in periods of economic adversity, then 
those derivatives are deemed to hedge the firm’s risk”.
According to a survey by the International Swap and Derivatives Association 
(2003) over 90% of the world’s 500 largest companies are using derivatives to 
manage their risks (chart 7). The survey was conducted by ISDA in March and 
April 2003 and included the world’s 500 largest companies ranked by revenues as 
of year-end 2001. The companies are located in 26 countries around the world and 
represent a broad variety of industries. Roughly 92% of the companies covered 
in the survey use derivatives to manage and hedge their risk more effectively. Of 
those companies using derivatives, 92% or 85% of the total sample use derivatives 
to manage interest rate risk. Derivatives to manage currency risk are used by 85% 
of the companies (or 78% of the total sample), 25% of the companies (23.5% of 
the total) apply derivatives to manage commodity price risk and 12% (11% of the 
total) use derivative instruments to manage equity price risk.
Chart 7: Number of the world’s top 500 companies that use derivatives: by type of 
risk (2003 derivatives usage survey, ISDA)158 Derivative Channels
On a geographic basis, 196 or 94% of the US companies included in the 
survey use derivatives to manage and hedge their risks (Chart 8). In Japan 89 
or 91%, in France 37 or 92%, in UK 35 or 100% and in Germany 34 or 94% 
of the covered companies apply derivatives.
According to Pickel (ISDA, 2003)
7 “The survey demonstrates that derivatives 
today are an integral part of corporate risk management among the 
world’s leading companies. Across geographic regions and industry sectors, 
the vast majority of these corporations rely on derivatives to hedge a range of 
risks to which they are exposed in the normal course of business.”
Chart 8: Number of the world’s top 500 companies that use derivatives: by country 
(2003 derivatives usage survey, ISDA)
4.2.2  Derivative use in fund management
In the third survey of European asset managers, Financial News (2006) 
polled European fund management companies on the use of derivatives in 
their investment activities. The survey received 209 responses representing 
financial institutions that manage USD 9.4 trillion globally. The rapid growth 
of derivatives markets (see section “volume channel”) is also reflected in 
the European asset management industry. According to the survey, seven 
out of ten asset management companies are engaged in derivatives markets, 
7  executive director and chief executive officer of ISDA159 Derivative Channels
up from only four in the 2004 survey. On a geographic basis, Spain (all 
12 institutions), France (19 of 22 institution), Italy (12 of 15), the Netherlands 
(8 out of 10), and Switzerland (15 out of 19 institutions) showed the highest 
penetration of derivatives usage. According to the survey not only the breadth 
of derivatives use grew dramatically, fund managers regarded derivatives 
increasingly important for their activities; two thirds regarded derivatives as 
either vital or integral to their investment activities. Asked for the reason of 
derivatives usage respondents named hedging as by far the most important 
use of derivatives, followed by overlay and cash management strategies. 
According to the study liability-driven investing and absolute return saw 
notable increases compared to the 2005 survey (table 4). Surprisingly the 
importance of return enhancement as driver of derivatives use declined 
according to the study.
Table 4: asset manager’s derivatives use 
Strategy Score 2006 Score 2005
Hedging 3.7 3.2
Overlay 3.2 3.3
Cash management 3.1 3.1
Absolute return 2.7 2.5
Return enhancement 2.5 2.8
Liability driven investing 2.2 1.8
Trading efficiently 2.2 2.2
Alpha transport 2.1 1.9
Tax efficiency 1.6 1.5
Transition management 1.5 1.3
*Score from 1 to 5 where 1= not important and 5 = very important
Source: Third annual survey of European asset managers, Financial News, 2006)160 Derivative Channels
Chart 9: usage of derivatives split between different products 
Source: Third annual survey of European asset managers, Financial News, 2006)
An analysis of the use of derivatives split between different products (chart 9) 
showed that equity linked derivatives are the most applied instruments within 
the asset management sector, followed by fixed income instruments, which 
showed rapid expansion from 2005 to 2006. Significant expansion can also be 
seen in credit and foreign exchange derivatives, reflecting the trend towards 
active currency management. 
Summarizing the Financial News (2006) survey shows that derivatives play 
a vital part in asset management activities. Hedging against certain risks 
is by far the most important strategy applied by asset managers whereas 
return enhancement is awarded more importance than the reality shows. 
Also the broad use of derivatives (seven out of ten asset managers are using 
derivatives) shows the importance of those instruments in today’s asset 
management business.161 Derivative Channels
4.3  Risk Channel and Discussion
In the last section (“efficiency channel”) we have delineated the benefits 
of derivatives instruments. In addition we have defined a “risk channel” to 
cover derivatives and their ability to negatively influence financial markets 
and economic development. As we have already examined in section I., 
Rousseau and Wachtel (2006) suggested financial crisis to be responsible for 
the weakening link between financial development and economic growth. 
In this section we will discuss the influence of derivatives on the credit, 
market and liquidity risk and possible derivative influences that are capable 
of destabilizing the financial system. In a first step we will give a short 
explanation of these risks and, in a second step, we will discuss if the existence 
of derivatives makes it necessary to evaluate these risks in a different way.
Credit, market and liquidity risks are neither new nor unique to users of 
derivatives instruments. Credit risk can be defined as risk to both parties 
of a transaction (e.g. a loan, a derivatives transaction) that a loss will occur 
because one party fails to make the payments due in time. Easily speaking 
credit risk becomes effective if one party may default on the contract. 
According to Sill (1997) “credit risk is not much a problem of for derivatives 
traded on organized exchanges, since these exchanges are designed in such 
a way that their contracts are almost always honored. Credit risk is much 
more a problem in the OTC market, where two parties negotiate a derivative 
contract specific to their needs”. Exchange traded derivatives are always 
settled through a derivatives exchange and their members, the clearing banks, 
which guarantee the fulfillment of the traded contracts. A derivatives contract 
is thus separated in two agreements, and each party to a contract is contracting 
with a clearing bank. The credit risk is accordingly concentrated on the 
clearing bank. The concept of margin requirements for trading a derivatives 
contract assures the limitation of credit risk for the contracting parties. OTC 
traded derivatives are – in contrast – not cleared through a central clearing 
party. OTC trading happens directly between the contracting parties, whereas 
each party is bearing the credit risk that the opposite party is defaulting. 
Generally speaking market participants face liquidity risk when assets cannot 
be traded because nobody in the market wants to trade the asset (i.e. buy). 
Market liquidity risk is a risk that a large transaction in a specific asset can 
have an adverse impact on its market price. Market risk is a risk that the value 
of an asset will change when market conditions change. Common market risk 
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risk (the risk of changing interest rates), the currency risk (risk of changing 
foreign exchange rates) and the commodity risk (the risk that commodity 
prices will change).
Especially the case of the near default of the hedge fund “Long Term Capital 
Management” (LTCM; see Single and Stahl, 2000, or Fungh and Hsieh, 
2000) and the recent subprime-securitization crisis shows that financial 
markets have been more vulnerable to certain risks than expected. LTCM 
used arbitrage strategies to take advantage of minimum price differences of 
various bond asset classes. To maximize profit LTCM traded large volumes 
of derivative instruments (more than $ 1.200 billion). The fund’s strategy 
was based on the assessment that bond spreads, which widened in the course 
of the Asian crisis, should decrease and reach a normal level. The strategy 
was mainly implemented using OTC traded derivatives. In defiance of the 
fund’s strategy, Russia defaulted in summer 1998. Market participants flew 
in the save government bond haven and “non-prime” bonds faced dramatic 
spread widenings. Historically positive correlations between various bond 
asset classes suddenly turned negative. Having speculated on decreasing 
spreads, LTCM faced enormous losses within short spell.
8 Not knowing the 
nature and the volumes LTCM has traded with other counterparties several 
contracting parties pushed LTCM to repay the given loans and to meet 
open margin calls resulting from existing derivatives contracts. Thereinafter 
it became public that LTCM has traded a volume of $ 1,000 billion of 
interest rate swap with only 50 counterparties. Since several banks acted as 
counterparty and creditor vis-à-vis LTCM, financial markets had to worry 
about possible domino effects. Only a US Federal Reserve intervention and 
a liquidity injection initiated by 16 banks avoided a default of LTCM and 
a major crisis of the financial sector; similar actions proved necessary more 
recently in course of the failure of Bear Stearns.
The LTCM case has shown how exposed market participants were to liquidity 
risk within short notice. Since more than 5% of the registered swaps of 
market participants covered by the triennial survey with “other financial 
institutions” were associated with LTCM, the hedge fund cannot be regarded 
as minor player in the market. It can be assumed that the market for OTC 
traded derivatives is an oligopolistic market and pricing does not take place 
in a perfect competition environment. Is an important market player forced 
to sell large amounts of his positions, which exceeds the receptiveness of the 
markets, counterparties - knowing about the necessity to liquidate - will lower 
8 LTCM’s asset under management at the beginning of 1998: $4.8 billion, assets under 
management in September 1998: $ 1.5 billion.163 Derivative Channels
their bids to maximize their profits (at the expense of the liquidating party). 
Already the expectation of a compulsory liquidation can prompt a sell-off 
with dramatically falling prices; the actual liquidation of large positions 
can be executed only at dumping prices under these circumstances (Single 
and Stahl, 2000). The LTCM crisis went along with a flight in save-havens 
and a sell-off of risky positions. Formerly liquid market segments became 
illiquid within short notice and market participants were suddenly exposed to 
unexpected liquidity risk.
Although market risk – the risk that the value of an asset will change when 
market conditions change – is not new for market participants, the LTCM 
case has shown that long standing market conditions can change within short 
notice; more recently markets were again reminded about this fallacy. The 
market-neutral bond-arbitrage strategy of the hedge fund was based on historic 
correlation estimates that turned negative in course of the crisis. The hedge 
fund was suddenly exposed to market risk although market conditions seemed 
stable before. Especially in the derivative market segment misinterpretations 
of future conditions can cause severe problem. Since derivatives allow the 
accumulation of large positions at low costs, unexpected changes of market 
conditions can lead to an accumulation of losses of market participants.
Finally the LTCM crisis also showed the market participants’ exposure to 
credit risk. Since LTCM took large positions with various banks, a default 
of the hedge fund would have transformed the market risk to the various 
counterparties and intensified the crisis through possible domino effects: 
derivatives markets can become a trigger for contagion.
As already discussed market, credit and liquidity risks are neither new nor well 
understood. However the development of derivative markets and the LTCM 
crisis has highlighted that certain risks have to be evaluated differently. Due 
to the off-balance character of derivatives transactions (especially OTC traded 
derivatives), assessments of the creditworthiness of counterparties become 
more difficult. Derivatives’ trading fosters the integration of the financial 
markets and may allow shocks to be transferred to other financial sectors 
more easily at times, while also providing a cushion in regular circumstances. 
Oligopolistic structures in the derivatives segment can encourage the building 
of risk concentrations with possible domino effects, if important market 
participants default. In addition liquidations of large derivative positions can 
overburden the liquidity of the markets. Due to the complexity of derivatives 
risk controlling becomes more important for market participants to allow an 
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popularity of trading strategies that can lead to herding behavior (“crowded 
trades”) of market participants (see Bertuch-Samuels and Störmann, 1995, 
and ECB, 2007b).
The recent “subprime-securitization-crises” has once again shown the 
sensitivity of the markets towards risk.
9 The subprime crisis “started as 
a problem in the lower-quality section of the market for US housing finance. It 
was triggered by a combination of rising borrowing costs and falling housing 
prices, themselves brought on by overbuilding, with rising levels of consumer 
leverage” (JPMorgan, 2008). A long-term trend of rising housing prices and 
loan incentives encouraged (especially higher-risk) borrowers to assume 
mortgages, believing that they would be able to refinance at more favorable 
terms later on. When housing prices started to decrease in 2006  –2007, 
refinancing became more difficult for many borrowers. In the course of 
a rising interest and a decreasing housing price environment many borrowers 
became unable to repay their loans and mortgage lenders were the first that 
have been affected by risk of payment default of their borrowers. In addition 
many mortgage lenders passed the rights to the mortgage payment and the 
default risk via securitization (mortgage-backed securities, collateralized 
debt obligations) to investors, which experienced significant losses when 
the underlying mortgage pools declined or defaulted. Beside a reduction of 
lending activities and the danger of a credit crunch many investors (especially 
banks) had to depreciate their credit portfolios significantly. Similar to the 
LTCM case investors shifted their money in safe haven like the government 
bond sector or kept their money in cash. The market for mortgage-backed 
and asset-backed securities “dried up” and equities and corporate bonds 
faced significant losses. The corporation’s ability to finance trough loans or 
the issuance of bonds was restricted within short notice and central banks 
have been flooding the financial markets with fresh money. Once again 
the subprime crisis has showed that credit, market, and liquidity risk is 
a “permanent companion” of market participants and that transparency about 
the investor’s exposure in securitized loans would have helped to better assess 
certain risks.
In applying the structure-conduct-performance-paradigm (Waterson, 1984), 
we can argue that the emergence of derivatives and related financial 
instruments has altered the structure and conduct of financial markets. 
Derivatives have added both to to the efficiency and volatility of financial 
9  For space considerations, we can only summarize main issues pertaining to derivatives. For 
a more detailed review of the subprime-securitization crises, see e.g. Dell´Ariccia et al (2008), 
Blundell-Wignall (2008), Greenlaw et al (2008), Kregel (2007), Russo (2007) or Wray (2007). 165 Derivative Channels
systems and the real economy and actually appear to fill part of the gap 
that traditional products and participants recently face in explaining the 
fostering of economic development. As derivatives increased the ability of 
the financial sector to spread risk, it also altered its performance. According 
to Rajan (2006) “the increase in the risk bearing capacity of economies, …, 
has led to a range of financial transactions that hitherto were not possible, 
and has created much greater access to finance for firms and households”. We 
have also seen oligopolistic structures in the derivatives sector and financial 
intermediaries that are exposed to huge derivatives amounts, and possible 
triggers for contagion. In discussing the two examples (LTCM, subprime-
securitization) we have highlighted that certain risks (market, liquidity, and 
credit-risk) are not new, but have to evaluated differently. According to Rajan 
(2006) “risk can never be reduced to zero, nor should it be. We should be 
prepared for the low probability but highly costly downturn” (see LTCM and 
the subprime-securitization). Further research could dig deeper into “what 
are the alternatives”, i.e. what if there were no derivatives? What actions 
would market participants (have) to take in the absence of derivative markets, 
would these be less “risky”? This “unobserved alternative” (Mason, 1995) 
could provide an interesting path for further research as would econometric 
approaches to the evaluation of the impact of derivatives to asset management 
and economic development.
5.  Summary and Conclusion
We examined the impact of derivatives markets on asset management and the 
economy through three transmission channels: (1) the volume channel, (2) 
the efficiency channel, and (3) the risk channel. At the outset of our analysis 
was the question, whether the growing importance of derivatives changed the 
financial sectors’ ability to support economic growth and development. After 
all, certain empirical studies with recent data (e.g. Rousseau and Wachtel, 
2006) could not reconfirm the positive finance-growth-nexus typically found 
in the classical studies on older data (e.g. King and Levine, 1993). What has 
happened? Have financial markets become more crisis-prone? Or has the 
advent of derivatives changed the structure and thus conduct and performance 
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In analyzing these questions, we contribute to the literature by (1) introducing 
derivatives within the context of the finance-growth-literature; (2) by applying 
the Merton and Bodie (1995) functional framework to discussing the spheres 
of derivatives influence, (3) by delineating the volume, the efficiency and 
the risk channel, and (4) by providing descriptive and comparative evidence. 
With regard to the impact of derivatives on the finance-growth-nexus, we 
argue that their huge volumes are clear sign that funds are drawn in from the 
real side of the economy, while at the same putting these to more productive 
use within the financial sector via the efficiency channel; given that markets 
are sub-perfect, these flows add a certain dose of risk to financial markets, 
at least at times. The true question, however, is: what is the alternative to 
derivatives?
To sum up in more detail: we find that the exchange traded segment and the 
over-the-counter segment have experienced strong growth rates during the 
period 1998 to 2006. Especially the OTC traded segment faced enormous 
growth rates during the period suggesting that market participants honor the 
unregulated character and the flexibility of this segment. A comparison of 
exchange traded derivatives with bank assets, equities, bonds and the GDP 
in North America shows that the derivatives sector is by far the biggest 
financial sector in North America, amounting to nearly 300% of GDP. Taking 
OTC-traded derivatives into account the size of the derivatives sector exceed 
“traditional” financial sector even more clearly. Compared to market liquidity 
indicators (cash, minimum reserves, broad monetary aggregates) derivatives 
account for more than 8 times the global GDP and represent the majority of 
global liquidity. Given the huge derivative amounts outstanding it seems that 
derivative markets have decoupled from other financial sectors and the real 
economy. 
Interpreting descriptive data shows that certain derivatives sectors have 
become international. Whereas equity-linked derivatives still seem to have 
a national focus, government debt derivatives already decoupled from 
national development and turned into a regional phenomenon in Europe. 
Liquidity became a “critical success factor” and forced derivatives exchanges 
to provide highly liquid government debt derivatives in Europe. OTC-traded 
derivatives have decoupled from national or regional markets long ago and 
represent the most internationalized derivative segment. 
Derivatives have become a common instrument for a broad range of users, 
particularly financial institutions, asset managers and corporations. In allowing 
speculation, arbitrage and hedging, and in making the markets more complete, 167 Summary and Conclusion
derivatives have been identified as useful instrument to foster the efficiency of 
financial markets and economic growth. In allowing the flow of funds and risk 
sharing among national systems with different institutional shapes and sizes 
derivative instruments function as “adapter” for the integration of the markets. 
Especially asset managers regarded derivatives increasingly important for their 
activities and named hedging as by far the most important use of derivatives, 
followed by overlay and cash management strategies. 
Given the size, the concentration, and the oligopolistic structure of the 
derivatives markets, we have highlighted certain risks (market, liquidity, and 
credit-risk) that have to be evaluated differently from market participants. 
As the LTCM case and the subprime-securitization crisis showed, financial 
institutions and asset managers have to draw more attention to risk controlling 
and transparency to better assess certain risks associated with derivatives. Due 
to the fact that derivatives markets are characterized by a huge accumulation 
of assets and a highly concentrated market structure, we should be prepared 
for low probability but highly costly downturns. So stress testing is key for 
asset management and for analyzing counterparty risk. To analyze the impact 
of derivatives on financial market performance, further quantitative analysis 
is necessary, including the alternative of “no derivatives”.168
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